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I generally agree with you that all science should be testable, i.e. it should give us tell us things that we did not know, but can then test. However, I don't

I generally agree with you that all science should be testable, i.e. it should give us tell us things that we did not know, but can then test. However, I don't agree that you can easily extrapolate from that to saying these fields are science and these are not. Psychology, economics etc. do make predictions and many have been tested. To give you one example of predictions in psychology: Pavlov made very clear (and accurate) predictions about what is going to happen to his dog after "training" it. On the other hand there are areas in the "hard science", for example physics that have been going for long time, without making any predictions that are testable. String theory is the canonical example here. So saying only the "hard sciences" are "real sciences" is just repeating the trope that is very popular in engineering cycles (in my experience much less so amongst physicists or chemist). It doesn't make it true. Also it's very difficult to say what you mean by predictions. For example complex systems theory can make accurate predictions about general behavior of a system, but can't predict

carapace 5y ago
It seems like you got cut off there? > I generally agree with you that all science should be testable, i.e. it should give us tell us things that we did not know, but can then test. However, I don't agree that you can easily extrapolate from that to saying these fields are science and these are not. I'm talking about this in the context of the political power of science, or more precisely what gets called "science" and why. Coming out of WWII that power derived largely from the very literal power of the mechanized scientific war machine and its ultimate expression in the atom bomb. Not to repeat myself but E=mc² has nothing to prove, what political power physicists hold derives from the universality of their domain of knowledge. Anyone anywhere can test the formula by testing its predictions. > Psychology, economics etc. do make predictions and many have been tested. Not to the degree that we can rely on them for large-scale policy decisions, though? I mean the guy who runs the Federal Reserve is on record saying he doesn't know what he's doing, eh? In re: Pavlov, I don't know how to respond. Behaviorism as an example of successful scientific psychology seems... I dunno... counterproductive? > String theory is the canonical example here. String theory isn't science. String theorists should be embarrassed to call what they do "physics" and they should admit that they're actually mathematicians. There's no shame in that, is there? Anhow, to get back to my main point, I don't really have a problem with people wanting to call what they do "science" until we get to the point when they want to wield political power. To caricature what I mean: I don't think it's valid to say "I'm a scientist therefore believe me." if you can't make solid dependable predictions about it (whatever it is that you're trying to get people to believe.) If you're able to say, truthfully, "I can make predictions that you can rely on, and I can also teach you how to make the same predictions using the same data and methods so you don't have to take my word for it." then not only is that proper science (in my view) but it's also unimpeachable in the realm of political power.
- derbOac 5y ago
  > if you can't make solid dependable predictions about it (whatever it is that you're trying to get people to believe.) If you're able to say, truthfully, "I can make predictions that you can rely on..." This very much seems like you're confusing stochastic or systemic uncertainty in a domain (which might be the same thing, information-theoretically) with uncertainty due to the representations or models of a field. There's limits to the predictability of all phenomena. That doesn't mean there isn't some predictability, or that it's not worth achieving those limits.
  - carapace 5y ago
    > This very much seems like you're confusing stochastic or systemic uncertainty in a domain (which might be the same thing, information-theoretically) with uncertainty due to the representations or models of a field. I don't fully understand that sentence, but you're speaking my language. > There's limits to the predictability of all phenomena. That doesn't mean there isn't some predictability, or that it's not worth achieving those limits. Oh absolutely! I'm not arguing against gaining knowledge. I'm saying that we should reserve the name "science" for when those limits are well-established, when the predictions can be used reliably. Really, it doesn't matter so much what you call it up until the point when you're trying to sway public opinion or policy. The political power of science flows from its power of prediction and the universality and impartiality of its knowledge.
- pjc50 5y ago
  > Not to the degree that we can rely on them for large-scale policy decisions, though? I mean the guy who runs the Federal Reserve is on record saying he doesn't know what he's doing, eh? Who are you talking about and what did they actually say? Inflation rate targeting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation_targeting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation_targeting has been a huge success for classical economics. Various countries announced they were going to use it to control inflation and have managed to keep it in 2%ish bands over the past 30 years. However, it's not a complete control system and it's still vulnerable to fiscal and exogenous shocks like "a pandemic" and "a war with one of the major fossil fuel producers of the world".

carapace 5y ago

It seems like you got cut off there? > I generally agree with you that all science should be testable, i.e. it should give us tell us things that we did not know, but can then test. However, I don't agree that you can easily extrapolate from that to saying these fields are science and these are not. I'm talking about this in the context of the political power of science, or more precisely what gets called "science" and why. Coming out of WWII that power derived largely from the very literal power of the mechanized scientific war machine and its ultimate expression in the atom bomb. Not to repeat myself but E=mc² has nothing to prove, what political power physicists hold derives from the universality of their domain of knowledge. Anyone anywhere can test the formula by testing its predictions. > Psychology, economics etc. do make predictions and many have been tested. Not to the degree that we can rely on them for large-scale policy decisions, though? I mean the guy who runs the Federal Reserve is on record saying he doesn't know what he's doing, eh? In re: Pavlov, I don't know how to respond. Behaviorism as an example of successful scientific psychology seems... I dunno... counterproductive? > String theory is the canonical example here. String theory isn't science. String theorists should be embarrassed to call what they do "physics" and they should admit that they're actually mathematicians. There's no shame in that, is there? Anhow, to get back to my main point, I don't really have a problem with people wanting to call what they do "science" until we get to the point when they want to wield political power. To caricature what I mean: I don't think it's valid to say "I'm a scientist therefore believe me." if you can't make solid dependable predictions about it (whatever it is that you're trying to get people to believe.) If you're able to say, truthfully, "I can make predictions that you can rely on, and I can also teach you how to make the same predictions using the same data and methods so you don't have to take my word for it." then not only is that proper science (in my view) but it's also unimpeachable in the realm of political power.

derbOac 5y ago
> if you can't make solid dependable predictions about it (whatever it is that you're trying to get people to believe.) If you're able to say, truthfully, "I can make predictions that you can rely on..." This very much seems like you're confusing stochastic or systemic uncertainty in a domain (which might be the same thing, information-theoretically) with uncertainty due to the representations or models of a field. There's limits to the predictability of all phenomena. That doesn't mean there isn't some predictability, or that it's not worth achieving those limits.
- carapace 5y ago
  > This very much seems like you're confusing stochastic or systemic uncertainty in a domain (which might be the same thing, information-theoretically) with uncertainty due to the representations or models of a field. I don't fully understand that sentence, but you're speaking my language. > There's limits to the predictability of all phenomena. That doesn't mean there isn't some predictability, or that it's not worth achieving those limits. Oh absolutely! I'm not arguing against gaining knowledge. I'm saying that we should reserve the name "science" for when those limits are well-established, when the predictions can be used reliably. Really, it doesn't matter so much what you call it up until the point when you're trying to sway public opinion or policy. The political power of science flows from its power of prediction and the universality and impartiality of its knowledge.
pjc50 5y ago
> Not to the degree that we can rely on them for large-scale policy decisions, though? I mean the guy who runs the Federal Reserve is on record saying he doesn't know what he's doing, eh? Who are you talking about and what did they actually say? Inflation rate targeting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation_targeting https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inflation_targeting has been a huge success for classical economics. Various countries announced they were going to use it to control inflation and have managed to keep it in 2%ish bands over the past 30 years. However, it's not a complete control system and it's still vulnerable to fiscal and exogenous shocks like "a pandemic" and "a war with one of the major fossil fuel producers of the world".