4 ms·

I don't understand your point, if the database is leaked the security is compromised... well yes red is red, and green is green and HTTPS improves NOTHING of th

by bullen 5y ago

I don't understand your point, if the database is leaked the security is compromised... well yes red is red, and green is green and HTTPS improves NOTHING of that. HTTPS is a huge waste of electricity. A more frugal way of securing logins is to use this RFC: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289 Registrations would need additional security but HTTPS with centralized root certificates is NOT one of them.

jamespwilliams 5y ago
Do you agree that storing passwords in plain text is a problem? My point is that storing passwords in a way compatible with using Digest authentication is essentially equivalent to storing your passwords in plain text, at least with respect to your own site’s authentication.
- bullen 5y ago
  You don't store them as plain text, you store them as hashes. And then you send a server salt/nonce and the browser hashes the plain text password with the salted hash in your database and then with the server salt/nonce. Still HTTPS solves nothing of that. I don't even know what Digest is... I'm talking this RFC: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289
thayne 5y ago
You shouldn't store a password in plaintext in your database. So if your database is leaked, they don't have the user's actual passwords. But with the digest scheme, you can't store a hash of the digest, because if all you have is Hash2(Hash1(username:realm:password)) and the nonces, then you can't compute Hash1(Hash1(username:realm:password):server_nonce:client_nonce), assuming that Hash2 is irreversible, which you want it to be.
- bullen 5y ago
  > Hash1(Hash1(username:realm:password):server_nonce:client_nonce) client_nonce? This is how the RFC works: Hash(Hash(username:password):server_nonce) What is the difference between Hash1 and Hash2? Hash(username:password) is what you store in the database != plain text. Also what is realm?
  - thayne 5y ago
    > client_nonce? Yes, the client also generates a nonce that is included in the digest. The full digest (according to RFC 2617) is (assuming qop is used): request-digest = <"> < KD ( H(A1), unq(nonce-value) ":" nc-value ":" unq(cnonce-value) ":" unq(qop-value) ":" H(A2) ) <"> > What is the difference between Hash1 and Hash2? Hash1 is the hash algorithm for the authorization digest, so MD5 or maybe SHA256 (although only firefox currently supports that). Hash2 is the hash algorithm (including salting) used on the server to hash the hash of the username password before storing in the database. > Hash(username:password) is what you store in the database != plain text. The password isn't plaintext, but if the Hash(username:password) is compromised that gives an attacker enough information to impersonate that user. The attacker can just use that `Hash(username:password)` to compute the digest, they don't need to know the original password.
    - bullen 5y ago
      Yes, again if the database is compromised, it's compromised... I don't understand why so many people keep mentioning that when HTTPS does not solve that either?!
      - thayne 5y ago
        If a database of passwords is compromised, but the passwords are properly hashed and salted (server-side, not client-side), then you would need a rainbow table for each salt in order to actually get something usable from the compromised data.
- catlifeonmars 5y ago
  This is vulnerable to 2nd preimage attacks. As a rule of thumb, you should use HMAC whenever you are concatenating values.
  - bullen 5y ago
    Can you exaplin what a "2nd preimage attack" is and how HMAC solves it? If it's an attack you can do after the database is compromised it's not very interesting, and if it's an attack you can do over the wire then you can just limit the number of login attempts per some duration no?
    - catlifeonmars 5y ago
      I can try to explain, but this answer on the theoretical computer science stackexchange does it much better: https://cstheory.stackexchange.com/a/591 https://cstheory.stackexchange.com/a/591 There are numerous ways to accidentally introduce a weakness to 2nd preimage resistance. Using an HMAC is a way to “reset” the entropy of a hash key and eliminate any unwanted source of information leakage.
  - thayne 5y ago
    which is itself a problem with using the Digest method from RFC 2617
SahAssar 5y ago
If the site isn't served over https why would you trust anything on it with sensetive info like passwords, personal info or payment details? if "HTTPS is a huge waste of electricity" can you please explain to me how to currently secure (in transit) user information entered on my site without it?
- bullen 5y ago
  1st you shouldn't trust any site with anything. BUT if you trust it with anything it's a password so that only you can prove that you are you. And then you use server side nonce hashing to ONLY compute that part securely wasting only the required cycles one each end to proove you are you period! Then, if for some reason you need additional security on some ulterior action, say a payment, you just do the same trick again. That way you save your servers and the electricity grid from encrypting every meaningless cat picture in the world just because you are paranoid. Electricity is not an energy source, we are going to pay a very high price for it soon. It's the most liquid energy form we have and therefor when oil becomes illiquid (both litteraly and economically because the quality of oil is degrading at a rapid pace) prices in electrons (which have no quality properties that differ) will explode! Again read the RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289, and think about where you want to spend you energy, more customers or less energy for your own kids.
  - SahAssar 5y ago
    > 1st you shouldn't trust any site with anything. Okay, so your proposal is to never use any private info, anywhere, ever on the internet? > Again read the RFC Page 2 of that RFC says > It does not prevent a network eavesdropper from gaining access to private information and does not provide protection against either "social engineering" or active attacks How do you propose to prevent MITM attacks? How do you propose to be able to send private data to a server in a way that is readable by the server?
    - bullen 5y ago
      Nothing is private if you send it somewhere. Embrace the chaos, hide in the noise and save energy!

by bullen 5y ago

jamespwilliams 5y ago

Do you agree that storing passwords in plain text is a problem? My point is that storing passwords in a way compatible with using Digest authentication is essentially equivalent to storing your passwords in plain text, at least with respect to your own site’s authentication.

bullen 5y ago
You don't store them as plain text, you store them as hashes. And then you send a server salt/nonce and the browser hashes the plain text password with the salted hash in your database and then with the server salt/nonce. Still HTTPS solves nothing of that. I don't even know what Digest is... I'm talking this RFC: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289

thayne 5y ago

You shouldn't store a password in plaintext in your database. So if your database is leaked, they don't have the user's actual passwords. But with the digest scheme, you can't store a hash of the digest, because if all you have is Hash2(Hash1(username:realm:password)) and the nonces, then you can't compute Hash1(Hash1(username:realm:password):server_nonce:client_nonce), assuming that Hash2 is irreversible, which you want it to be.

bullen 5y ago
> Hash1(Hash1(username:realm:password):server_nonce:client_nonce) client_nonce? This is how the RFC works: Hash(Hash(username:password):server_nonce) What is the difference between Hash1 and Hash2? Hash(username:password) is what you store in the database != plain text. Also what is realm?
- thayne 5y ago
  > client_nonce? Yes, the client also generates a nonce that is included in the digest. The full digest (according to RFC 2617) is (assuming qop is used): request-digest = <"> < KD ( H(A1), unq(nonce-value) ":" nc-value ":" unq(cnonce-value) ":" unq(qop-value) ":" H(A2) ) <"> > What is the difference between Hash1 and Hash2? Hash1 is the hash algorithm for the authorization digest, so MD5 or maybe SHA256 (although only firefox currently supports that). Hash2 is the hash algorithm (including salting) used on the server to hash the hash of the username password before storing in the database. > Hash(username:password) is what you store in the database != plain text. The password isn't plaintext, but if the Hash(username:password) is compromised that gives an attacker enough information to impersonate that user. The attacker can just use that `Hash(username:password)` to compute the digest, they don't need to know the original password.
  - bullen 5y ago
    Yes, again if the database is compromised, it's compromised... I don't understand why so many people keep mentioning that when HTTPS does not solve that either?!
    - thayne 5y ago
      If a database of passwords is compromised, but the passwords are properly hashed and salted (server-side, not client-side), then you would need a rainbow table for each salt in order to actually get something usable from the compromised data.
catlifeonmars 5y ago
This is vulnerable to 2nd preimage attacks. As a rule of thumb, you should use HMAC whenever you are concatenating values.
- bullen 5y ago
  Can you exaplin what a "2nd preimage attack" is and how HMAC solves it? If it's an attack you can do after the database is compromised it's not very interesting, and if it's an attack you can do over the wire then you can just limit the number of login attempts per some duration no?
  - catlifeonmars 5y ago
    I can try to explain, but this answer on the theoretical computer science stackexchange does it much better: https://cstheory.stackexchange.com/a/591 https://cstheory.stackexchange.com/a/591 There are numerous ways to accidentally introduce a weakness to 2nd preimage resistance. Using an HMAC is a way to “reset” the entropy of a hash key and eliminate any unwanted source of information leakage.
- thayne 5y ago
  which is itself a problem with using the Digest method from RFC 2617

SahAssar 5y ago

If the site isn't served over https why would you trust anything on it with sensetive info like passwords, personal info or payment details? if "HTTPS is a huge waste of electricity" can you please explain to me how to currently secure (in transit) user information entered on my site without it?

bullen 5y ago
1st you shouldn't trust any site with anything. BUT if you trust it with anything it's a password so that only you can prove that you are you. And then you use server side nonce hashing to ONLY compute that part securely wasting only the required cycles one each end to proove you are you period! Then, if for some reason you need additional security on some ulterior action, say a payment, you just do the same trick again. That way you save your servers and the electricity grid from encrypting every meaningless cat picture in the world just because you are paranoid. Electricity is not an energy source, we are going to pay a very high price for it soon. It's the most liquid energy form we have and therefor when oil becomes illiquid (both litteraly and economically because the quality of oil is degrading at a rapid pace) prices in electrons (which have no quality properties that differ) will explode! Again read the RFC https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289 https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2289, and think about where you want to spend you energy, more customers or less energy for your own kids.
- SahAssar 5y ago
  > 1st you shouldn't trust any site with anything. Okay, so your proposal is to never use any private info, anywhere, ever on the internet? > Again read the RFC Page 2 of that RFC says > It does not prevent a network eavesdropper from gaining access to private information and does not provide protection against either "social engineering" or active attacks How do you propose to prevent MITM attacks? How do you propose to be able to send private data to a server in a way that is readable by the server?
  - bullen 5y ago
    Nothing is private if you send it somewhere. Embrace the chaos, hide in the noise and save energy!