Regretfully too optimistic. 1) I can see the Russians being bogged down indefinitely, but outright defeat in the manner Fukuyama suggests requires either a cou

Regretfully too optimistic. 1) I can see the Russians being bogged down indefinitely, but outright defeat in the manner Fukuyama suggests requires either a counteroffensive or mass mutiny. Ukrainian forces have proven they could defend and execute ambushes, but there haven't been many successful counterattacks, and no large scale counterattacks - and I guess they are right not to try. If the Ukrainians get the timing wrong and Russians aren't entirely out of ammo, they get cut down by Russian artillery, which is one thing the Russians seem to have an endless supply of. 2) Strategic counterattack requires heavy weapons, the weapons Fukuyama suggests not giving Ukraine with a very silly reason ('narratives' are less important than giving weapons the Ukrainians need). I suspect he lets his feelings towards the current US administration get in the way - Ukrainian generals are better suited to know what they need and we should listen. 3) There will be no effect on the fortunes of populists all over the world. The reasons that led to their original success are local and still exist. Also frankly the record of non-populist politicians regarding Putin is less than stellar. For example, if history went a bit differently and the US did not pressure France, Putin would be attacking using Mistral ships sold by France.