A few thoughts: 1. It is bad form for this sort of thing to be aired publicly. It may give us a voyeuristic fascination on something that is depicted as an int

A few thoughts: 1. It is bad form for this sort of thing to be aired publicly. It may give us a voyeuristic fascination on something that is depicted as an internal intrigue within a prominent up-and-coming startup but this is fundamentally company confidential information that is not capable of being aired publicly without significant distortion. Who can answer the implied charges of impropriety? Those most directly affected by whatever is happening can’t do so without violating duties of confidentiality. Yet what are they supposed to do? Sit by while people now start making invidious comparisons of their activities with, say, the increasingly notorious Groupon venture? Come out and declare "I am not a crook"? Start attacking the author of the email, who may have intended it as a confidential communication and not even have had a role in its being leaked? Or start to spread over the public record all sorts of confidential discussions in hopes of trying to defend their reputations? I don’t know how this got leaked. But it amounts to an inherently unfair attack that is almost impossible to defend just by the nature of the case. In law, we learn early on that a one-sided story can almost always be made to sound compelling, while on a full airing it can just as easily be shown as just the opposite. 2. There is a long-time tension in the startup world between founders and VCs and, as someone who has worked closely with founders for nearly three decades, I can say unequivocally that it has not been the VCs who have tended to get the short end of the stick when the inequities arise. Now that fact does not justify founder abuse, if that is what happens in a given case (I say nothing about this case - we really don’t know the facts). For decades, investors categorically refused to let founders take even a penny out of the company as they were urged to "swing for the fences" to ensure that the investors got their projected minimum 10-to-1 one return on investment. And when they missed, it was the investors who would force a merger or sale of the company, take out their liquidation preference to get a return on their money, and leave founders with a zero-equity return after perhaps years of working for little or no salary and putting in 20-hour workdays in the process. This value proposition may have paid in a big way for founders in select companies but it has also left large numbers of seriously harmed founders in its wake over the years. Today, this is changed somewhat and founders at times have opportunities to balance their risks along the way as they strike their bargains with the VCs. How, when, and to what extent they take any money out along the way is a completely legitimate issue to be fought for by founders and resisted by investors as circumstances dictate. But the overriding goal of letting founders spread some of their risk is completely bona fide. The details get resolved by the founders, the company, and the investors through private negotiation, not through a public airing. If investors choose to accept something that sounds aggressive to the rest of us, that is their calculated risk. Last I checked, they qualified as "sophisticated investors." 3. Is it good policy to have a dividend declared for the benefit of insiders and for founders to take significant cash out of a company in the early stages even while other employees may not have that opportunity? Maybe, maybe not. That is a legitimate question for debate and it should be cast as a policy debate, not as a perverse prying into the details of a particular company whose circumstances we do not really know. The traditional justification for requiring founders to ride it out to the bitter end with no prospect of any real return unless the company hit it big is that it is important that founders have "skin in the game," i.e., show a real commitment to the venture as opposed to making opportunistic short-term moves that further their immediate gain at the expense of the venture. That is a legitimate concern at all times in a startup but so too is the idea of fairness to founders. Why, when founders have the power to assert more control, should they voluntarily accede to a historic policy the keeps them in handcuffs and leaves them with basically an all-or-nothing proposition in whether they ever get anything significant out of the venture? This makes no sense and it is natural that founders would want to change this older pattern and practice. We can debate to our heart's content whether this is good for startups or not - that should be a policy debate (including over where exact lines ought to be drawn on cash take-outs), not an excuse to take what might amount to cheap shots at a founding team that certainly deserves better treatment than to have a one-sided debate carried on at its expense.