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This was interesting: > At this point, while reflecting on that topic, I decided to look more into the origins of the drill/hole adage; that diversion led me t
by PaulDavisThe1st 5y ago
This was interesting:
> At this point, while reflecting on that topic, I decided to look more into the origins of the drill/hole adage; that diversion led me to a lovely post critiquing the adage, saying it “doesn’t go far enough.” The heart of the argument there is that people don’t want holes either. [... ]
but then TFA didn't actually go there for Rust. After laying out a great example of how the purpose of a hole is ultimately about time (and possibly frustration), the author fails to reach a similar end-goal for Rust, despite hinting at it:
> But, thinking of the drill/hole adage, I stopped and asked myself: “Who wants safety? Is it an end in itself? If it is merely a means to an end, then to what end?”
What is the true end-goal? Saving lives/money/property by avoiding errors?
- 3pt14159 5y agoI find it kinda amusing that the New York Times lead reporter on cybersecurity has a book out literally called "This is How They Tell Me the World Ends" and we're on the worlds premier hacker forum pondering about the point of safety in software languages.
- skybrian 5y agoHave you read it? Is it good? Maybe submit a link to a review?
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoYou seem to be trying to make the point that is should be completely obvious what the point of safety is. And yet so much (not all, but a substantial part) of what that book is about has very little relationship to language safety. Rust will not protect you if there's a backdoor left in the system. Rust will not protect you if there's no password, or absurdly weak passwords. Rust will not protect you if your entire system design is predicated on a perimeter defense with no internal checks. Etc. etc. Now, I'm not so stupid as to believe that we shouldn't do all we can, and that can include language safety. But by itself, that doesn't have a lot to do with the huge end goal laid out in the book, which might be summarized as: be able to build computational systems and networks that are extremely resistant to unintended access, utilization and modification in pursuance of personal, political or national goals".
- 3pt14159 5y ago> And yet so much (not all, but a substantial part) of what that book is about has very little relationship to language safety. Yes, yes. I know that. But we literally have a book floating around around THE END of the WORLD and us nerds can't justify even the first step around fixing these systems. It's like someone asking what good fire hydrants are since they won't help with battery fires.
- avgcorrection 5y agoI can’t believe people care about cybersecurity when climate change is a bigger threat to us all ad nauseam.
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoThey don't need to be mutually exclusive. They operate on different time scales too (or can). And the nature of the solutions is fairly different in each case. Were someone actually able to hack into a power generation plant and destroy it, they might actually intersect in some way.
- avgcorrection 5y agoMeanwhile PL design (in particular memory safety) doesn’t impact cybersecurity? That seems to be the indirect implication (going by GP).
- PaulDavisThe1st 5y agoMy point about PL design was that it may not be the most important issue with cybersecurity, and that even if it was, there are still many other important issues that it does not impact.
- pphysch 5y agoI had a similar thought; TFA: > Can I just say “Rust developers spend less time debating about who is responsible when issues arise, and they spend less time figuring out how to get a performant solution into shape”? The author sneaks in the assertion that issue attribution is the primary cost of issue resolution. I don't think this is true at all. What about actually writing & testing the patch? If Rust has a technical approach to solving issues, then Go has a social approach. The latter is so darn simple that an intermediate Gopher can grok a codebase and contribute patches relatively quickly. Go is easy to hack; it's C with garbage collection and concurrency primitives (and an excellent ecosystem). That's why it was made! I think Rust's primary value proposition is expressiveness. People enjoy writing Rust, because they can represent complex ideas with few LOC. Safety is a distant second. It's a language for enthusiasts, not products. If you want language where safety is truly #1, well, Ada is going on half a century of usage in safety-critical systems including aerospace.
- zozbot234 5y agoNo, Go is "simple" but big Go codebases are not going to be simple. It will actually be simpler to get onboard on a larger Rust codebase, because Rust offers a higher variety of tools to define modularity boundaries.
- pphysch 5y agoGo has interfaces and namespaced packages. Not everyone uses them effectively. Codebases can always be overcomplicated by careless abstractions, even in the simplest language. > Rust offers a higher variety of tools to define modularity boundaries. "Higher variety" is among the last things I want when trying to understand a big new codebase.
- ParetoOptimal 5y ago> No, Go is "simple" but big Go codebases are not going to be simple. Can you expand on this? I actually lean towards the same belief but wants to hear your reasons. Can any gophers suggest one or more exemplars of simple big codebases for us to test our beliefs on?
- 5y ago