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There was actually a major SEAD campaign in the lead up to D-day, with strikes on German RADAR stations, but the primary objective prior to that point was to ga

There was actually a major SEAD campaign in the lead up to D-day, with strikes on German RADAR stations, but the primary objective prior to that point was to gain air superiority over the Luftwaffe fighter force (considered significantly more dangerous than AAA [anti-aircraft artillery, flak]). While electronic warfare was still in relative infancy, radio and RADAR jamming and chaff (known then to the Allies as "Window") were widely used. However, prior to the widespread development and use of guided weapons (e.g. homing anti-radiation missiles) it was very difficult to precisely strike small SEAD targets (semi-mobile RADAR units, AAA batteries) without needing to first close within range of low-level AAA defenses.

zabzonk 5y ago
All you say is true, but the radar and flak installations were not particularly mobile. THe Allies _did_ hit nightfighter bases which are definitely not mobile, but didn't seem to prioritise such strikes that much.
- cpgxiii 5y ago
  RADAR and Flak installations took a lot of forms - many of which were fixed or semi-fixed (these often being protected installations), but also a range that were trailer-mobile or self-propelled. The Allies did use bombing raids on Luftwaffe airfields as a way to draw out fighters, as well as wide-ranging fighter sweeps that would attempt to catch fighters on the ground. But these had serious limitations: the Germans had very effective short-range AAA deployed around their airfields which inflicted serious losses on ground-attack missions, and airfields at the time were very difficult to damage. Especially prior to the widespread use of jet aircraft with higher takeoff and landing speeds and weights, an airfield could basically be just that - a field - and filling in bomb craters to return a runway to active use was straightforward. That means the only effective target was the planes on the ground themselves, and without guided munitions the only way to effectively target airplanes on the ground was to strike at low altitude and thus come within range of the strong AAA defenses. This would begin to change later in the war with the growing use of (unguided) rockets that allowed for something of a standoff distance (compared to dive bombing), but nothing like the reach of a modern PGM. I think there's a necessary combination of factors that came together in the Vietnam and Arab-Israeli wars to give birth to SEAD in its modern form: - Strong enemy air defenses in the form of SAM batteries - Unacceptable attrition due to said defenses - Increased weapon accuracy to allow effective targeting of specific threats (e.g. a specific enemy RADAR or SAM site) either via homing (Shrike/Standard ARM) or TV/laser guidance (Bullpup/Walleye/Paveway) - Early integrated circuits allowing for more complicated and effective electronic warfare equipment (warning receivers, jammers, homing seekers, etc)

zabzonk 5y ago

All you say is true, but the radar and flak installations were not particularly mobile. THe Allies _did_ hit nightfighter bases which are definitely not mobile, but didn't seem to prioritise such strikes that much.

cpgxiii 5y ago
RADAR and Flak installations took a lot of forms - many of which were fixed or semi-fixed (these often being protected installations), but also a range that were trailer-mobile or self-propelled. The Allies did use bombing raids on Luftwaffe airfields as a way to draw out fighters, as well as wide-ranging fighter sweeps that would attempt to catch fighters on the ground. But these had serious limitations: the Germans had very effective short-range AAA deployed around their airfields which inflicted serious losses on ground-attack missions, and airfields at the time were very difficult to damage. Especially prior to the widespread use of jet aircraft with higher takeoff and landing speeds and weights, an airfield could basically be just that - a field - and filling in bomb craters to return a runway to active use was straightforward. That means the only effective target was the planes on the ground themselves, and without guided munitions the only way to effectively target airplanes on the ground was to strike at low altitude and thus come within range of the strong AAA defenses. This would begin to change later in the war with the growing use of (unguided) rockets that allowed for something of a standoff distance (compared to dive bombing), but nothing like the reach of a modern PGM. I think there's a necessary combination of factors that came together in the Vietnam and Arab-Israeli wars to give birth to SEAD in its modern form: - Strong enemy air defenses in the form of SAM batteries - Unacceptable attrition due to said defenses - Increased weapon accuracy to allow effective targeting of specific threats (e.g. a specific enemy RADAR or SAM site) either via homing (Shrike/Standard ARM) or TV/laser guidance (Bullpup/Walleye/Paveway) - Early integrated circuits allowing for more complicated and effective electronic warfare equipment (warning receivers, jammers, homing seekers, etc)