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If you assign conclusive weight to recent "news", rather than historical precedents, I think you'll remain at the mercy of constructed narratives about what's r
by gojomo 5y ago
If you assign conclusive weight to recent "news", rather than historical precedents, I think you'll remain at the mercy of constructed narratives about what's really happening in high-stakes diplomacy & warmaking.
The US was shouting from the rooftops that they expected an attack, in a manner putting real credibility at risk. While laypeople, & left footsoldiers, may have completely discounted the possibility, Germany & others in NATO are close enough allies they'd have seen more of the tangible reasons why the US was saying that.
Note that feigned surprise can also be a conscious tactic, to help shepherd-along any alliance stragglers, or domestic opinion. Or, excuse inaction. "No one could have known", say the official mouthpieces for those who ignored the alarms from those who did know. "We are blameless!"
Further, if there was actual confidence in policymakers that an attack was unlikely, & that Putin was deterrable, then pre-announcing the severity of the response would have been very cheap! You won't have to do it, in the expected case. And pre-announcing makes the expected case even more likely.
The risk of coordinating with a leaky/corrupt regime isn't necessarily disqualifyng. There may be portions of the Ukraine government/military in which there was very high trust - such as close contacts in special forces, & those who have repeatedly proven themselves in the last ~8y of lower-grade hostilities. Or, people whose comms have been completely pierced – so NATO knows exactly how much corruption, or mixed-loyalties, they'll express.
Weaponry could also have been pre-positioned just outside Ukraine, or kept in the custody/knowledge of trusted contractors or deniably pre-positioned special forces. I hope you don't think Russians, like the saboteur groups repeatedly confronted in Ukrainian cities, are the only forces who can pretend to be someone else when it suits them!
As another example, no one outside of the home airbase support teams know who's really flying a fighter jet, unless enemies shoot it down & recover the pilot. I hope Ukraine has some world-class fighter pilots! But with lives and practically priceless (in the short term) military hardware at stake, if an even 10% better pilot is ready & willing from an allied counry, I suspect Ukraine can grant them a uniform & citizenship instantly. (It's been surprising how many NATO countries have said it's OK for their private citizens to go fight in Ukraine.)
- def_true_false 5y agoYou massively underestimate the complexity required of any such conspiracy. NATO has 30 member states, EU has 27 member states. Most have leaders who can not ignore domestic public opinion and they almost never agree on anything. Some have leadership positions with more ceremonial role, who nevertheless have access to classified material and/or are formally the commander of the armed forces. The likelihood that even the eurosceptic leaders who were widely considered to be Putin's allies were all in on some secret plan is nil. They are simply not capable of keeping this a secret. Conspiracy theories all have this same problem, where they underestimate how many layers of bureaucracy are involved in running something as large as a country or an army. It's much more likely that many politicians were genuinely surprised by the invasion. They ignored the Eastern Europeans, as always, who were just being paranoid about Russia, as always. People tend to ignore problems that are hard to deal with, especially when solving them seems costly, until they can ignore them no longer.
- gojomo 5y agoAs far as I can tell, none of Germany, France, or Italy – key countries who'd seemed a bit squishy – have 'eurosceptic' leaders. And I'm not alleging any "secret plan" requiring coordination – some "conspiracy" to hide the certainty of a stronger response – just the normal duplicity & halfheartedness & wishful-thinking of politicians, which you allude to. That stronger pre-invasion deterrence wasn't popular in "domestic public opinion" is all that it takes, for the private discussions between the national-security establishments & top rulers to go roughly: PRE-WAR SANCTION HAWKS (eg: US): "They're gonna invade all Ukraine, here's how we know, precommitting to all the tough measures you'd surely do if that happens might deter it." PRE-WAR SANCTION DOVES (eg: DE): "Well, really-specific toughness up front isn't popular with our voters, & we're still hoping for that tiny chance Putin's just saber-rattling, despite your evidence. So, if what you say materializes, we'd be able to be tougher than Putin expects. But we can't signal that beforehand, no matter the benefits." Voila. They've hidden their true level of commitment to retaliate economically, under the eventuality we find ourselves in – no fancy multilateral secret plans required. The flip in Germany, especially, was dizzying, wasn't it? Do you think the whole package was improvised in the preceding few days? Or that it was assembled from preexisting "break in case of fire" emergency plans, at the very top, that lower-ranking party-members & coalition partners simply didn't need-to-know? I'm saying the latter.
- def_true_false 5y agoYes, I literally think that. It's not a coincidence that some of the claimed sanctions or support for Ukraine had to be walked back (jets) -- it's a direct consequence of lacking preparation and coordination. One example of something that wasn't prepackaged or prepared in any way: There are reports that only Lindner and Scholz knew about the 100bn EUR fund beforehand, the rest were surprised.