3 ms·

I think they're a smokescreen for some state-sponsored group. LAPSUS$ grabs the headlines, sows chaos, keeps security teams fighting fires. Meanwhile the trul

I think they're a smokescreen for some state-sponsored group. LAPSUS$ grabs the headlines, sows chaos, keeps security teams fighting fires. Meanwhile the truly important attacks proceed with great stealth.

0xy 5y ago
If it's state-sponsored the number of nations is pretty limited. They attacked Brazilian government infrastructure, which rules out Russia, US, Israel and China who all maintain strong Brazilian relations. That doesn't leave very many actors capable or willing to do this. They also use Brazilian slang, which granted could just be disinfo to throw people off.
- Adrox 5y ago
  They also attacked at least a newspaper in Portugal ( expresso.pt) and some government agencies.
- mschuster91 5y ago
  Israeli and the US' secret services doesn't care about allies or strong relations. They do whatever they deem necessary to do their job and both have been caught red-handed multiple times.
- toyg 5y ago
  There are no friends in the spy game; this should have become abundantly clear after the revelations on US tapping the German chancellor as a matter of routine. There might well be something that, say, some US interests want and Brazilian entities are not willing to share. Enter a bit of XXI century spycraft, and everyone is happy. This said, it seems a bit too exposed to be an intelligence op, even as diversion. Even if misdirecting, it is raising alarms and improving the security posture of the affected organisations afterwards, which you typically wouldn't want as a spook. You want to put down invisible roots, to let everyone sleep soundly while you go about your business undetected. To me this looks like an average gang with slightly above-average tech skills, drunk on their own success - with a mindset to "get rich, or die trying".
  - KMag 5y ago
    > There are no friends in the spy game; this should have become abundantly clear after the revelations on US tapping the German chancellor as a matter of routine. Even in the late 1990s, the public learned the FVEY countries had explicit agreements to not spy on each others' governments. Anyone paying attention knew that meant that the US probably considered all non-FVEY governments fair game. Germany might feign surprise, but German counterintelligence knew there was a club, and they weren't in it. In the early 2000s, I was contracted out to write (unclassified) network simulations for a US defense contractor. I was using a library written by a colleague contracted out to a French defense contractor. I found an apparent bug in poorly commented code (treating unexpected error codes as successes). My client instructed me that I could talk to my French colleague over the phone and verify that it really was a bug, but if the colleague asked, I couldn't tell him what the code was being used for (apart from general network simulation). Furthermore, if my colleague asked a second time what the library was being used for, I was to (1) assume he was working for French intelligence,(2) hang up immediately, and (3) report the incident to my client. My French colleague was experienced and smart enough not ask the forbidden question. I was smart enough not to ask him about the purpose for which he originally wrote the library. We both knew the rules. Nobody paying attention is surprised that even close allies routinely spy on each other.

0xy 5y ago

If it's state-sponsored the number of nations is pretty limited. They attacked Brazilian government infrastructure, which rules out Russia, US, Israel and China who all maintain strong Brazilian relations. That doesn't leave very many actors capable or willing to do this. They also use Brazilian slang, which granted could just be disinfo to throw people off.

Adrox 5y ago
They also attacked at least a newspaper in Portugal ( expresso.pt) and some government agencies.
mschuster91 5y ago
Israeli and the US' secret services doesn't care about allies or strong relations. They do whatever they deem necessary to do their job and both have been caught red-handed multiple times.
toyg 5y ago
There are no friends in the spy game; this should have become abundantly clear after the revelations on US tapping the German chancellor as a matter of routine. There might well be something that, say, some US interests want and Brazilian entities are not willing to share. Enter a bit of XXI century spycraft, and everyone is happy. This said, it seems a bit too exposed to be an intelligence op, even as diversion. Even if misdirecting, it is raising alarms and improving the security posture of the affected organisations afterwards, which you typically wouldn't want as a spook. You want to put down invisible roots, to let everyone sleep soundly while you go about your business undetected. To me this looks like an average gang with slightly above-average tech skills, drunk on their own success - with a mindset to "get rich, or die trying".
- KMag 5y ago
  > There are no friends in the spy game; this should have become abundantly clear after the revelations on US tapping the German chancellor as a matter of routine. Even in the late 1990s, the public learned the FVEY countries had explicit agreements to not spy on each others' governments. Anyone paying attention knew that meant that the US probably considered all non-FVEY governments fair game. Germany might feign surprise, but German counterintelligence knew there was a club, and they weren't in it. In the early 2000s, I was contracted out to write (unclassified) network simulations for a US defense contractor. I was using a library written by a colleague contracted out to a French defense contractor. I found an apparent bug in poorly commented code (treating unexpected error codes as successes). My client instructed me that I could talk to my French colleague over the phone and verify that it really was a bug, but if the colleague asked, I couldn't tell him what the code was being used for (apart from general network simulation). Furthermore, if my colleague asked a second time what the library was being used for, I was to (1) assume he was working for French intelligence,(2) hang up immediately, and (3) report the incident to my client. My French colleague was experienced and smart enough not ask the forbidden question. I was smart enough not to ask him about the purpose for which he originally wrote the library. We both knew the rules. Nobody paying attention is surprised that even close allies routinely spy on each other.