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I feel like security through obscurity is the most prominent example of the Dunning-Kruger effect Where beginners in security wrongly rely on it entirely Then

I feel like security through obscurity is the most prominent example of the Dunning-Kruger effect Where beginners in security wrongly rely on it entirely Then intermediate experts proudly proclaim that it's not acceptable Then expert experts realize it's an excellent part of defense in depth. - I mean I know it's a hyperbolic example in your comment, but do you really think leveraging the obscurity of TempleOS wouldn't be an extremely potent way of dodging 99.99999% of malware in existence? Forcing a tailored attack to breach your isolation is already miles ahead of just running it on your desktop and is most certainly an "acceptable approach", even if it's not infallible.

chrsig 5y ago
There are quite a number of vectors that are activated similarly regardless of large swaths of the implementation. For example: if you're hosting a self made shopping cart versus an open source/commercial product, there's probably a higher risk of being vulnerable to SQL injections. It's conceivable that open source and commercial offerings have been beaten on more and as a result hardened against more attack vectors. Of course to your point, it means that you're not vulnerable to a zero day that impacts many deployments. I imagine the shops that made their own logging library were quite pleased with themselves when the log4j vulnerabilities came out. My point being that it's not a simple calculus, and it's really hard to evaluate the relative risks of one versus the other. It's probably best to look at the cost of implementing and maintaining security through obscurity and using that as a litmus test for if it's reasonable or not. Running something on a non-standard port has a very different cost than making your own operating system.