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> Russia does not trust NATO and especially the USA, any neighboring country joining NATO allows them place more military assets close to the Russian border and

> Russia does not trust NATO and especially the USA, any neighboring country joining NATO allows them place more military assets close to the Russian border and having military assets close to a target is obviously more threatening. Russia had all those assets that are in Ukraine now all the time but moving them to the Ukrainian border made a heck of a difference. I do not think this justifies your analogy to the USA during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In Cuban Missile Crisis we are talking about first strike nuclear capability when people thought it mattered, and it really might have mattered. The ability to destroy a nation, kill millions of it civilians, without risking equal retaliation, and where that ability would not have existed otherwise. Compare that to Ukraine joining NATO, there is no comparison. NATO does not gain any new abilities that are even close to that. This disparity is why the analogy breaks down. > I have now also looked at more resources and they mostly support what I researched before. I am somewhat worried that I accidently got trapped in a bubble as the pieces fit together almost to well, so I will have to look more for opposing opinions. I am probably not going to have time to go through the multiple hours of videos here. Some of them look interesting so I will be listening to one or two in the background when I doing something else so thank you for the links. I do not think this additional info is likely to reconcile or explain the difference in view point we have here. Exploring how we see your analogy might. Exploring how I seem to think there is a larger divide between publicly shared motivations and all of the hidden layers of motivation which are not public than you might.

danbruc 5y ago
I do not think this justifies your analogy to the USA during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In Cuban Missile Crisis we are talking about first strike nuclear capability when people thought it mattered, and it really might have mattered. The ability to destroy a nation, kill millions of it civilians, without risking equal retaliation, and where that ability would not have existed otherwise. Compare that to Ukraine joining NATO, there is no comparison. NATO does not gain any new abilities that are even close to that. This disparity is why the analogy breaks down. I get your point, you want me to demonstrate that a Ukrainian NATO membership would be an actual increased threat to Russia. I can not do this from the top of my head, I would have to research this. At best I vaguely remember concerns about anti ballistic missiles system, ICBMs are especially vulnerable during early flight when they are still slow but this requires of course being close to the launch location. Why does it matter? Because this may be able to weaken retaliatory strike capabilities and therefore make a first strike by the other side more viable. But I am not sure that this even matters, what if the threat is only perceived but not real? At least before the current mess I would have been reasonably confident that NATO would not attack Russia and only use its assets for defensive purposes. So there is no real threat, only a theoretical one, NATO could but would not. You could also imagine the inverse scenario, where there is an actual threat but the threatened country does not know or misjudges the situation. So what really seems to matter here is how the situation is perceived by Russia. If you think their perception is wrong, you can try to convince them otherwise. I could even try to make the case for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba requested the missiles as a deterrent against further invasion attempts and if we assume for the sake of argument that they and the USSR are sincere, then there was no actual threat unless the USA tried to go after Cuba again. But it seems of course very unlikely to me that the USA would have this amount of trust and confidence.
- davorak 5y ago
  > I can not do this from the top of my head, I would have to research this. At best I vaguely remember concerns about anti ballistic missiles system, ICBMs are especially vulnerable during early flight when they are still slow but this requires of course being close to the launch location. Why does it matter? Because this may be able to weaken retaliatory strike capabilities and therefore make a first strike by the other side more viable. It sounds like you are talking about nuclear first strike here again, ICBMs are primarily for nuclear weapons after all, and there is no advantage to having them closer, see my first comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 > But I am not sure that this even matters, what if the threat is only perceived but not real? At least before the current mess I would have been reasonably confident that NATO would not attack Russia and only use its assets for defensive purposes. So there is no real threat, only a theoretical one, NATO could but would not. You could also imagine the inverse scenario, where there is an actual threat but the threatened country does not know or misjudges the situation. So what really seems to matter here is how the situation is perceived by Russia. This makes it so the most delusional or paranoia person/country, or those that act like it, are given advantages over those that are acting reasonable. This, used as a general rule, can/would cause a negative feedback cycle making the world worse over time. > I could even try to make the case for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba requested the missiles as a deterrent against further invasion attempts and if we assume for the sake of argument that they and the USSR are sincere, then there was no actual threat unless the USA tried to go after Cuba again. But it seems of course very unlikely to me that the USA would have this amount of trust and confidence. No, because the threat of Cuba and/or USSR in this case would have drastically changed, unlike with Ukraine joining NATO. This analogy breaks done for the same reasons the pervious does.
  - danbruc 5y ago
    It sounds like you are talking about nuclear first strike here again, ICBMs are primarily for nuclear weapons after all, and there is no advantage to having them closer, see my first comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 No, I am talking about boost phase ANTI ballistic missile systems. During the boost phase ICBMs are especially vulnerable because they are still slow, but you need your interceptors close to the launch site because you have to detect the ICBM launches, launch your interceptors, and catch up with the ICBMs. If you have an effective ABM system, you gain a better first strike capability because you can weaken or ideally neutralize a retaliatory strike, i.e. the opposing ICBMs are no longer or at least a weaker deterrent. This makes it so the most delusional or paranoia person/country, or those that act like it, are given advantages over those that are acting reasonable. This, used as a general rule, can/would cause a negative feedback cycle making the world worse over time. But look what we got now. Even if my reasoning is incorrect and we ended up with this mess for other reasons, I think it is at least plausible scenario and we could have ended up in the current situation this way. But there would have been options, Norway is a NATO member but has all kind of additional rules like no ICBMs and foreign troops on their soil. You could pave a way for Russia to also join NATO. You could at least discuss concerns and try to find some middle ground. You could try to reduce concerns. It's not binary, you can work on reasonable perceived threats without being compelled to address absolutely outlandish concerns. No, because the threat of Cuba and/or USSR in this case would have drastically changed, unlike with Ukraine joining NATO. No, there would have been no actual threat if Cuba would have gotten those missiles purely as a deterrent. The threat would be only in the heads of the Americans because they don't know and can not be sure that the missiles are purely a deterrent. If I point a realistically looking toy gun at you, there is no actual threat. But you don't know or at least are not sure that it is not a real gun, so you will act according to the perceived threat. And now that I am rethinking this I actually tend towards making a stronger claim than last time, you always act according to the perceived threat. Why? Because the perceived threat is everything you have, you don't have access to the actual threat.

danbruc 5y ago

I do not think this justifies your analogy to the USA during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In Cuban Missile Crisis we are talking about first strike nuclear capability when people thought it mattered, and it really might have mattered. The ability to destroy a nation, kill millions of it civilians, without risking equal retaliation, and where that ability would not have existed otherwise. Compare that to Ukraine joining NATO, there is no comparison. NATO does not gain any new abilities that are even close to that. This disparity is why the analogy breaks down. I get your point, you want me to demonstrate that a Ukrainian NATO membership would be an actual increased threat to Russia. I can not do this from the top of my head, I would have to research this. At best I vaguely remember concerns about anti ballistic missiles system, ICBMs are especially vulnerable during early flight when they are still slow but this requires of course being close to the launch location. Why does it matter? Because this may be able to weaken retaliatory strike capabilities and therefore make a first strike by the other side more viable. But I am not sure that this even matters, what if the threat is only perceived but not real? At least before the current mess I would have been reasonably confident that NATO would not attack Russia and only use its assets for defensive purposes. So there is no real threat, only a theoretical one, NATO could but would not. You could also imagine the inverse scenario, where there is an actual threat but the threatened country does not know or misjudges the situation. So what really seems to matter here is how the situation is perceived by Russia. If you think their perception is wrong, you can try to convince them otherwise. I could even try to make the case for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba requested the missiles as a deterrent against further invasion attempts and if we assume for the sake of argument that they and the USSR are sincere, then there was no actual threat unless the USA tried to go after Cuba again. But it seems of course very unlikely to me that the USA would have this amount of trust and confidence.

davorak 5y ago
> I can not do this from the top of my head, I would have to research this. At best I vaguely remember concerns about anti ballistic missiles system, ICBMs are especially vulnerable during early flight when they are still slow but this requires of course being close to the launch location. Why does it matter? Because this may be able to weaken retaliatory strike capabilities and therefore make a first strike by the other side more viable. It sounds like you are talking about nuclear first strike here again, ICBMs are primarily for nuclear weapons after all, and there is no advantage to having them closer, see my first comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 > But I am not sure that this even matters, what if the threat is only perceived but not real? At least before the current mess I would have been reasonably confident that NATO would not attack Russia and only use its assets for defensive purposes. So there is no real threat, only a theoretical one, NATO could but would not. You could also imagine the inverse scenario, where there is an actual threat but the threatened country does not know or misjudges the situation. So what really seems to matter here is how the situation is perceived by Russia. This makes it so the most delusional or paranoia person/country, or those that act like it, are given advantages over those that are acting reasonable. This, used as a general rule, can/would cause a negative feedback cycle making the world worse over time. > I could even try to make the case for the Cuban Missile Crisis. Cuba requested the missiles as a deterrent against further invasion attempts and if we assume for the sake of argument that they and the USSR are sincere, then there was no actual threat unless the USA tried to go after Cuba again. But it seems of course very unlikely to me that the USA would have this amount of trust and confidence. No, because the threat of Cuba and/or USSR in this case would have drastically changed, unlike with Ukraine joining NATO. This analogy breaks done for the same reasons the pervious does.
- danbruc 5y ago
  It sounds like you are talking about nuclear first strike here again, ICBMs are primarily for nuclear weapons after all, and there is no advantage to having them closer, see my first comment: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30569822 No, I am talking about boost phase ANTI ballistic missile systems. During the boost phase ICBMs are especially vulnerable because they are still slow, but you need your interceptors close to the launch site because you have to detect the ICBM launches, launch your interceptors, and catch up with the ICBMs. If you have an effective ABM system, you gain a better first strike capability because you can weaken or ideally neutralize a retaliatory strike, i.e. the opposing ICBMs are no longer or at least a weaker deterrent. This makes it so the most delusional or paranoia person/country, or those that act like it, are given advantages over those that are acting reasonable. This, used as a general rule, can/would cause a negative feedback cycle making the world worse over time. But look what we got now. Even if my reasoning is incorrect and we ended up with this mess for other reasons, I think it is at least plausible scenario and we could have ended up in the current situation this way. But there would have been options, Norway is a NATO member but has all kind of additional rules like no ICBMs and foreign troops on their soil. You could pave a way for Russia to also join NATO. You could at least discuss concerns and try to find some middle ground. You could try to reduce concerns. It's not binary, you can work on reasonable perceived threats without being compelled to address absolutely outlandish concerns. No, because the threat of Cuba and/or USSR in this case would have drastically changed, unlike with Ukraine joining NATO. No, there would have been no actual threat if Cuba would have gotten those missiles purely as a deterrent. The threat would be only in the heads of the Americans because they don't know and can not be sure that the missiles are purely a deterrent. If I point a realistically looking toy gun at you, there is no actual threat. But you don't know or at least are not sure that it is not a real gun, so you will act according to the perceived threat. And now that I am rethinking this I actually tend towards making a stronger claim than last time, you always act according to the perceived threat. Why? Because the perceived threat is everything you have, you don't have access to the actual threat.