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Just last week I saw Daniel Dennet get asked by an interviewer whether he had a dog, and what it might like to be his dog, with the implication that Dennet's ta

Just last week I saw Daniel Dennet get asked by an interviewer whether he had a dog, and what it might like to be his dog, with the implication that Dennet's takes on animal consciousness tend to diminish the relevance of a dogs thoughts or emotions as lacking meaningful sapience and self awareness because of their lack of a complex verbalized langage. He said he has had dogs, but is mostly allergic, and has a robot dog of some sort now, which I thought was a complete dodge of the question, and even later in the interview, it was as though he hadn't really thought his language model of self and consciousness though. He's got a new book out, which I should probably read as he's likely more of a writer than an interview, but I heckled my screen most of the way though anyway. If this study has more details, it would be interesting to see what consequences it has for other theories of mind.

legalcorrection 5y ago
This is a guy who wrote a whole book trying to deny that subjective experience even exists. Are you surprised that he's obtuse?
- spindle 5y ago
  In my opinion that one view of his is obtuse, and TBH I'm happy that you agree with me about that, but he has many other views and overall he's extremely smart (according to me, and according to almost all philosophers). Perhaps sadly, obtuse ideas are not limited to obtuse people.
- IIAOPSW 5y ago
  The guy wrote a whole book arguing why subjective experience doesn't exist. You wrote a whole sentence asserting subjective experience does exist.
  - legalcorrection 5y ago
    Insisting subjective experience isn’t real is like pissing on someone’s leg and telling them it’s raining. Seriously, if you read the book, you realize his main angle of attack is (intentionally?) substituting a different definition of consciousness. The position he is arguing against is the existence of qualia/subjective experience, but the book is mostly about showing that we overestimate our capacity for higher order cognitive synthesis of sensory input. In new editions/epilogue/? (it’s been a while), he finally does address the hard problem (though doesn’t admit that his whole book misses the point), and just makes a few dismissive points.
    - IIAOPSW 5y ago
      When you say "substituting a different definition of consciousness", exactly what definition of consciousness was there in the first place such that one could usurp that throne? What exactly is "subjective experience" and "qualia". For a moment lets go with the banal wikipedia example: "The 'redness' of red is a commonly used example of a quale" (followed by a graphic that is entirely just red pixels). When I take a picture with my phone, does the phone not experience "redness"? If so then consciousness and machine consciousness are trivial and we are done. If not then the "quale" of redness must involve some sort of processing which happens along the path from the eye to wherever-the-train-of-thought-lives. So suppose I write an app such that when I point my phone at something it either prints the words "that's red" or "that's not red". Is my phone experiencing the quale of red yet? How sophisticated must the processing get before my phone has subjective experience? Thus we arrive at my real gripe and why I'm inclined to agree with Dennet. The entirety of the conversation around "subjective experience" and "qualia" seems to be a word game designed to rig the definition of consciousness so that machines can't have it. We could get all the way to a Turing-test-passing AI having this very conversation with you, and some people would still reject my consciousness and call me "a p-zombie without real qualia or subjective experience". It comes off as being in denial about materialism out of an egotistical need to believe ones consciousness is somehow better than computation, and that ones atoms are somehow more special than the atoms in my phone. Give a definition of qualia/subjective experience which isn't just "cognitive synthesis of sensory input" and also isn't contorted such that only humans could have it.
      - legalcorrection 5y ago
        That's part of the trouble with subjective experience. It's not fully reducible to objective explanation. If it was, it would not be subjective experience. But it is such a central part of the human experience—it is experience itself—that when you nonetheless do your best to evoke it with language, reasonable people without philosophical agendas (e.g. the defense of a materialism, or relatedly, the absence of true mystery in the world) all know what you're talking about. I would be surprised if anyone who is not studied in the area would dispute the existence of phenomenal consciousness upon a quick explanation of what they are alleged to be. I imagine they would think there's something wrong with someone who did dispute it. Only an intelligent person well-studied in the area, understanding the implications of the problem, could manage to convince themselves of something so utterly ridiculous.
spindle 5y ago
You'll be pleased to hear that I've heard John Searle mention his (Searle's) dog as evidence in an argument with Dennett.
- motohagiography 5y ago
  This laugh made my morning, thank you. That would have been a pleasure to watch. I in fact agree with Dennet's self-as-effect of language comments if I've interpreted them correctly, but I think it's a small part, and he was even emphasizing physical competence as a way to interpret and develop it, but doesn't appear to want to take the leap into more interesting but maybe dangerous territory. Perhaps he dodged it because he thought the question about his dog seemed a bit searly.
  - spindle 5y ago
    It was a pleasure to watch, and made me very fond of Searle, who clearly loved his dog (even though I disagree with him - Searle, not his dog - about lots of things too ... but, you know, all philosophers disagree with all other philososphers about lots of things). > seemed a bit searly. Good pun but also nail on head. He must be so very bored of the main arguments against his most famous position. In my opinion those main arguments are right but in terms of Dennett's boredom that's not even relevant.

legalcorrection 5y ago

This is a guy who wrote a whole book trying to deny that subjective experience even exists. Are you surprised that he's obtuse?

spindle 5y ago
In my opinion that one view of his is obtuse, and TBH I'm happy that you agree with me about that, but he has many other views and overall he's extremely smart (according to me, and according to almost all philosophers). Perhaps sadly, obtuse ideas are not limited to obtuse people.
IIAOPSW 5y ago
The guy wrote a whole book arguing why subjective experience doesn't exist. You wrote a whole sentence asserting subjective experience does exist.
- legalcorrection 5y ago
  Insisting subjective experience isn’t real is like pissing on someone’s leg and telling them it’s raining. Seriously, if you read the book, you realize his main angle of attack is (intentionally?) substituting a different definition of consciousness. The position he is arguing against is the existence of qualia/subjective experience, but the book is mostly about showing that we overestimate our capacity for higher order cognitive synthesis of sensory input. In new editions/epilogue/? (it’s been a while), he finally does address the hard problem (though doesn’t admit that his whole book misses the point), and just makes a few dismissive points.
  - IIAOPSW 5y ago
    When you say "substituting a different definition of consciousness", exactly what definition of consciousness was there in the first place such that one could usurp that throne? What exactly is "subjective experience" and "qualia". For a moment lets go with the banal wikipedia example: "The 'redness' of red is a commonly used example of a quale" (followed by a graphic that is entirely just red pixels). When I take a picture with my phone, does the phone not experience "redness"? If so then consciousness and machine consciousness are trivial and we are done. If not then the "quale" of redness must involve some sort of processing which happens along the path from the eye to wherever-the-train-of-thought-lives. So suppose I write an app such that when I point my phone at something it either prints the words "that's red" or "that's not red". Is my phone experiencing the quale of red yet? How sophisticated must the processing get before my phone has subjective experience? Thus we arrive at my real gripe and why I'm inclined to agree with Dennet. The entirety of the conversation around "subjective experience" and "qualia" seems to be a word game designed to rig the definition of consciousness so that machines can't have it. We could get all the way to a Turing-test-passing AI having this very conversation with you, and some people would still reject my consciousness and call me "a p-zombie without real qualia or subjective experience". It comes off as being in denial about materialism out of an egotistical need to believe ones consciousness is somehow better than computation, and that ones atoms are somehow more special than the atoms in my phone. Give a definition of qualia/subjective experience which isn't just "cognitive synthesis of sensory input" and also isn't contorted such that only humans could have it.
    - legalcorrection 5y ago
      That's part of the trouble with subjective experience. It's not fully reducible to objective explanation. If it was, it would not be subjective experience. But it is such a central part of the human experience—it is experience itself—that when you nonetheless do your best to evoke it with language, reasonable people without philosophical agendas (e.g. the defense of a materialism, or relatedly, the absence of true mystery in the world) all know what you're talking about. I would be surprised if anyone who is not studied in the area would dispute the existence of phenomenal consciousness upon a quick explanation of what they are alleged to be. I imagine they would think there's something wrong with someone who did dispute it. Only an intelligent person well-studied in the area, understanding the implications of the problem, could manage to convince themselves of something so utterly ridiculous.

spindle 5y ago

You'll be pleased to hear that I've heard John Searle mention his (Searle's) dog as evidence in an argument with Dennett.

motohagiography 5y ago
This laugh made my morning, thank you. That would have been a pleasure to watch. I in fact agree with Dennet's self-as-effect of language comments if I've interpreted them correctly, but I think it's a small part, and he was even emphasizing physical competence as a way to interpret and develop it, but doesn't appear to want to take the leap into more interesting but maybe dangerous territory. Perhaps he dodged it because he thought the question about his dog seemed a bit searly.
- spindle 5y ago
  It was a pleasure to watch, and made me very fond of Searle, who clearly loved his dog (even though I disagree with him - Searle, not his dog - about lots of things too ... but, you know, all philosophers disagree with all other philososphers about lots of things). > seemed a bit searly. Good pun but also nail on head. He must be so very bored of the main arguments against his most famous position. In my opinion those main arguments are right but in terms of Dennett's boredom that's not even relevant.