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> I'm not clear from the article how having an onion address helps website operators who receive abusive traffic through Tor. No, it's not clear. Also "abusi
by nonrandomstring 5y ago
> I'm not clear from the article how having an onion address helps
website operators who receive abusive traffic through Tor.
No, it's not clear. Also "abusive traffic" is vague. Are you mainly
concerned with shitposters, trolls, DOS attacks?
> What am I missing?
Maybe you're not missing it, but essentially it's a behavioural/social
rather than technical challenge. Most abusers, ones that technical
changes can address, operate at scale over HTTP/S and use Tor simply
as a free VPN via regular exit nodes to hide their IP. The author
calls this the "Wheat/chaff problem". Viewed this way, it's easiest
for a site owner to just block all of Tor and kill all legitimate users
too.
Most of those bulk abusers cannot be bothered to deal with marginal
cases like using an overlay network with .onion addresses whereas
those who _need_ Tor are highly motivated.
Other kinds of abusers, like persistent troll posters, are better
dealt with by other means even if you're using HTTP/S.
- mst 5y agoBack when I was staff on (pre-madness) freenode providing an onion address was pretty much the only way we could afford to support tor at all given the moderation resources available. Smaller networks often (usually regretfully) end up blocking tor entirely if they don't have the capacity to set up such infrastructure.
- tempestn 5y agoSo you'd offer an onion address, but then block Tor traffic that didn't use it?
- mst 5y agoThat's how we did it and so far as I'm aware is the most common answer to "How do we keep Tor while keeping the abuse mitigation efforts required within the resources available?" for services in general.