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Reply from Lapsus$ on Telegram: I do enjoy the lies given by Okta. 1. We didn't compromise any laptop? It was a thin client. 2. "Okta detected an unsuccessfu
by t0bia_s 5y ago
Reply from Lapsus$ on Telegram:
I do enjoy the lies given by Okta.
1. We didn't compromise any laptop? It was a thin client.
2. "Okta detected an unsuccessful attempt to compromise the account of a customer support engineer working for a third-party provider." -
I'm STILL unsure how its a unsuccessful attempt? Logged in to superuser portal with the ability to reset the Password and MFA of ~95% of clients isn't successful?
4. For a company that supports Zero-Trust. Support Engineers seem to have excessive access to Slack? 8.6k channels? (You may want to search AKIA* on your Slack, rather a bad security practice to store AWS keys in Slack channels )
5. Support engineers are also able to facilitate the resetting of passwords and MFA factors for users, but are unable to obtain those passwords. -
Uhm? I hope no-one can read passwords? not just support engineers, LOL. - are you implying passwords are stored in plaintext?
6. You claim a laptop was compromised? In that case what suspicious IP addresses do you have available to report?
7. The potential impact to Okta customers is NOT limited, I'm pretty certain resetting passwords and MFA would result in complete compromise of many clients systems.
8. If you are committed to transparency how about you hire a firm such as Mandiant and PUBLISH their report? I'm sure it would be very different to your report :)
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https://www.okta.com/sites/default/files/2021-12/okta-security-privacy-documentation.pdf https://www.okta.com/sites/default/files/2021-12/okta-securi...
21. Security Breach Management.
a) Notification: In the event of a Security Breach, Okta notifies impacted customers of such Security Breach. Okta
cooperates with an impacted customer’s reasonable request for information regarding such Security Breach, and Okta
provides regular updates on any such Security Breach and the investigative action and corrective action(s) taken. -
But customers only found out today? Why wait this long?
9. Access Controls. Okta has in place policies, procedures, and logical controls that are designed:
b. Controls to ensure that all Okta personnel who are granted access to any Customer Data are based on leastprivilege principles;
kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
1. Security Standards. Okta’s ISMP includes adherence to and regular testing of the key controls, systems and procedures of
its ISMP to validate that they are properly implemented and effective in addressing the threats and risks identified. Such
testing includes:
a) Internal risk assessments;
b) ISO 27001, 27002, 27017 and 27018 certifications;
c) NIST guidance; and
d) SOC2 Type II (or successor standard) audits annually performed by accredited third-party auditors (“Audit
Report”).
I don't think storing AWS keys within Slack would comply to any of these standards?
- dboreham 5y agoPosting a key in Slack is obviously not good opsec, but whether this is a big problem depends whether those keys allowed access to anything sensitive. They could be keys allowing access to random test data, or public data, etc. They could have been revoked immediately they were posted.
- Closi 5y agoIt does directly/partially contradict their statement though, i.e. > The potential impact to Okta customers is limited to the access that support engineers have Well the implication here is that the support engineer only had some limited set of tasks, but if that Support Engineer also indirectly had access to AWS keys then it suggests that Lapsus could have had broader access than just what the support engineer had direct access to.