The Ethiopian Airlines crew that crashed also turned off the stab trim[1]. The problem is that you couldn't turn off MCAS separately from the fly-by-wire trim c

The Ethiopian Airlines crew that crashed also turned off the stab trim[1]. The problem is that you couldn't turn off MCAS separately from the fly-by-wire trim control, so you could either have fly-by-wire with MCAS or manual trim control without it. Unfortunately for the Ethiopian Airlines crew, they were too late. By the time they set the stabilizer trim to CUT OUT, MCAS already pushed the plane nose down too much and they couldn't manage them manual controls, which were pretty hard to use under extreme conditions[2]. I'm not an expert or even an amateur, but the engineering issue I see here is that Boeing really left no contingency plan for a catastrophically failing AoA sensor on take-off. You can't turn off MCAS directly, and the recommended indirect method for turning it off require skills that many (most?) commercial airline pilots are not trained for. The worst thing, of course, is that the Lion Air crew that crashed wasn't even aware of MCAS. The 737 MAX manuals made no mention of it. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian_Airlines_Flight_302 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian_Airlines_Flight_302 [2]: https://www.cliffordlaw.com/boeing-faa-knew-manual-stab-trim-was-unlikely-at-high-speed-but-failed-to-warn-after-lion-air/ https://www.cliffordlaw.com/boeing-faa-knew-manual-stab-trim...