I agree our nations have done less than everything that could be done. I do think we've done quite better than could have been hoped around 2016. I believe you

I agree our nations have done less than everything that could be done. I do think we've done quite better than could have been hoped around 2016. I believe your moral certainty is quite flawed: 1. It rests entirely on hindsight. These events only started seeming inevitable about 24 hours ago. Now we've found them to be true, we trust and are even impressed by the Americans' warnings. But these last weeks I little doubt the Bundestag's halls, and European couches everywhere, heard many recollections of Iraq's supposed WMD program. 2. You advocate a purely moral policy. There's a quiet part in every happy Westerner's mind that believes, without examination, in the ultimate and inevitable triumph of good over evil. To be fair, the past few generations experienced reassuring evidence for this assumption - and Hollywood keeps the reassurance alive. Unfortunately, the good guys do not always win; moral will cannot overcome geopolitical reality. Neither Realpolitik nor MAD were made defunct by 20 years of Pax Americana. History may have had a near-death experience, but she's apparently now quite recovered. Ukraine is Russia's neighbor. Ukraine is very much Russia's family: brothers who long cohabited. Ukraine's attitude towards Russia is legitimately a vital interest of Russia. Russia has, by right of force (Realpolitik!), complete dominance to act in Ukraine. Deterrence was always the only realistic option. 500,000 Western soldiers <500m from Moscow would be both target for, and, perhaps, sufficient justification in Russians citizens' eyes for the use of, tactical nukes. 3. It is unrealistic about how democracies work. Only the aggression your proposed policy is meant to prevent would be sufficient to convince democracies to implement it: an unfortunate catch-22. Democracies are extremely reluctant to go to war, which is good. The price paid is inevitably foolishness in global power politics. Roosevelt could not have started a pre-emptive war with Japan, though perhaps this would have been the optimal move. Similarly, there is no chance that, in the context of 20 years of unbroken peace, any Nato member would be interested in such a massive deployment directly next to Moscow. No scenario would have allowed this risk. If it did somehow happen, Russia's aggressive response could easily divide the alliance in recrimination for implementing such a reckless policy.