4 ms·

Bug 1758773: MITM in Russia

51 points by lalaland1125 5y ago

politelemon 5y ago
In the comment's zip attachment you can have a look at the certificate. Subject Name C (Country): RU O (Organisation): The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications CN (Common Name): Russian Trusted Root CA Issuer Name C (Country): RU O (Organisation): The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications CN (Common Name): Russian Trusted Root CA Issued Certificate Version: 3 Serial Number: 10 00 Not Valid Before: 2022-03-01 Not Valid After: 2032-02-27 Certificate Fingerprints SHA1: 8F F9 15 CC AB 7B C1 6F 8C 5C 80 99 D5 3E 0E 11 5B 3A EC 2F MD5: 7F BB 1F BB D1 29 47 E7 28 DC BF A4 56 8C 64 CD
- xblau 5y ago
  Also available on crt.sh: https://crt.sh/?id=6316640888 https://crt.sh/?id=6316640888 (from comment #7)
tragictrash 5y ago
I hate to say it, but here it is: that's a feature not a bug.
- hulitu 5y ago
  Don't tell them. They still believe that if they use TLS and some {google, microsoft, cloudfare, etc} cert they are safe.
riedel 5y ago
Seemingly they did not prepare early enough like the French [1] at the time. IMHO the whole cert trust chain is broken. Is there actually a services that serves cert fingerprints seen from another place in the world that can help detect a MITM? [1] https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2013-117/ https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2013-1...
- toomuchtodo 5y ago
  https://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/ https://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/
  - ThePowerOfFuet 5y ago
    >Last updated: Thursday, 26. July 2018 03:21 PDT
    - toomuchtodo 5y ago
      Shucks, all the good tooling dies young.
nikonyrh 5y ago
How is this a bug in Mozilla? This seems to be about some email the Russian government has sent, and CA certificates. If the certificate is being misused, I think it should be revoked by the authority who approved it.
- duskwuff 5y ago
  > If the certificate is being misused, I think it should be revoked by the authority who approved it. That's the problem. There is no "authority who approved it", beyond the Russian government agency that created the certificate. The certificate is self-signed, and users are being asked to install it manually.
- randomhodler84 5y ago
  This is a root ca that can issue as many unauthorized certs as they wish. It is critical that this thing is added to every other explicitly untrusted list in all OSes and Browsers, to protect millions of innocent internet users.
supergirl 5y ago
what's the bug? that Mozilla should ban this certificate so the West can successfully disrupt Russia's internet?
- randomhodler84 5y ago
  No, so the Russian government cannot intercept every https (TLS) connection out of the country. With this they could attack every user on ruNET and capture every password, every email, every message… it is critical that it be blocked for the safety of the internet.
  - 0ldskool 5y ago
    Centralized trust is the mechanism used by the current version of the web. It is a broken system by design. Who says I can trust verisign or any other CA. Russia creating their own CA and asking it to be installed just emphasize how broken the current mechanisms are. Its not new, its always been broken.
    - randomhodler84 5y ago
      It’s a lot more complex than you may realize. We have a transparency solution known as Certificate Transparency. For a “verisign” issued cert to be trusted in the browser, there must be an append only record of the cert stored in a blockchain. If Russia overrides a local trusted root, all bets are off an CTlog is not used. You can trust the CA because malicious issuance is a death sentence. And we have logs for all eternity.
      - 0ldskool 5y ago
        Hmm I had never heard of Certificate Transparency, looks like its a relatively newish tech added onto how SSL/TLS certs work. It seems only Google Chrome & Safari require SCT chains (not used by Firefox). Maybe I've never heard of it because I'm a Firefox user? You mentioned blockchain, does that mean there is a public blockchain for these Certs? I didn't see that mentioned anywhere but it does seem like blockchain features overlap with the desired features of "Certificate Transparency".

51 points by lalaland1125 5y ago

In the comment's zip attachment you can have a look at the certificate. Subject Name C (Country): RU O (Organisation): The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications CN (Common Name): Russian Trusted Root CA Issuer Name C (Country): RU O (Organisation): The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications CN (Common Name): Russian Trusted Root CA Issued Certificate Version: 3 Serial Number: 10 00 Not Valid Before: 2022-03-01 Not Valid After: 2032-02-27 Certificate Fingerprints SHA1: 8F F9 15 CC AB 7B C1 6F 8C 5C 80 99 D5 3E 0E 11 5B 3A EC 2F MD5: 7F BB 1F BB D1 29 47 E7 28 DC BF A4 56 8C 64 CD

xblau 5y ago
Also available on crt.sh: https://crt.sh/?id=6316640888 https://crt.sh/?id=6316640888 (from comment #7)

tragictrash 5y ago

I hate to say it, but here it is: that's a feature not a bug.

hulitu 5y ago
Don't tell them. They still believe that if they use TLS and some {google, microsoft, cloudfare, etc} cert they are safe.

riedel 5y ago

Seemingly they did not prepare early enough like the French [1] at the time. IMHO the whole cert trust chain is broken. Is there actually a services that serves cert fingerprints seen from another place in the world that can help detect a MITM? [1] https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2013-117/ https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2013-1...

toomuchtodo 5y ago
https://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/ https://notary.icsi.berkeley.edu/
- ThePowerOfFuet 5y ago
  >Last updated: Thursday, 26. July 2018 03:21 PDT
  - toomuchtodo 5y ago
    Shucks, all the good tooling dies young.

nikonyrh 5y ago

How is this a bug in Mozilla? This seems to be about some email the Russian government has sent, and CA certificates. If the certificate is being misused, I think it should be revoked by the authority who approved it.

duskwuff 5y ago
> If the certificate is being misused, I think it should be revoked by the authority who approved it. That's the problem. There is no "authority who approved it", beyond the Russian government agency that created the certificate. The certificate is self-signed, and users are being asked to install it manually.
randomhodler84 5y ago
This is a root ca that can issue as many unauthorized certs as they wish. It is critical that this thing is added to every other explicitly untrusted list in all OSes and Browsers, to protect millions of innocent internet users.

supergirl 5y ago

what's the bug? that Mozilla should ban this certificate so the West can successfully disrupt Russia's internet?

randomhodler84 5y ago
No, so the Russian government cannot intercept every https (TLS) connection out of the country. With this they could attack every user on ruNET and capture every password, every email, every message… it is critical that it be blocked for the safety of the internet.
- 0ldskool 5y ago
  Centralized trust is the mechanism used by the current version of the web. It is a broken system by design. Who says I can trust verisign or any other CA. Russia creating their own CA and asking it to be installed just emphasize how broken the current mechanisms are. Its not new, its always been broken.
  - randomhodler84 5y ago
    It’s a lot more complex than you may realize. We have a transparency solution known as Certificate Transparency. For a “verisign” issued cert to be trusted in the browser, there must be an append only record of the cert stored in a blockchain. If Russia overrides a local trusted root, all bets are off an CTlog is not used. You can trust the CA because malicious issuance is a death sentence. And we have logs for all eternity.
    - 0ldskool 5y ago
      Hmm I had never heard of Certificate Transparency, looks like its a relatively newish tech added onto how SSL/TLS certs work. It seems only Google Chrome & Safari require SCT chains (not used by Firefox). Maybe I've never heard of it because I'm a Firefox user? You mentioned blockchain, does that mean there is a public blockchain for these Certs? I didn't see that mentioned anywhere but it does seem like blockchain features overlap with the desired features of "Certificate Transparency".