4 ms·

Right, but the original experiment did not measure (A) 'the ability to delay gratification'. It measured (B) the decision children took in the face of uncertain

Right, but the original experiment did not measure (A) 'the ability to delay gratification'. It measured (B) the decision children took in the face of uncertainty. Only if all children assessed the chance of getting the promised second marshmallow as ~100%, would be (B) be a reasonable proxy for (A).

s1artibartfast 5y ago
I would argue that B is a subset of A. If you can't delay gratification because your mental model is an inconsistant world with broken promises, you still failed to delay gratification. B may explain the response to A, and be rational based on personal experience, but the action was still taken. The question of why some children can delay gratification is different that what how predictive delayed gratification is of life outcomes. It can also be true that broken promises are a better prediction of future outcomes.
- rahimnathwani 5y ago
  'can' is inherent (a capability of the child) 'do' depends on context I am capable of driving fast, and weaving in and out of traffic on the freeway. But I choose not to, due to the risk/reward trade-off. If I were in a different situation (e.g. sick child needing to get to hospital urgently), I might act differently. Measuring my behaviour in one context may tell you little about what I can and might do in another.
  - s1artibartfast 5y ago
    This is all quibbles. Replace can with do in my statement and it still stands. Measuring what people do can also have predictive power. >Measuring my behaviour in one context may tell you little about what I can and might do in another. It may tell you little, or it may tell you a lot. That is why you run a study and see how predictive it is. If someone drives fast and reckless today, they might not tomorrow. You can still run a study to see how predictive today's driving is for tomorrow. It won't be 100%, but I bet you would see some correlation. Someone who smoked a cigarette today is more likely to smoke tomorrow than someone that who didn't smoke today. That people can quit and can start doesn't change this

s1artibartfast 5y ago

I would argue that B is a subset of A. If you can't delay gratification because your mental model is an inconsistant world with broken promises, you still failed to delay gratification. B may explain the response to A, and be rational based on personal experience, but the action was still taken. The question of why some children can delay gratification is different that what how predictive delayed gratification is of life outcomes. It can also be true that broken promises are a better prediction of future outcomes.

rahimnathwani 5y ago
'can' is inherent (a capability of the child) 'do' depends on context I am capable of driving fast, and weaving in and out of traffic on the freeway. But I choose not to, due to the risk/reward trade-off. If I were in a different situation (e.g. sick child needing to get to hospital urgently), I might act differently. Measuring my behaviour in one context may tell you little about what I can and might do in another.
- s1artibartfast 5y ago
  This is all quibbles. Replace can with do in my statement and it still stands. Measuring what people do can also have predictive power. >Measuring my behaviour in one context may tell you little about what I can and might do in another. It may tell you little, or it may tell you a lot. That is why you run a study and see how predictive it is. If someone drives fast and reckless today, they might not tomorrow. You can still run a study to see how predictive today's driving is for tomorrow. It won't be 100%, but I bet you would see some correlation. Someone who smoked a cigarette today is more likely to smoke tomorrow than someone that who didn't smoke today. That people can quit and can start doesn't change this