4 ms·

I'm not sure if that makes sense. The goal is not to shoot aircraft down, the goal is to prevent them from coming in the first place. Wouldn't you want to disc

by evan_ 5y ago

I'm not sure if that makes sense. The goal is not to shoot aircraft down, the goal is to prevent them from coming in the first place. Wouldn't you want to disclose the hell out of your extremely effective anti-aircraft weapons so you don't have to use them as much? Obviously not the positioning or numbers but just that you have them...

mattnewton 5y ago
Not if your goal is to win a war of attrition.
- evan_ 5y ago
  Ukraine's win condition is not "destroy every airplane in Russia," it's "keep airplanes from blowing up stuff in Ukraine."
  - mattnewton 5y ago
    (obligatory I don't know what I am talking about, but) Russia has heavy artillery with crazy range. If they know you have air defenses they will just use artillery shelling instead that bypasses your defense, instead of giving you bombers or landing paratroopers as targets. I think that's how most missiles have been sent to Ukrainian cities so far. I don't think deterrence was a credible option for Ukraine before.
gojomo 5y ago
Not if early disclosure accelerates the development of countermeasures! Nor if you’re worried about a wider conflict - perhaps also involving Asia – & want both maximal degradation of Russian capabilities, & “mystery” advantages for as long as possible. Surprise is a force multiplier, but a new capability is only a surprise for a short period. And a simplistic model assuming the Ukrainian allies are optimally pursuing “prevention” as their goal insufficient to explain all mysteries. If the EU had been clearer about how intense sanctions would be, & how firm they considered the ‘red line’ limiting conflict to the regions Russian-allied forces already claimed, maybe the whole invasion could have been deterred! They weren’t so clear & firm, either because they were hiding the strength of their resolve, or the resolve only materialized late. The latter is currently the official story, but such things often only become known, if ever, years or decades later. People still debate whether Spain sunk the Maine in 1898, or FDR ignored or minimized advance warnings of Pearl Harbor to shepherd the US into WW2 in 1941. There’s also a gigantic phase change in strategy between when you believe an aggression is deterrable, & when you think it inevitable. If deterrence is an option, sure, show strength – but be aware the potential aggressor may detect any bluffs, or discount real strength as a bluff. But as soon as you decide war is inevitable, you may instead want to hide strengths, for a more decisive military response later. If the US/NATO concluded an invasion was inevitable 1 month, 6 months, or even years ago, there was plenty of time to secretly deploy “just in case” novel weapons & tactics - even while Ukraine’s leadership, especially, was publicly signaling “no war expected” & avoiding any overt mobilization.
- cycomanic 5y ago
  You only need to read/listen to German news, to know that there can't have been a "grand conspiracy" of Europeans to not show enough resolve. It is very clear that many (on both sides of the political spectrum, but particularly on the left) did not believe Putin would attack, they considered this the usual sabre-rattling and were completely shocked when he attacked. Also, the risk of deploying secret weapons into a state with significant corruption would have been much too high.
  - gojomo 5y ago
    If you assign conclusive weight to recent "news", rather than historical precedents, I think you'll remain at the mercy of constructed narratives about what's really happening in high-stakes diplomacy & warmaking. The US was shouting from the rooftops that they expected an attack, in a manner putting real credibility at risk. While laypeople, & left footsoldiers, may have completely discounted the possibility, Germany & others in NATO are close enough allies they'd have seen more of the tangible reasons why the US was saying that. Note that feigned surprise can also be a conscious tactic, to help shepherd-along any alliance stragglers, or domestic opinion. Or, excuse inaction. "No one could have known", say the official mouthpieces for those who ignored the alarms from those who did know. "We are blameless!" Further, if there was actual confidence in policymakers that an attack was unlikely, & that Putin was deterrable, then pre-announcing the severity of the response would have been very cheap! You won't have to do it, in the expected case. And pre-announcing makes the expected case even more likely. The risk of coordinating with a leaky/corrupt regime isn't necessarily disqualifyng. There may be portions of the Ukraine government/military in which there was very high trust - such as close contacts in special forces, & those who have repeatedly proven themselves in the last ~8y of lower-grade hostilities. Or, people whose comms have been completely pierced – so NATO knows exactly how much corruption, or mixed-loyalties, they'll express. Weaponry could also have been pre-positioned just outside Ukraine, or kept in the custody/knowledge of trusted contractors or deniably pre-positioned special forces. I hope you don't think Russians, like the saboteur groups repeatedly confronted in Ukrainian cities, are the only forces who can pretend to be someone else when it suits them! As another example, no one outside of the home airbase support teams know who's really flying a fighter jet, unless enemies shoot it down & recover the pilot. I hope Ukraine has some world-class fighter pilots! But with lives and practically priceless (in the short term) military hardware at stake, if an even 10% better pilot is ready & willing from an allied counry, I suspect Ukraine can grant them a uniform & citizenship instantly. (It's been surprising how many NATO countries have said it's OK for their private citizens to go fight in Ukraine.)
Gibbon1 5y ago
One thing I remember is a Russian fighter operating in Northern West Syria accidentally strayed into Turkish airspace and the Turks shot it down immediately. Combine that with the Russians would have a lot of trouble replacing any losses.

by evan_ 5y ago

mattnewton 5y ago

Not if your goal is to win a war of attrition.

evan_ 5y ago
Ukraine's win condition is not "destroy every airplane in Russia," it's "keep airplanes from blowing up stuff in Ukraine."
- mattnewton 5y ago
  (obligatory I don't know what I am talking about, but) Russia has heavy artillery with crazy range. If they know you have air defenses they will just use artillery shelling instead that bypasses your defense, instead of giving you bombers or landing paratroopers as targets. I think that's how most missiles have been sent to Ukrainian cities so far. I don't think deterrence was a credible option for Ukraine before.

gojomo 5y ago

Not if early disclosure accelerates the development of countermeasures! Nor if you’re worried about a wider conflict - perhaps also involving Asia – & want both maximal degradation of Russian capabilities, & “mystery” advantages for as long as possible. Surprise is a force multiplier, but a new capability is only a surprise for a short period. And a simplistic model assuming the Ukrainian allies are optimally pursuing “prevention” as their goal insufficient to explain all mysteries. If the EU had been clearer about how intense sanctions would be, & how firm they considered the ‘red line’ limiting conflict to the regions Russian-allied forces already claimed, maybe the whole invasion could have been deterred! They weren’t so clear & firm, either because they were hiding the strength of their resolve, or the resolve only materialized late. The latter is currently the official story, but such things often only become known, if ever, years or decades later. People still debate whether Spain sunk the Maine in 1898, or FDR ignored or minimized advance warnings of Pearl Harbor to shepherd the US into WW2 in 1941. There’s also a gigantic phase change in strategy between when you believe an aggression is deterrable, & when you think it inevitable. If deterrence is an option, sure, show strength – but be aware the potential aggressor may detect any bluffs, or discount real strength as a bluff. But as soon as you decide war is inevitable, you may instead want to hide strengths, for a more decisive military response later. If the US/NATO concluded an invasion was inevitable 1 month, 6 months, or even years ago, there was plenty of time to secretly deploy “just in case” novel weapons & tactics - even while Ukraine’s leadership, especially, was publicly signaling “no war expected” & avoiding any overt mobilization.

cycomanic 5y ago
You only need to read/listen to German news, to know that there can't have been a "grand conspiracy" of Europeans to not show enough resolve. It is very clear that many (on both sides of the political spectrum, but particularly on the left) did not believe Putin would attack, they considered this the usual sabre-rattling and were completely shocked when he attacked. Also, the risk of deploying secret weapons into a state with significant corruption would have been much too high.
- gojomo 5y ago
  If you assign conclusive weight to recent "news", rather than historical precedents, I think you'll remain at the mercy of constructed narratives about what's really happening in high-stakes diplomacy & warmaking. The US was shouting from the rooftops that they expected an attack, in a manner putting real credibility at risk. While laypeople, & left footsoldiers, may have completely discounted the possibility, Germany & others in NATO are close enough allies they'd have seen more of the tangible reasons why the US was saying that. Note that feigned surprise can also be a conscious tactic, to help shepherd-along any alliance stragglers, or domestic opinion. Or, excuse inaction. "No one could have known", say the official mouthpieces for those who ignored the alarms from those who did know. "We are blameless!" Further, if there was actual confidence in policymakers that an attack was unlikely, & that Putin was deterrable, then pre-announcing the severity of the response would have been very cheap! You won't have to do it, in the expected case. And pre-announcing makes the expected case even more likely. The risk of coordinating with a leaky/corrupt regime isn't necessarily disqualifyng. There may be portions of the Ukraine government/military in which there was very high trust - such as close contacts in special forces, & those who have repeatedly proven themselves in the last ~8y of lower-grade hostilities. Or, people whose comms have been completely pierced – so NATO knows exactly how much corruption, or mixed-loyalties, they'll express. Weaponry could also have been pre-positioned just outside Ukraine, or kept in the custody/knowledge of trusted contractors or deniably pre-positioned special forces. I hope you don't think Russians, like the saboteur groups repeatedly confronted in Ukrainian cities, are the only forces who can pretend to be someone else when it suits them! As another example, no one outside of the home airbase support teams know who's really flying a fighter jet, unless enemies shoot it down & recover the pilot. I hope Ukraine has some world-class fighter pilots! But with lives and practically priceless (in the short term) military hardware at stake, if an even 10% better pilot is ready & willing from an allied counry, I suspect Ukraine can grant them a uniform & citizenship instantly. (It's been surprising how many NATO countries have said it's OK for their private citizens to go fight in Ukraine.)

Gibbon1 5y ago

One thing I remember is a Russian fighter operating in Northern West Syria accidentally strayed into Turkish airspace and the Turks shot it down immediately. Combine that with the Russians would have a lot of trouble replacing any losses.