4 ms·

Perhaps a dumb question, but is there a definitive connection between the outsourcing mentioned here and the MCAS[1] system that has caused the 737-MAX tragedie

by jka 5y ago

Perhaps a dumb question, but is there a definitive connection between the outsourcing mentioned here and the MCAS[1] system that has caused the 737-MAX tragedies? (I have searched the web to try to confirm a link; there are some articles[2][3][4] that mention both MCAS and the outsourcing, but I haven't yet seen anything to indicate that outsourcing was used for development of MCAS-related software) [1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Augmentation_System https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maneuvering_Characteristics_Au... [2] - https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/boeing-s-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/boeing-s-... [3] - https://pulse.icdm.com.my/resource/boeing-a-plane-wreck/ https://pulse.icdm.com.my/resource/boeing-a-plane-wreck/ [4] - https://simpat.tech/did-boeings-software-development-outsourcing-contribute-to-its-737-max-8-failures/ https://simpat.tech/did-boeings-software-development-outsour...

imglorp 5y ago
The software was not truly to blame for the deaths. Management was fully aware that a redundant AOA sensor was desireable: they charged extra for it. Management also demanded a product that did not require pilot training. Then there was the whole certification malfeasance. The software was one piece of an impossible configuration.
AnimalMuppet 5y ago
$9/hour devs in India are less likely to say "Only listening to one angle-of-attack sensor is stupid; you need to redesign this." They are especially less likely to keep pushing until they get management to listen. I mean, sure, the designers should have known that, too. But by outsourcing the software development, they missed a chance to have the bad design questioned and corrected.
- bdavis__ 5y ago
  in general, a software dev anywhere might not realize the flaw. but an systems engineer or other aircraft and flight controls engineer would notice it. and they should have, when the requirements were written. and again when each requirement was verified prior to flight.
  - fallingmeat 5y ago
    well said
- coredog64 5y ago
  If you read the article, it’s clearly stated that the outsourced work was not related to MCAS. It was display software and flight-test software.
deleted 5y ago
[deleted]
Farmadupe 5y ago
Aerospace still uses traditional waterfall processes (usually called the 'V' lifecycle in the industry because if you put a 90 degree bend in the waterfall it looks like a V). The flow of responsibilities is strictly hierarchical. If Boeing specified to to their outsourcers that the software should have read from two sensors, then the outsourcer would be 'in the wrong' if they didn't implement that. With a strict interpretation of the rules Boeing doesn't necessarily have to check their outsourcer's work (In Safety-Critical the outsourcer has not just a commercial but also a moral obligation to perform all actions with competence)... But at the same time, because Boeing retains overall responsibility for its products no matter who it subcontracts to, it would be a mistake to not double check the work. So to at least some extent (at least with moral-tinted glasses), it doesn't actually matter whether or not the fault was introduced by the subcontractor or not. Boeing is responsibility either way, Answering your question only tells us if the subcontractor is also at fault. It's very important to note that in the Aerospace world, the subcontractor's moral duty only requires them to do exactly what they're told to do (assuming that the subcontractor was only reponsible for software design and not systems design). If Boeing told them to use one sensor, then the subcontractor has done nothing wrong if they failed to notice that this was fundamentally unsafe.
- sixdimensional 5y ago
  This is not entirely true anymore. Many aerospace organizations attempted to move to less rigid/structured development process (e.g. wishing to become more agile) to attempt to "move fast and break things". This trend actually has lead to an decrease in software quality and more quality escapes. The larger aerospace manufacturers have mostly stuck with more structured process for safety/mission critical process, but around the edges (e.g. other systems running on aircraft), less structure and faster turnaround/more "testing in the field" is happening. There was always the "skunk works" type of teams in aerospace organizations who worked with a lot less guardrails as well. Source: worked for an avionics company previously.
raz32dust 5y ago
The articles states, "Boeing said the company did not rely on engineers from HCL and Cyient for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which has been linked to the Lion Air crash last October and the Ethiopian Airlines disaster in March."
- jka 5y ago
  Thank you, my mistake - I did scan through the article and scrutinized a few sections, but I had missed that. I think I was expecting to find the acronym as opposed to the full expanded name.

by jka 5y ago

imglorp 5y ago

The software was not truly to blame for the deaths. Management was fully aware that a redundant AOA sensor was desireable: they charged extra for it. Management also demanded a product that did not require pilot training. Then there was the whole certification malfeasance. The software was one piece of an impossible configuration.

AnimalMuppet 5y ago

$9/hour devs in India are less likely to say "Only listening to one angle-of-attack sensor is stupid; you need to redesign this." They are especially less likely to keep pushing until they get management to listen. I mean, sure, the designers should have known that, too. But by outsourcing the software development, they missed a chance to have the bad design questioned and corrected.

bdavis__ 5y ago
in general, a software dev anywhere might not realize the flaw. but an systems engineer or other aircraft and flight controls engineer would notice it. and they should have, when the requirements were written. and again when each requirement was verified prior to flight.
- fallingmeat 5y ago
  well said
coredog64 5y ago
If you read the article, it’s clearly stated that the outsourced work was not related to MCAS. It was display software and flight-test software.

deleted 5y ago

[deleted]

Farmadupe 5y ago

Aerospace still uses traditional waterfall processes (usually called the 'V' lifecycle in the industry because if you put a 90 degree bend in the waterfall it looks like a V). The flow of responsibilities is strictly hierarchical. If Boeing specified to to their outsourcers that the software should have read from two sensors, then the outsourcer would be 'in the wrong' if they didn't implement that. With a strict interpretation of the rules Boeing doesn't necessarily have to check their outsourcer's work (In Safety-Critical the outsourcer has not just a commercial but also a moral obligation to perform all actions with competence)... But at the same time, because Boeing retains overall responsibility for its products no matter who it subcontracts to, it would be a mistake to not double check the work. So to at least some extent (at least with moral-tinted glasses), it doesn't actually matter whether or not the fault was introduced by the subcontractor or not. Boeing is responsibility either way, Answering your question only tells us if the subcontractor is also at fault. It's very important to note that in the Aerospace world, the subcontractor's moral duty only requires them to do exactly what they're told to do (assuming that the subcontractor was only reponsible for software design and not systems design). If Boeing told them to use one sensor, then the subcontractor has done nothing wrong if they failed to notice that this was fundamentally unsafe.

sixdimensional 5y ago
This is not entirely true anymore. Many aerospace organizations attempted to move to less rigid/structured development process (e.g. wishing to become more agile) to attempt to "move fast and break things". This trend actually has lead to an decrease in software quality and more quality escapes. The larger aerospace manufacturers have mostly stuck with more structured process for safety/mission critical process, but around the edges (e.g. other systems running on aircraft), less structure and faster turnaround/more "testing in the field" is happening. There was always the "skunk works" type of teams in aerospace organizations who worked with a lot less guardrails as well. Source: worked for an avionics company previously.

raz32dust 5y ago

The articles states, "Boeing said the company did not rely on engineers from HCL and Cyient for the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, which has been linked to the Lion Air crash last October and the Ethiopian Airlines disaster in March."

jka 5y ago
Thank you, my mistake - I did scan through the article and scrutinized a few sections, but I had missed that. I think I was expecting to find the acronym as opposed to the full expanded name.