4 ms·

It is possible to define an upper boundary for "this is not conscious" and a lower boundary for "this is conscious" with grey area in between them. Thus, even

It is possible to define an upper boundary for "this is not conscious" and a lower boundary for "this is conscious" with grey area in between them. Thus, even if we cannot clearly state for any given animal whether it is or is not conscious, we can still clearly state that, say, a coffee maker is not conscious, even if it has rudimentary processing capability, or that a person is. As I implied in another comment[0], I believe it would be both possible and valuable to construct a set of conditions that we collectively feel are necessary, if not sufficient, to define consciousness. That way, we could at least rule it out as long as no AI meets those minimum standards. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30409569 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=30409569

wallacoloo 5y ago
> we can still clearly state that, say, a coffee maker is not conscious, even if it has rudimentary processing capability a coffee maker might include a temperature sensor (thermistor) and a heating element. does it predict the future? yes: it has an expectation of the future temperature given the current state. does it model itself as an agent? to a limited degree: it considers the future effects to the thermistor which its immediate control of the heater has, it might even run hypotheticals over a set of different heater controls. throw in a pressure sensor or a flow meter and some valves for more fun. now, i haven’t read much literature post 90’s on this, but one of the more prominent components of consciousness seemed to be: modeling yourself as an actor within a larger setting, and using that to produce outputs based on predictions and thereby cause a specific future(*). does the coffee maker qualify? also i don’t think many people think of consciousness in a binary sense. that grey area you describe may be less of “we don’t know if these are conscious (binary)”, but rather “we don’t know if these things have experiences which are relatable enough to our own to be worth considering in the motivating questions (i.e. ethics).” and the things at the bottom (the coffee maker) are more like “whatever experience this thing has is so far removed from our own that we’ll never be able to understand it in human terms (like pain and suffering or wants and desires).” (*) though some people like Dennet argue that the conscious experience might not always be involved in the causal part of this loop.

wallacoloo 5y ago

> we can still clearly state that, say, a coffee maker is not conscious, even if it has rudimentary processing capability a coffee maker might include a temperature sensor (thermistor) and a heating element. does it predict the future? yes: it has an expectation of the future temperature given the current state. does it model itself as an agent? to a limited degree: it considers the future effects to the thermistor which its immediate control of the heater has, it might even run hypotheticals over a set of different heater controls. throw in a pressure sensor or a flow meter and some valves for more fun. now, i haven’t read much literature post 90’s on this, but one of the more prominent components of consciousness seemed to be: modeling yourself as an actor within a larger setting, and using that to produce outputs based on predictions and thereby cause a specific future(*). does the coffee maker qualify? also i don’t think many people think of consciousness in a binary sense. that grey area you describe may be less of “we don’t know if these are conscious (binary)”, but rather “we don’t know if these things have experiences which are relatable enough to our own to be worth considering in the motivating questions (i.e. ethics).” and the things at the bottom (the coffee maker) are more like “whatever experience this thing has is so far removed from our own that we’ll never be able to understand it in human terms (like pain and suffering or wants and desires).” (*) though some people like Dennet argue that the conscious experience might not always be involved in the causal part of this loop.