I'm not sure the article captures the danger of forward risk well given the argument that Boeing and cost management practices have hijacked the approval proces

I'm not sure the article captures the danger of forward risk well given the argument that Boeing and cost management practices have hijacked the approval process and design strategy, respectively, and the current inventory includes planes recent models with poor track records. In the next few years I think we will see if process failure has been a momentary blip or if this article is viewed as having fallen into the same trap as judging 1960 aviation on averages of entire period of flight instead of on rate of improvement. Put a different way, I wont be estimating the safety of the 787 on the safety of a 737-MAX because most of the systems of the MAX were designed in an earlier Boeing/FAA system that bears little resemblance to the modern Boeing process, yet I am still comfortable flying in a 737-MAX.