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The MAX failure illustrates what happens when one relies on one "cannot fail" component. But you should know that there was a backup. 3 crews experience MCAS f
by WalterBright 5y ago
The MAX failure illustrates what happens when one relies on one "cannot fail" component.
But you should know that there was a backup. 3 crews experience MCAS failure. 2 crashed. The 3rd crew simply turned off the stab trim system and completed the flight safely. You almost never hear about crew #3.
I can't really offer any suggestions for the power grid, as I don't know enough about it, except that I'm sure there's a way :-)
- bombcar 5y agoAnd a key there is “never fix software or hardware by depending on humans” because we’re always the weak link. And in cases like zero trust it may mean things like “make sure it works so well you don’t have people resetting access over the phone” or requiring an in-person replacement of a security token, etc.
- WalterBright 5y agoI agree that the MAX design should have been fully redundant. But the only reason there are pilots at all on an airliner is to deal with the unexpected. I was told about one case where the elevator actuators froze in the slightly nose up position. The pilot called the cabin, and asked everyone to pack themselves into the front. With that he managed to bring enough pitch control to land it safely, but it surely was a terrifying ordeal for everyone on board. (The actuators froze because of water buildup turning to ice at altitude. Actuators are now heavily designed and tested with freezing water. The stab trim test for this was quite thorough - the motors were very powerful and the ice scrapers on the nut would just peel the ice off. I also enlarged the drain holes in my car doors to Boeing spec so water wouldn't build up in them and rust.)
- unscaled 5y agoThe Ethiopian Airlines crew that crashed also turned off the stab trim[1]. The problem is that you couldn't turn off MCAS separately from the fly-by-wire trim control, so you could either have fly-by-wire with MCAS or manual trim control without it. Unfortunately for the Ethiopian Airlines crew, they were too late. By the time they set the stabilizer trim to CUT OUT, MCAS already pushed the plane nose down too much and they couldn't manage them manual controls, which were pretty hard to use under extreme conditions[2]. I'm not an expert or even an amateur, but the engineering issue I see here is that Boeing really left no contingency plan for a catastrophically failing AoA sensor on take-off. You can't turn off MCAS directly, and the recommended indirect method for turning it off require skills that many (most?) commercial airline pilots are not trained for. The worst thing, of course, is that the Lion Air crew that crashed wasn't even aware of MCAS. The 737 MAX manuals made no mention of it. [1]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian_Airlines_Flight_302 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian_Airlines_Flight_302 [2]: https://www.cliffordlaw.com/boeing-faa-knew-manual-stab-trim-was-unlikely-at-high-speed-but-failed-to-warn-after-lion-air/ https://www.cliffordlaw.com/boeing-faa-knew-manual-stab-trim...
- WalterBright 5y agoI know they turned off the trim. They turned it off when the airplane was too far nose down. They had successfully brought it back to normal trim with the electric trim switches, which had overridden MCAS. Then, the trim gets turned off. The 3rd crew that survived had no idea MCAS existed. All they knew was misbehaving trim => turn it off. They also had repeatedly used the electric trim switches to return trim to normal. Then they turned it off. This procedure was documented in an Emergency Airworthiness Directive sent to all MAX pilots, including the EA crew. The only skill required was to use the electric trim switches to restore normal trim, which all three crews did, and then turn it off. The point is, it is not necessary to know why the trim is misbehaving, it was only necessary to know how to turn it off. Emergency procedures are like this - they're not debugging procedures, they're about regaining control. Save the debugging for the mechanics on the ground. P.S. the LA crew restored normal trim 25 times, and never did turn it off.
- nwallin 5y agoI guess I don't understand what you're trying to say. All it takes for a 737 MAX to crash is one piece of equipment failure and 2/3 an instance of human error. I submit that if three crews were presenting with the same situation and two of them crashed with everyone onboard killed, it's not really the sort of thing that you can blame on human error. All it takes for a catastrophic failure of the grid is literally over a dozen cascading equipment and human error instances. I guess I don't understand -- you're saying that the grid, where over a dozen overlapping failures is required for catastrophic results, should learn from the airline industry where it takes 2-5 failures to bring down an airliner. I think it's possible you're maybe getting confused about what the point of the interview was-- were they talking about a targeted attack on the power grid? An adversarial opponent, knowledgeable, determined, well funded, conducting a dedicated attack on the power grid? I think that yes, if a nation state or terrorist organization conducted a targeted attack on the power grid, it would likely do an outsized amount of damage on a regional portion of the nation compared to the resources expended. But in that case the comparison to airliners does not apply -- all the redundant safety systems in the world aren't going to save you from a Buk or SM-2MR surface to air missile.