You are absolutely correct. With web traffic encryption, you’re putting ALL your trust in ALL of the root certificates on your system. And this has about the s

You are absolutely correct. With web traffic encryption, you’re putting ALL your trust in ALL of the root certificates on your system. And this has about the same number of possible failure points than PGP encrypted emails. Trick a user into installing a root cert? Game over. Find an exploit in one of the default, super trusted CAs and get them to issue you a certificate for a domain / with flags you have no business having in (like this has never happened before, I couldn’t quickly find this, but I clearly remeber the day when some major CA issued certificates and let you issue further certificates down the chain, for which the intended use was to allow you to do subdomains on your own, but they worked for any domain at all)? Game over Nation state? Game over (except Kazakhstan, they chose the path of most resistance with a method that’s trivially defeatee) Not to mention DPI, which can’t reveal contents, but can reveal what kind of content it is, and from that possibly identify exactly what it is. HTTPS prevents only the most dumbed-down MITM attacks. Anyone with enough resources and determination will be able to find out exactly what you’re doing on the web without too much trouble.