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> Instead of the attacker having to find a vulnerability in a single product, they can instead find a vulnerability in one of multiple products (a much easier t
by vlovich123 5y ago
> Instead of the attacker having to find a vulnerability in a single product, they can instead find a vulnerability in one of multiple products (a much easier task)
I’m not sure I understand this argument you’re making. If you have them in series then you have to find vulnerabilities for all of them before you can talk to any other system. A vulnerability to one of them only lets you punch through that one layer. In theory of course. I think this advice may not be well flushed out though. For example, if the firewalls are running on the same appliance and have poor isolation/misconfigure settings, an escape in one can bypass the entire set of firewalls (which is maybe what you’re implying?). Having totally isolated firewall machines is inefficient from a capex perspective (more machines than needed for your load) and in general multiple vendors increased your opex costs too (you now need employees that are proficient with multiple vendors which ends up meaning you have teams with dedicated experts per firewall, you have to build automation for multiple vendors with non-standard APIs etc).
The bigger problem though is you’ve sacrificed availability which is now divided by N times because every layer you’ve added has to be functioning perfectly or the entire system is down (and if it’s not you’ve implemented this advice incorrectly).
I think not mentioning this security/availability/cost trade off is a disservice.
- dhx 5y agoThe scenario I had in mind is Firewall A and Firewall B are in series and they're different products from two vendors. Firewall B is found to contain a vulnerability triggered by a specially crafted IPv6 TCP packet (that firewall A is happy to pass to firewall B), giving the attacker a level of control over Firewall B that allows them to then access the centralised authentication/authorisation system that would have otherwise been off limits to the attacker. The attacker communicates with firewall B using the same accepted protocol that firewall A and firewall B are configured to allow the attacker to access. Firewall B communicates to the authentication/authorisation system using the accepted protocol for doing so. Nothing suspicious appears to be going on unless you look at the patterns of traffic (throughput, duration of connections, number of connections in interval, etc) particularly to the authentication/authorisation system. I don't think in-band attacks on routers, switches, firewalls doing simple ACL checks are a risk worth spending much concern on because parsing IPv4/IPv6/TCP/UDP headers is not hard to securely implement. Riskier architecture would be intrusion detection systems that perform deep packet inspection in-band (e.g. not out-of-band via a beam splitter to a standalone IDS) where there is 1,000,000's of lines of potentially buggy code exposed to attackers. I agree with your point too that a complex network is harder to secure because you need more skill and expertise spread across more people. In such a scenario, it is easier for human mistakes to occur because of the difficulty in communicating, and difficulty in seeing the broader implication of what may appear to be a simple configuration change.
- vlovich123 5y agoIn your scenario though, if the company just used firewall B you’d have the same issue. It can’t be less secure. I’m not familiar enough with how enterprise firewalls work to evaluate things from that perspective. I just know operationally, the more moving pieces, the more issues you have to deal with.
- dhx 5y agoThe company would be less secure because they would also be wearing the risk that independent of the vulnerability in firewall B, there is potentially also an unknown vulnerability in firewall A being exploited by a different attacker.
- mrjin 5y agoI guess he meant to say that each product has its own attack surface, using n different products just make your attacking surfaces multiply by n. It would be true if you mix those at the same layer. Even if you deploy them in different layers, you still have n different types of devices to maintain instead of one. And it would provide little benefit if different lays of the network were not segregated correctly as the chance to breach the very first layer remains the same. Plus the points you pointed out, there is not much point to deploy such strategy unless you have more than enough budget.
- R0b0t1 5y agoAs you increase the number of systems in series you increase the likelihood of failure. In this case failure is "there's an exploit." When you have A->B->C it's possible that exploiting B, the middle layer, is both possible by going through A but also allows you to pass traffic through C that lets you launch an attack or exfiltrate from the network. In practice it may be different, but it seems like security theater to just put a bunch of firewalls in series.
- vlovich123 5y agoThe security failure rate here cannot drop below the weakest link in the chain. In other words in your example A -> B -> C is no different than just B. The likelihood of failure of independent systems in a series is defined as 1 - product(1 - p(failure of one component)) [1]. It only degraded to the probability of one of the links if the systems are correlated which they’re not here. I don’t think regular failure analysis applies here (more components = more failure) because the security failure rate gets better with more components and worst case is that of your weakest link. In the traditional failure analysis you’re arguing for, the best case is the failure of the weakest component and it gets worse from there. [1] https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/failure-probability https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/engineering/failure-pro...
- R0b0t1 5y ago> because the security failure rate gets better with more components [citation needed] This isn't obvious to me, and as I explained (in a way that agrees with your first paragraph) more components could just mean more opportunities to get hacked. You'd have to go out of your way to prove that the security does overlap, and you can't trivially go around one component if the other is hacked.
- vlovich123 5y agoIf hacking one component gives you full access, then yes, more components is worse. If hacking one component means you need to hack the next as well, then security gets better. This is the very definition of defense in depth.
- fulafel 5y agoFirewalls are good spoils, your payload can then monitor, exfiltrate, or meddle with traffic, or use it as a stepping stone to network infra/administrators.