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How many people feel they get positive value from CT services in general? I have Cloudflare email me whenever my domain gets a cert, and that is a positive val
by freedomben 5y ago
How many people feel they get positive value from CT services in general?
I have Cloudflare email me whenever my domain gets a cert, and that is a positive value for me. However, it is very clear to me that bots are watching these logs (in near real time) because obscure hostnames (sometimes UUIDs) that I set up for a quick test but need a real cert will start getting traffic almost immediately after the cert comes back from Let's Encrypt.
As an attacker, this log is a fantastic tool for service/host discovery, but as a defender I kind of wish I could opt out.
Note: a wildcard cert is a good way to avoid the problem, but I prefer to avoid wildcards if possible.
- decodebytes 5y agoA lot do, but without knowing it. Chrome uses an 'expect-CT' header, which means the sites TLS cert should chain to a root CA, with both stored in a CTL.
- tialaramex 5y agoI don't think that's what your parent post meant, but, Chrome actually mechanically requires CT logging in order to trust a site, the expect-CT header doesn't come into it. Safari has the same policy, and Mozilla intends to some day do likewise in Firefox but the politics of the exact rules are tricky for reasons we could get into if somebody cares. When your Chrome connects to a TLS server, the server has to provide a certificate, and Chrome examines that certificate before any HTTP traffic happens (and thus before you could send an HTTP header like Expect-CT anywhere) unless you've got Group Policy or similar rules saying otherwise: - The certificate must have proof it was logged in the form of SCTs. For most sites the SCTs are baked into the certificate when they got it, they're all that incomprehensible gibberish near the end of your certificate if you've read it. - The certificate must have been issued relatively recently (825 days or less previously) and it must expire within 825 days of issuance or if it was issued since some time in 2020 when Apple's policy change happened, 398 days. - The certificate says it is for TLS Servers (in most cases certificates say they're also for TLS Clients, and sometimes other things too, but Chrome checks it says specifically TLS Servers here) - The certificate has a Subject Alternative Name matching the DNS name of the server, or, if the URL we're resolving is for a numeric IP address, a SAN matches that IP Address. SANs are typed, and are not free human text, so a DNS SAN and an IP address SAN are distinguishable even if 10.20.30.40 was a valid DNS name, which it is not. Old-fashioned "Common" names are disregarded. - The certificate must be signed by a trusted CA (or by an intermediate which in turn was trusted, and so on recursively). I think I hit the big ticket items, there might be some others.
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- tialaramex 5y agoEverybody indirectly gets value from CT because it allows the public to exercise their oversight over the Web PKI more effectively, and thus it acts as a guarantee over the behaviour of the CAs. As a researcher it lets you call "bullshit" easily, many years ago I actually used the logs to show that CAs "missed" (did an inadequate job of identifying and revoking) some certificates they should have revoked months earlier, if you attempted that without logs you'd never be sure how much you missed and you'd have no fixed scope for the work. [[ As to getting hit by bots, keep in mind that passive DNS can cause that too, if anybody (testers, third party services, anybody) does a DNS lookup for name X on most well known public DNS servers, the server operators sell the DNS answer + timestamp (but not who asked so this is not personal information), which you can then buy as a bulk service. So e.g. some-uuid-on-a.server.example gets looked up on an iPhone over somebody's ISP, and within seconds a feed has added some-uuid-on-a.server.example A 10.20.30.40 to the list of known DNS answers. ]] You can use these monitors, (although not specifically the one operated by Google for much longer) or you can build your own. If you build your own you can choose to specialise. Maybe you only care about certificates for names under .horse, or you only care about certificates from for-profit companies, or with RSA keys.
- freedomben 5y agoThanks, the passive DNS is a good point. I hadn't thought about that.