3 ms·

I love Pidgin. If I want a secure chat between 2 I will forse my buddy to go XMPP OTR

zaik 5y ago
You should also checkout OMEMO which is based on the Signal protocol and allows things like group chat and sending messages to contacts who are offline.
- eimrine 5y ago
  I have tried Matrix not on my wish but it has not worked. Also I like Tox but it needs processor with hardware cryptography and have not use it a long time.
  - zaik 5y ago
    OMEMO is an XMPP extension: https://omemo.top/ https://omemo.top/
    - spyc 5y ago
      The OMEMO plug-in for Pidgin is named "lurch" and has it's home at https://github.com/gkdr/lurch https://github.com/gkdr/lurch .
pabs3 5y ago
Note that OTRv3 is insecure these days, there is OTRv4 but it isn't ready yet. You are better off using OMEMO with XMPP for now. https://bugs.otr.im/otrv4/otrv4 https://bugs.otr.im/otrv4/otrv4
- upofadown 5y ago
  How exactly is OTRv3 insecure?
  - pabs3 5y ago
    Too small encryption keys, using DH instead of RSA or newer encryption etc
    - upofadown 5y ago
      From Wikipedia: >OTR uses a combination of AES symmetric-key algorithm with 128 bits key length, the Diffie–Hellman key exchange with 1536 bits group size, and the SHA-1 hash function. What specifically is wrong with any of that?
      - syntheticnature 5y ago
        None of those sizes are considered secure these days. AES-128 is the strongest of the bunch, though much more vulnerable to multi-channel attack[0] than AES-256 (and OTR would be a definite place to use that if you have a number of people). It's at the lowest end of suggested symmetric key in the approved NIST document[1] right now. Diffie-Hellman key exchange with 1536 bits is considered to be within nation-state reach, providing only 89 bits of actual security[2]. SHA-1 has been considered insecure since 2005[3], with chosen-prefix attacks now considered practical; if, somehow, the bitcoin network was retargeted to SHA-1 chosen-prefix attacks it would be capable of generating 32 such per second. 0: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/75880/what-is-a-multi-target-attack https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/75880/what-is-a-m... 1: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-5/final https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/r... 2: https://weberblog.net/site-to-site-vpns-with-diffie-hellman-group-14/ https://weberblog.net/site-to-site-vpns-with-diffie-hellman-... 3: https://sha-mbles.github.io/ https://sha-mbles.github.io/
        upofadown 5y ago
        0. What use would a break of a random OTR user's AES-128 be if it took millions of dollars, years and a significant chunk of all the memory that exists? And only a single session key's worth. 1. Does that not mean that NIST considers AES-128 secure? 2. Who exactly thinks that 1536 bit DH is breakable by nation states? The closest I have heard is 1024 bit DH. Note that we are talking messaging here where a break gets you one users messages. 3. Exactly what sort of attack would be possible against OTR using a practical SHA-1 collision?

zaik 5y ago

You should also checkout OMEMO which is based on the Signal protocol and allows things like group chat and sending messages to contacts who are offline.

eimrine 5y ago
I have tried Matrix not on my wish but it has not worked. Also I like Tox but it needs processor with hardware cryptography and have not use it a long time.
- zaik 5y ago
  OMEMO is an XMPP extension: https://omemo.top/ https://omemo.top/
  - spyc 5y ago
    The OMEMO plug-in for Pidgin is named "lurch" and has it's home at https://github.com/gkdr/lurch https://github.com/gkdr/lurch .

pabs3 5y ago

Note that OTRv3 is insecure these days, there is OTRv4 but it isn't ready yet. You are better off using OMEMO with XMPP for now. https://bugs.otr.im/otrv4/otrv4 https://bugs.otr.im/otrv4/otrv4

upofadown 5y ago
How exactly is OTRv3 insecure?
- pabs3 5y ago
  Too small encryption keys, using DH instead of RSA or newer encryption etc
  - upofadown 5y ago
    From Wikipedia: >OTR uses a combination of AES symmetric-key algorithm with 128 bits key length, the Diffie–Hellman key exchange with 1536 bits group size, and the SHA-1 hash function. What specifically is wrong with any of that?
    - syntheticnature 5y ago
      None of those sizes are considered secure these days. AES-128 is the strongest of the bunch, though much more vulnerable to multi-channel attack[0] than AES-256 (and OTR would be a definite place to use that if you have a number of people). It's at the lowest end of suggested symmetric key in the approved NIST document[1] right now. Diffie-Hellman key exchange with 1536 bits is considered to be within nation-state reach, providing only 89 bits of actual security[2]. SHA-1 has been considered insecure since 2005[3], with chosen-prefix attacks now considered practical; if, somehow, the bitcoin network was retargeted to SHA-1 chosen-prefix attacks it would be capable of generating 32 such per second. 0: https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/75880/what-is-a-multi-target-attack https://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/75880/what-is-a-m... 1: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-5/final https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/r... 2: https://weberblog.net/site-to-site-vpns-with-diffie-hellman-group-14/ https://weberblog.net/site-to-site-vpns-with-diffie-hellman-... 3: https://sha-mbles.github.io/ https://sha-mbles.github.io/
      - upofadown 5y ago
        0. What use would a break of a random OTR user's AES-128 be if it took millions of dollars, years and a significant chunk of all the memory that exists? And only a single session key's worth. 1. Does that not mean that NIST considers AES-128 secure? 2. Who exactly thinks that 1536 bit DH is breakable by nation states? The closest I have heard is 1024 bit DH. Note that we are talking messaging here where a break gets you one users messages. 3. Exactly what sort of attack would be possible against OTR using a practical SHA-1 collision?