Instead of using a faraday pouch to prevent this kind of attack, I added a kill switch to my key fob, a few years ago, and still use it: https://www.youtube.com

Instead of using a faraday pouch to prevent this kind of attack, I added a kill switch to my key fob, a few years ago, and still use it: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02M57GPix-4 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=02M57GPix-4 The problem is that manufacturers are using strength of signal to detect keyfob proximity, which is, of course, defeatable with a (somewhat expensive) amplifier. I wonder how hard could it be to measure response latency instead? That should solve the problem. I thought about selling those for a while (and got a few requests), but realized I can't easily design them for the many kinds of key fobs out there. I suppose the manufacturers are not adding them themselves because that would hurt the image of "security" of these key fobs.