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> And because it is hard to know what somebody thinks I will just assume that he thinks what he says unless there are good reasons to assume he was consistently

> And because it is hard to know what somebody thinks I will just assume that he thinks what he says unless there are good reasons to assume he was consistently lying about this concerns for decades. This seems native, there is a history of politicians and political parties hiding their motivations, or at least some of, for years/decades. For example it seems plausible that Putin thinks it hurts his personal power or his friends rather than hurting Russia or Russians at large. I can not tell, and it would take considerable insight to tell, the difference between that and Putin thinking of Russian security, but being mistaken about what would increase security the most. > For a first strike it might still be good to be as close to the target as possible because it minimizes reaction time. And for a first strike you are not so much worried about them being in a static location. First strike is not really important in my understanding. I thought the current doctrine was there was no way to first strike enough assets to prevent massive retaliation. There is no victory with nuclear war only mutual destruction, first strike or not. > But I was a bit sloppy there, I just wrote nukes but I am not actually sure what kind of military assets would be the most worrisome. Maybe it would be an anti ballistic missile system close to your border that weakens your nuclear posture. Maybe it would just be a hand full of military bases with a few hundred tanks. > > In the end it doesn't really matter, I think a NATO presence close to Russian borders is unlikely to be a security thread to Russia, no matter what kind of assets, but Putin thinks otherwise. I think this leaves us in a place where we do not have any concrete example of how Putin thinks NATO's threat to Russia will be substantially changed with Ukraine joining NATO.

danbruc 5y ago
I have made this comparison in other comments, I see this conflict as a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. If you are convinced that nuclear weapons will not be used for a first strike and if you - as the USA - are committed to not perform a first strike on the USSR, then there is no risk from USSR missiles on Cuba. But the USA didn't like the idea, so either they were not convinced that the USSR would not perform a first strike despite the dire consequences or they were not committed to not perform a first strike and feared the retaliations. And whatever consideration made the USA not like the idea of nuclear missiles close to their border, the same considerations may make Putin dislike its neighbors become NATO members. And this was just ignored. This seems, at least in my opinion, a much better and more rational explanation than some vague ideas of what Putin might be thinking. At it perfectly aligns with his actions in the past. In 2008 Ukraine and Georgia started the process of becoming NATO members in Georgia was promptly attacked. The Ukraine under Yanukovych no longer really pursued a NATO membership until 2014, then this became again more and more a priority and Russia reacted with Crimea, eastern Ukraine and now this. In reaction Sweden and Finnland consider a NATO membership and Putin immediately reacts with a warning.
- davorak 5y ago
  > I have made this comparison in other comments, I see this conflict as a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. If you are convinced that nuclear weapons will not be used for a first strike and if you - as the USA - are committed to not perform a first strike on the USSR, then there is no risk from USSR missiles on Cuba. But the USA didn't like the idea, so either they were not convinced that the USSR would not perform a first strike despite the dire consequences or they were not committed to not perform a first strike and feared the retaliations. ... This analogy does not work. Nuclear weapons technology and military doctrine has changed since the 1960s some people thought an effective first strike was possible, that is no longer the case and has not been for over a decade(decades?) to my understanding. > And whatever consideration made the USA not like the idea of nuclear missiles close to their border, the same considerations may make Putin dislike its neighbors become NATO members. And this was just ignored. This seems, at least in my opinion, a much better and more rational explanation than some vague ideas of what Putin might be thinking. At it perfectly aligns with his actions in the past. In 2008 Ukraine and Georgia started the process of becoming NATO members in Georgia was promptly attacked. The Ukraine under Yanukovych no longer really pursued a NATO membership until 2014, then this became again more and more a priority and Russia reacted with Crimea, eastern Ukraine and now this. In reaction Sweden and Finnland consider a NATO membership and Putin immediately reacts with a warning. Maybe you think I am objecting to something I am not. I asserted your claim/statement was too strong. I objected to the claim that you know Putin's thought process about Ukraine joining NATO. In particular that it threatens Russian security. Claiming Putin's actions are consistent with your assertion is much stronger, but also leave open the possibility for other explanations, for Putin to have other motivations.
  - danbruc 5y ago
    This analogy does not work. Nuclear weapons technology and military doctrine has changed since the 1960s some people thought an effective first strike was possible, that is no longer the case and has not been for over a decade(decades?) to my understanding. My main point here is not the nuclear thread, I am focusing on the fact that US security concerns outweighed Cuba's defense interests, they asked for the missiles after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion. So while ideally every sovereign country should be free to decide whether or not they want to join NATO and which kind of military assets it wants to place there, I think one should not plainly dismiss Russia's security concerns about its neighbors becoming NATO members. Maybe you think I am objecting to something I am not. I asserted your claim/statement was too strong. I objected to the claim that you know Putin's thought process about Ukraine joining NATO. In particular that it threatens Russian security. Claiming Putin's actions are consistent with your assertion is much stronger, but also leave open the possibility for other explanations, for Putin to have other motivations. I am not claiming to know what Putin thinks, when I write »Putin considers Ukraine becoming a NATO member a security thread.« this is of course just a shorthand for »Considering everything I know, especially what Putin said and did, it seems to me the most plausible explanation that Putin considers Ukraine becoming a NATO member a security thread.«, nothing more, nothing less. I don't think anyone could reasonably mean anything else with a phrase like »Putin thinks« in this context, therefore I didn't think it is necessary to use really precise language. But that also means that I am unwilling to accept a simple »But you might be wrong.«, »Politicians often lie.« or »Maybe he fears looking weak.« as a counterargument. Sure, they all might be correct and I know this, but I think assertions alone are not good enough. I have written quite a few comments on this topic today but I think there was only one good counterpoint, namely why does Putin not openly justify the war with those ignored security concerns and went instead with the protection of Russian in Ukraine? And if I am not misremembering, no one tried to make a different case for the primary reason, not for natural resources, not for Crimea and Sevastopol, not for actually protecting Russian minorities, not for the water supply to Crimea, not for an easier to defend western border, not for a delusional desire to return Russia to past power or enter the history books as a hero.

danbruc 5y ago

I have made this comparison in other comments, I see this conflict as a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. If you are convinced that nuclear weapons will not be used for a first strike and if you - as the USA - are committed to not perform a first strike on the USSR, then there is no risk from USSR missiles on Cuba. But the USA didn't like the idea, so either they were not convinced that the USSR would not perform a first strike despite the dire consequences or they were not committed to not perform a first strike and feared the retaliations. And whatever consideration made the USA not like the idea of nuclear missiles close to their border, the same considerations may make Putin dislike its neighbors become NATO members. And this was just ignored. This seems, at least in my opinion, a much better and more rational explanation than some vague ideas of what Putin might be thinking. At it perfectly aligns with his actions in the past. In 2008 Ukraine and Georgia started the process of becoming NATO members in Georgia was promptly attacked. The Ukraine under Yanukovych no longer really pursued a NATO membership until 2014, then this became again more and more a priority and Russia reacted with Crimea, eastern Ukraine and now this. In reaction Sweden and Finnland consider a NATO membership and Putin immediately reacts with a warning.

davorak 5y ago
> I have made this comparison in other comments, I see this conflict as a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. If you are convinced that nuclear weapons will not be used for a first strike and if you - as the USA - are committed to not perform a first strike on the USSR, then there is no risk from USSR missiles on Cuba. But the USA didn't like the idea, so either they were not convinced that the USSR would not perform a first strike despite the dire consequences or they were not committed to not perform a first strike and feared the retaliations. ... This analogy does not work. Nuclear weapons technology and military doctrine has changed since the 1960s some people thought an effective first strike was possible, that is no longer the case and has not been for over a decade(decades?) to my understanding. > And whatever consideration made the USA not like the idea of nuclear missiles close to their border, the same considerations may make Putin dislike its neighbors become NATO members. And this was just ignored. This seems, at least in my opinion, a much better and more rational explanation than some vague ideas of what Putin might be thinking. At it perfectly aligns with his actions in the past. In 2008 Ukraine and Georgia started the process of becoming NATO members in Georgia was promptly attacked. The Ukraine under Yanukovych no longer really pursued a NATO membership until 2014, then this became again more and more a priority and Russia reacted with Crimea, eastern Ukraine and now this. In reaction Sweden and Finnland consider a NATO membership and Putin immediately reacts with a warning. Maybe you think I am objecting to something I am not. I asserted your claim/statement was too strong. I objected to the claim that you know Putin's thought process about Ukraine joining NATO. In particular that it threatens Russian security. Claiming Putin's actions are consistent with your assertion is much stronger, but also leave open the possibility for other explanations, for Putin to have other motivations.
- danbruc 5y ago
  This analogy does not work. Nuclear weapons technology and military doctrine has changed since the 1960s some people thought an effective first strike was possible, that is no longer the case and has not been for over a decade(decades?) to my understanding. My main point here is not the nuclear thread, I am focusing on the fact that US security concerns outweighed Cuba's defense interests, they asked for the missiles after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion. So while ideally every sovereign country should be free to decide whether or not they want to join NATO and which kind of military assets it wants to place there, I think one should not plainly dismiss Russia's security concerns about its neighbors becoming NATO members. Maybe you think I am objecting to something I am not. I asserted your claim/statement was too strong. I objected to the claim that you know Putin's thought process about Ukraine joining NATO. In particular that it threatens Russian security. Claiming Putin's actions are consistent with your assertion is much stronger, but also leave open the possibility for other explanations, for Putin to have other motivations. I am not claiming to know what Putin thinks, when I write »Putin considers Ukraine becoming a NATO member a security thread.« this is of course just a shorthand for »Considering everything I know, especially what Putin said and did, it seems to me the most plausible explanation that Putin considers Ukraine becoming a NATO member a security thread.«, nothing more, nothing less. I don't think anyone could reasonably mean anything else with a phrase like »Putin thinks« in this context, therefore I didn't think it is necessary to use really precise language. But that also means that I am unwilling to accept a simple »But you might be wrong.«, »Politicians often lie.« or »Maybe he fears looking weak.« as a counterargument. Sure, they all might be correct and I know this, but I think assertions alone are not good enough. I have written quite a few comments on this topic today but I think there was only one good counterpoint, namely why does Putin not openly justify the war with those ignored security concerns and went instead with the protection of Russian in Ukraine? And if I am not misremembering, no one tried to make a different case for the primary reason, not for natural resources, not for Crimea and Sevastopol, not for actually protecting Russian minorities, not for the water supply to Crimea, not for an easier to defend western border, not for a delusional desire to return Russia to past power or enter the history books as a hero.