4 ms·

This attack would completely fall flat if you were using something that was posted here a couple days ago: https://hotdoglinux.com/ https://hotdoglinux.com/ Th

This attack would completely fall flat if you were using something that was posted here a couple days ago: https://hotdoglinux.com/ https://hotdoglinux.com/ The fake popup would be the only window that doesn't look like an Atari ST. :D

metadat 5y ago
Yes, as long as HotDogL doesn't leak the OS variant via the User-Agent string, JavaScript fingerprinting, or TCP fingerprinting. I believe CloudFlare has already developed and explored all of these paths, obviously to great effect. This means replication of what CF has done is only a matter of pouring resources into it, surely many others have also completed bits and pieces or maybe even superior top-secret proprietary technology. What's that Ultra-privacy oriented Linux distro which is TOR-centric, with a locked-down-by-default browser config? That beast might be your best bet.
- smaudet 5y ago
  It's actually not about the browser config, its all about the graphics - this reminds me in firefox you could customize the UI easily with an overlay image. That would defeat this attack, assuming it was random/undetectable. Maybe time to go the other way and never lock down the config... Or just disable anything resembling a box in the browser, make html strictly hyper text media again, no programming or js.
  - metadat 5y ago
    I love this idea, wish this was a standard feature implemented in many of my applications and operating systems. Also.. setting a custom UI background image sounds like browser configuration to me :p Seriously though, the difference with and genius in your idea is essentially applying the "Send my bank a custom secret they then present to me so I know if I'm really speaking with them", except with new twists in: 1. Know if a window belongs to my FF client / OS / whatever needs securing. 2. The absence of further concerns about what OS details get inevitably leaked, at least for protecting against this one class of threat.
- schoen 5y ago
  > What's that Ultra-privacy oriented Linux distro which is TOR-centric, with a locked-down-by-default browser config? That beast might be your best bet. You're probably thinking of TAILS.
  - segfaultbuserr 5y ago
    Even better, QubesOS with a Whonix template. QubesOS never allows true full screen mode to prevent spoofing attacks, the titlebar and taskbar are always visible. It also forces all windows to display a colored border, the color represents the application's security domain. A window in an untrusted VM cannot pretend to be a trusted VM window. A spoofed browser screen won't show the correct titlebar and (user-defined) color. But what makes this attack frightening is that even such kind of extreme measures only provide limited protections. Spoofing is still possible, you can bet on the default theme with a red border - this is the default for untrusted, disposable VM. I'd say I would totally fall for this. The only thing that makes it somewhat safe is the impossibility to detect QubesOS reliably. Some heuristics exist: you can detect CPU cores, a low number indicates a potential VM. You can also detect the GPU model, a LLVM software renderer or disabled WebGL is a strong indication of VM or Tor Browser. But none is reliable.

metadat 5y ago

Yes, as long as HotDogL doesn't leak the OS variant via the User-Agent string, JavaScript fingerprinting, or TCP fingerprinting. I believe CloudFlare has already developed and explored all of these paths, obviously to great effect. This means replication of what CF has done is only a matter of pouring resources into it, surely many others have also completed bits and pieces or maybe even superior top-secret proprietary technology. What's that Ultra-privacy oriented Linux distro which is TOR-centric, with a locked-down-by-default browser config? That beast might be your best bet.

smaudet 5y ago
It's actually not about the browser config, its all about the graphics - this reminds me in firefox you could customize the UI easily with an overlay image. That would defeat this attack, assuming it was random/undetectable. Maybe time to go the other way and never lock down the config... Or just disable anything resembling a box in the browser, make html strictly hyper text media again, no programming or js.
- metadat 5y ago
  I love this idea, wish this was a standard feature implemented in many of my applications and operating systems. Also.. setting a custom UI background image sounds like browser configuration to me :p Seriously though, the difference with and genius in your idea is essentially applying the "Send my bank a custom secret they then present to me so I know if I'm really speaking with them", except with new twists in: 1. Know if a window belongs to my FF client / OS / whatever needs securing. 2. The absence of further concerns about what OS details get inevitably leaked, at least for protecting against this one class of threat.
schoen 5y ago
> What's that Ultra-privacy oriented Linux distro which is TOR-centric, with a locked-down-by-default browser config? That beast might be your best bet. You're probably thinking of TAILS.
- segfaultbuserr 5y ago
  Even better, QubesOS with a Whonix template. QubesOS never allows true full screen mode to prevent spoofing attacks, the titlebar and taskbar are always visible. It also forces all windows to display a colored border, the color represents the application's security domain. A window in an untrusted VM cannot pretend to be a trusted VM window. A spoofed browser screen won't show the correct titlebar and (user-defined) color. But what makes this attack frightening is that even such kind of extreme measures only provide limited protections. Spoofing is still possible, you can bet on the default theme with a red border - this is the default for untrusted, disposable VM. I'd say I would totally fall for this. The only thing that makes it somewhat safe is the impossibility to detect QubesOS reliably. Some heuristics exist: you can detect CPU cores, a low number indicates a potential VM. You can also detect the GPU model, a LLVM software renderer or disabled WebGL is a strong indication of VM or Tor Browser. But none is reliable.