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Hence my second suggestion, a separate server akin to what AWS's post offered. Essentially the encryption server will get encrypted data, de-crypt it and then s
by Joakal 15y ago
Hence my second suggestion, a separate server akin to what AWS's post offered. Essentially the encryption server will get encrypted data, de-crypt it and then sends it back to production server (vice versa). It's not public facing, etc. Which means the attacker has to try to compromise the second server that's more locked down.
Or are you saying evil maid attacks can breach the VM they're on?
- lsc 15y agoPretty sure there is no VM involved... there'd be no reason to virtualize your storage nodes. But yeah, you are right that if you kept the keys and did the encryption on the second server, you'd have to do the attack on the second server; but that's really just moving the problem around.