4 ms·

Ukraine never had the control of those nukes. “Until then, Ukraine had the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile, of which Ukraine had physical, but

Ukraine never had the control of those nukes. “Until then, Ukraine had the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile, of which Ukraine had physical, but not operational, control. Russia alone controlled the codes needed to operate. Their use was dependent on Russian-controlled electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum_on_Securit...

JumpCrisscross 5y ago
> Russia alone controlled the codes needed to operate If Ukraine had held on to those nukes, disconnected, an engineer today could re-work them to function under Kiev’s command. (American PALs from the era have de-classified weaknesses that merited upgrades. Post-USSR nuclear safekeeping was roundly criticised for decades [1].) Even barring that, possessing fissile material is no small feat. It would give Kiev the credible capability to e.g. threaten large sections of Russian agricultural production. That’s the sort of thing that deters tanks. [1] https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SE-11.pdf https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SE-11.pdf
- morelisp 5y ago
- LargoLasskhyfv 5y ago
  And there was this: https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/05/02/weekly-document-the-censored-chapter-1946/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/05/02/weekly-document-t... and this: https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/01/04/weekly-document-8-reexamining-the-the-nth-country-experiment-1967/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/01/04/weekly-document-8...
baybal2 5y ago
> “Until then, Ukraine had the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile, of which Ukraine had physical, but not operational, control. Russia alone controlled the codes needed to operate. Their use was dependent on Russian-controlled electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system” I don't know where they got it, the book author cited in Wiki. The man cited read too much Tom Clancy I guess. USSR nuclear weapons had no permissive action links as such Kazakhstan's, and Ukrainian's nukes were fully operational, sans confused nuclear weapons officer command chain. The launch codes were employed, but they were used solely for checking the authenticity of launch, and targetting commands.

JumpCrisscross 5y ago

> Russia alone controlled the codes needed to operate If Ukraine had held on to those nukes, disconnected, an engineer today could re-work them to function under Kiev’s command. (American PALs from the era have de-classified weaknesses that merited upgrades. Post-USSR nuclear safekeeping was roundly criticised for decades [1].) Even barring that, possessing fissile material is no small feat. It would give Kiev the credible capability to e.g. threaten large sections of Russian agricultural production. That’s the sort of thing that deters tanks. [1] https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SE-11.pdf https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/SE-11.pdf

morelisp 5y ago
LargoLasskhyfv 5y ago
And there was this: https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/05/02/weekly-document-the-censored-chapter-1946/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/05/02/weekly-document-t... and this: https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/01/04/weekly-document-8-reexamining-the-the-nth-country-experiment-1967/ https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2012/01/04/weekly-document-8...

baybal2 5y ago

> “Until then, Ukraine had the world's third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile, of which Ukraine had physical, but not operational, control. Russia alone controlled the codes needed to operate. Their use was dependent on Russian-controlled electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system” I don't know where they got it, the book author cited in Wiki. The man cited read too much Tom Clancy I guess. USSR nuclear weapons had no permissive action links as such Kazakhstan's, and Ukrainian's nukes were fully operational, sans confused nuclear weapons officer command chain. The launch codes were employed, but they were used solely for checking the authenticity of launch, and targetting commands.