> Maybe one should do the more principled Bayesian thing and just allow oneself to be uncertain proportional to the amount you don't know. I think this still f

> Maybe one should do the more principled Bayesian thing and just allow oneself to be uncertain proportional to the amount you don't know. I think this still fails in the sense that the distribution representing one's beliefs is only defined with respect to a set of hypotheses. By invoking Bayes, presumably you acknowledge that different parties will come to the conversation with different priors. But critically, one can only update one's beliefs given both evidence and a likelihood function related that evidence back to hypotheses in the domain of one's beliefs. The "our take" summary near the end of the article explicitly says that they would regard the claim as reasonable given the right explicitly definition of consciousness. > The reality is that we don’t have a widely accepted definition, let alone understanding, of consciousness. Claiming that we have already replicated such a nebulous concept with computers seems improbable at best. Our take is that the claim could also be reasonable, but only if a particular definition of consciousness was specified as well.