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It's a good thing there aren't any known classes of architectural attacks exploiting the interaction of speculative execution and caches to exfiltrate sensitive
by RodgerTheGreat 5y ago
It's a good thing there aren't any known classes of architectural attacks exploiting the interaction of speculative execution and caches to exfiltrate sensitive data, nor are there classes of attacks which exploit the physical properties of DRAM to evade memory protection.
Yes indeed; running untrusted code blobs on my home computers and cloud servers alike is truly and finally solved by running them in a VM.
- abtinf 5y agoMalicious attacks aren't always the vector of concern. There are many software packages that confine themselves to what is legal. They often want to ingest and upload everything they can about the user. But if they are locked down to a narrow set of user data, they won't risk the liability of attacking the protections themselves.
- thfuran 5y agoIt's also rather harder to exfiltrate data via rowhammer or meltdown than via, say, unrestricted filesystem access so even if it's technically possible, it will be less prevalent.
- mikewarot 5y agoI agree that we have big problem with defective CPUs and DRAM in the industry. Those chips and modules shouldn't have made it out the factory door, nor should they have passed quality control at the receiving desk. We also seem to have the same issue with SSD modules and SYNC commands. You can't fix broken hardware in software without taking a huge performance it, if it is possible at all. Yes, we all like to point out corner cases here, don't we?