4 ms·

Yes, but I don't live in the EU and they aren't funded by my taxes.

oh_sigh 5y ago
My point was that the EU commission has a much better reputation than the American one for actually caring about anticompetitive behavior, and even they said that Amazon can buy MGM unconditionally.
- mardifoufs 5y ago
  I'm not sure that's true. While they have been very good at using antitrust as a leverage for trade disputes... they have been more or less toothless against european conglomerates. They seem to care a lot less about the type of anti competitive behavior that (partly or fully) state owned corporations and large conglomerates would be more likely to indulge in. >One complaint of industrial policy in European antitrust came from no less than the then President of the United States. President Obama suggested that some European antitrust enforcement targeting U.S. tech companies might be essentially an element of European industrial policy. President Obama explained in an interview with Kara Swisher: “We have owned the Internet. Our companies have created it, expanded it, perfected it, in ways [that inefficient European competitors] can’t compete [with]. And often- times what is portrayed as high-minded positions on issues sometimes is designed to carve out their commercial interests.”59 [...] >They note that the European case law more readily accepts refusals to supply and refusals to deal than U.S. case law (although the duty is not broad). Something Gifford and Kudrle fail to mention, however, is that, importantly, in addition to the limits on the European case law, the Guidance Paper also shows deep reluctance to create blanket obligations for rivals. The context for refusals to deal is different in Europe where, unlike the United States, there is a history of state-owned enterprises. In what is per- haps still the leading economic policy book of European competition law, the most recent former chief economist of DG Competition, in his prior academic writing, also shows great reluctance to undertake an aggressive ap- proach with regard to refusals to deal. Source: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1819&context=facultypub https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=... The reason we hear more about their enforcement actions is because big tech is mostly American. The US also has a much less arbitrary and more transparent process, where the main focus is economical costs to the customer is the main concern. Not so much for for the black box that is the european DG. I'm not saying that's a bad thing, europe has no reason to want itself dominated by big American tech corporations. But I think some perspective is needed, and I think the paper I linked shows the pros and cons of both approaches pretty well.

My point was that the EU commission has a much better reputation than the American one for actually caring about anticompetitive behavior, and even they said that Amazon can buy MGM unconditionally.

mardifoufs 5y ago
I'm not sure that's true. While they have been very good at using antitrust as a leverage for trade disputes... they have been more or less toothless against european conglomerates. They seem to care a lot less about the type of anti competitive behavior that (partly or fully) state owned corporations and large conglomerates would be more likely to indulge in. >One complaint of industrial policy in European antitrust came from no less than the then President of the United States. President Obama suggested that some European antitrust enforcement targeting U.S. tech companies might be essentially an element of European industrial policy. President Obama explained in an interview with Kara Swisher: “We have owned the Internet. Our companies have created it, expanded it, perfected it, in ways [that inefficient European competitors] can’t compete [with]. And often- times what is portrayed as high-minded positions on issues sometimes is designed to carve out their commercial interests.”59 [...] >They note that the European case law more readily accepts refusals to supply and refusals to deal than U.S. case law (although the duty is not broad). Something Gifford and Kudrle fail to mention, however, is that, importantly, in addition to the limits on the European case law, the Guidance Paper also shows deep reluctance to create blanket obligations for rivals. The context for refusals to deal is different in Europe where, unlike the United States, there is a history of state-owned enterprises. In what is per- haps still the leading economic policy book of European competition law, the most recent former chief economist of DG Competition, in his prior academic writing, also shows great reluctance to undertake an aggressive ap- proach with regard to refusals to deal. Source: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1819&context=facultypub https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=... The reason we hear more about their enforcement actions is because big tech is mostly American. The US also has a much less arbitrary and more transparent process, where the main focus is economical costs to the customer is the main concern. Not so much for for the black box that is the european DG. I'm not saying that's a bad thing, europe has no reason to want itself dominated by big American tech corporations. But I think some perspective is needed, and I think the paper I linked shows the pros and cons of both approaches pretty well.