I respect the basic idea of falsification, but the fact is we routinely draw conclusions despite their being just one of infinite possibilities, all of which ar

I respect the basic idea of falsification, but the fact is we routinely draw conclusions despite their being just one of infinite possibilities, all of which are unfalsifiable. The tool we use to distinguish between them is Occam's razor, and with it we can argue for one conclusion or another. Quantum physicists don't agree on MW, Copenhagen, or weirder hidden-variable type theories. But very few of them are of the opinion that, say, the universe has obeyed the laws of physics until now by chance. It has exactly as much evidence as every other theory, but isn't favored by Occam's razor. Someone favoring the Copenhagen interpretation would argue that the rest of the waveform is deadweight. Someone favoring MW would say collapse is. I don't know many hidden variable people, but maybe they think probabilities are just more elegant. Not only are universes operating on each of these theories distinct, there are absolutely things we could discover that would push the balance! Bell's Theorem genuinely hurts the credibility of hidden variable theories. MW would be absolutely deranged without the notion of decoherence. If someone published a paper tomorrow showing why world measure translates into probabilities, I'd call that a big win for MW. If someone found a clever, non-decoherence reason for collapse, it would be a big win for the Copenhagen interpretation. Regardless, such speculation is far from metaphysics. Overly theoretical? Perhaps. But Newton wasn't doing metaphysics when he proposed gravity, and he was shown to be basically right the instant a handful of elegant equations predicted the motion of the planets.