5 ms·
"The foundational tenet of the Zero Trust Model is that no actor, system, network, or service operating outside or within the security perimeter is trusted" It
by WalterBright 5y ago
"The foundational tenet of the Zero Trust Model is that no actor, system, network, or service operating outside or within the security perimeter is trusted"
It's about time. That's how airliners are designed. The guiding principle is "no single failure will bring the airplane down."
What it is not is "guarantee critical components will not fail".
The airline design principle is applicable to all kinds of things, like electrical grid design, security design, nuclear plant design, oil drilling platform design, ship design, and on and on. But I see it rarely applied, which is frustrating.
- hulitu 5y agoTell that to Microsoft.
- pinephoneguy 5y agoHow do you do shared secret authentication in this model? I know cert based auth is far better but today many apps rely on some kind of shared secret auth. Don't you by definition trust eg LDAP/IPA servers then? EDIT: In case it's not clear: I'm talking about employee facing software inside an organization where you might have some kind of single sign on system or a distributed account system (like IPA or LDAP.)
- WalterBright 5y agoOne method is "assume your system is penetrated, so do not put all your secrets on one system." For example, don't use the same password on your Etrade account that you use on your bank account.
- daveevad 5y agoI don't know but have wondered about this sort of thing before. There is a Wikipedia article on 'Key ceremony'[0] that seems to indicate an in-real-life shared secret creation and or sharing event. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_ceremony)[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Key_ceremony)[0]
- noasaservice 5y agoUse SAML. The SP never sees the credentials. The SP only sees a token which includes the username (NameID) and other attributes passed from the IdP through the client. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Assertion_Markup_Language https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Assertion_Markup_Lang... (Scroll down to the "Single sign-on using SAML in a Web browser" image for a good data flow depiction) Basically this seems to be a "SAML-IZE EVERYTHING".
- distortedsignal 5y agoBut with SAML you're trusting the cert/key pair on the signing end of the connection. If you say "well, we can use the cert provided by the server by getting it over HTTPS every time we need to auth with SAML," then you're trusting the Root CA Cert/Key pair for the TLS connection that underlies the HTTPS protocol. (Source: I've written two SAML SPs.) With ZT, you basically have to bootstrap trust from the factory. I don't think of ZT as "don't trust anything" - it's more like "trust our supply lines". Think about the failure modes of ZT: if the NIC, the CPU, the OS, and the bootloader are deemed secure at boot time, there has to be something that starts the bootloader and loads its keys. If you compromise _that_ piece, then you can compromise anything further up the stack and not worry too much about security alerts. The only way to make sure that all machines are secure/uncompromised is to XRay all of the bootloader chips and verify them down to the ~100um level (got this figure by talking to a guy doing grad work @UofM when he was in SV around 2017-2018, I want to say).
- WalterBright 5y agoAnother way to look at it is to not ask the question: *Can* this fail? but instead ask: *When* this fails, can it be survived?
- distortedsignal 5y agoWith all due respect to the esteemed gentleman, I think sometimes an equally important question is "When this fails, should it be survived?" There may be some operations that _shouldn't_ be worked around. For example, if my auth service goes down, should accesses continue, or should we prevent all accesses? I don't think I'm communicating myself clearly here, but I would like to thank the parent commenter for his insight into this area and more. Just to cover my bases. EDIT: I want to make clear that there is no sarcasm here. I respect WalterBright probably only behind Knuth in terms of effective programmers/engineers in the field today, and I doubt I could add anything to his opinions.
- WalterBright 5y agoIf the auth service has failed, the correct response is to shut down all access to what that service was connected to. In order to survive shutting down that access, the system must be compartmentalized, so the shutdown is limited in scope. For example, the hydraulic system on an airplane has a redundant equivalent hydraulic system. But within a hydraulic system, it is designed to isolate failed sections of it from the rest, so the rest can still function. I.e. developing a leak in the elevator actuators won't disable the aileron actuators on the wings. The Fukushima plant and Deepwater Horizon rig both had a vulnerability to a single point of failure that produced cascading failures that unzipped the whole system. Both were easily and inexpensively preventable.
- bombcar 5y agoEven an auth system can be handled in various other ways - for example, auth tokens can be handed out as valid for 48 hours but normally cycled every 24 - in case of auth failure those who already have a token can keep working for up to two days. But that may not fit the risk profile, and you may need additional considerations - and perhaps even different levels of authentication.
- WalterBright 5y agoA related principle is compartmentalization. For example, if your system is penetrated, it doesn't give access to all the information. There should never be "X was penetrated, 100 million records were stolen." It should be X only has access to 1 million records, and penetrating X should not compromise X2, X3, X4, etc.
- rascul 5y agoI believe you described the principle of least privilege, or something similar to it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_least_privilege https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_least_privilege
- bombcar 5y agoAnd it can go further - things like “I can look at any record in the database” and “I can run any sql query against it but only get a max of C results per hour” or similar to prevent exfiltration without preventing work against the dataset.
- WalterBright 5y agoJust on the last "60 Minutes" there was an episode about how a handful of substation failures would bring down the entire grid. Yet another example of the concepts of airliner design being completely unknown outside of the aviation industry. The "grid" doesn't appear to be a grid at all, but a tree. An actual grid would be able to route around failures, much like the internet protocol can do.
- nwallin 5y agoThe power grid is in fact a graph, not a tree, and not a grid. It is automatically able to route around failures, and it does route around the failures. These failures happen every day, but people almost never notice. Almost. The trouble is that the power grid just operates on the electrical principle of electricity following the path of least resistance. So if there's low resistance but low capacity line between generation and usage, the electricity will flow through it, and there is no QoS on the line that can limit how much power goes through it, besides on/off. The on/off nature of the interconnections is what makes the power grid fragile. If a interconnection has a rating of 100MW or whatever, and the grid attempts to pump 110MW through it, you either leave it on and hope it doesn't break or shut it off and pump 0MW. The grid will then automatically route that 110MW through other interconnects. If there is a nearby 500MW interconnect that is currently pumping 350MW, you're fine, but if it's pumping 475MW, you're probably not. This can lead to cascading failures. The grid does have the ability to shut down usage if there's a danger of a cascading failure. For instance, if your 100MW rated interconnect has 101MW coursing through it, you can shut down a neighborhood that's using 10MW or whatever, and keep the 100MW interconnect online with just 91MW running through it. This is what brownouts and rolling blackouts are. The grid can have major failures, but these major failures don't happen unless there are multiple overlapping minor failures. Similarly, if your 737 MAX has 2 MCAS sensors and 1 manual MCAS override button, and both your sensors and your manual override all fail, you're going to have a bad time. Look at the sequence of events of the 2003 Northeast blackout: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_blackout_of_2003#Sequence_of_events https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northeast_blackout_of_2003#Seq... There are at least half a dozen failures between the initial problem at 12:15pm and until the point of no return failure at 4:05pm that if handled properly would have averted the crisis and turned it into a minor inconvenience. At least half a dozen instances of human error plus multiple instances of equipment failures. If an aircraft had that many things go wrong all at once, the plane's going down. Note that the Texas power outage last year wasn't like this at all. The grid actually kept working fine, the problem is that there were lots of generators that failed as a result of the cold, mostly due to impure natural gas freezing. The generation capacity of the grid was cut to a fraction of its capacity, and as a result, they shut down a bunch of cities to reduce load. For whatever reason, they just left power off in several cities for days instead of doing rolling blackouts. I don't know enough about the circumstances to speculate on what the reason for that is.
- tptacek 5y agoIt's a good sound bite, but it's not really true. Nobody designs their IT infrastructure so that nothing is trusted; in fact, universally, IT security teams talk about their "source of truth" (usually: their single "source of truth") for things like authentication. What ZTN is mostly about is changing the SPOF we had before --- the network perimeter --- to something fuzzier and more flexible. It's a good plan; we've been talking for over 20 years, going back to the Jericho Forum, about "deperimeterization" and "segmentation", and segmentation hasn't really worked out. But it'd be a mistake to look at all of this stuff and think that it's a shift away from single points of failure, or to fundamentally greater resilience. We're opting for better SPOFs, not the elimination of SPOFs.
- distortedsignal 5y agoI kind of want to challenge this "better SPOFs" idea. From what I understand of the ZTN concept, the SPOF is the factory line. If an adversary can compromise what's on the board, it's really hard to prevent that adversary from controlling what happens on that machine. I have had people tell me in meetings at work that they have pictures of people swapping out parts on an assembly line for unknown parts. If that's happening, unless the machines are verified by XRay, from my point of view, the ZT concept isn't worth a whole lot.
- tptacek 5y agoA pitfall of all these ZTN discussions is that they tend to propose a definition of "zero trust" as an axiom, and then use deduction to construct a whole system from those first principles. This is especially useful for security product vendors, who will pick the most congenial definition of "zero trust" in order to derive a mandate for their products. We don't so much have to get lost in abstractions here. There's a blueprint: all this ZTN stuff was inspired by Google's BeyondCorp paper (ZTN is the marketing-neutral name for BeyondCorp; the Kubernetes to BC's Borg). So: just go read the BeyondTrust paper; it's great: https://storage.googleapis.com/pub-tools-public-publication-data/pdf/43231.pdf https://storage.googleapis.com/pub-tools-public-publication-...
- 5y ago
- WalterBright 5y agoI apply this in my own life, too. 1. when on a ladder, always 3 of my 4 limbs are firmly on the ladder at all times. 2. when jacking up my car, I always put 2 sets of jack stands under it. 3. I never put a body part underneath a chain hoist. 4. I rehearse in my mind what to do if the brakes fail.