That was the propaganda published at the time. Postwar analysis showed that the air campaign was totally ineffective at hunting down scud launchers. >Second, t

That was the propaganda published at the time. Postwar analysis showed that the air campaign was totally ineffective at hunting down scud launchers. >Second, there is no technical evidence that a single TEL was actually destroyed during the war, despite the claims of some 100 “kills” by aircrews and special forces. [...] The exact impact of coalition operations against mobile systems is more problematic. Iraqi launch operations never stopped and only diminished somewhat over time, although during the last week of the war launch operations increased in tempo. At best, it can be said that counter-Scud efforts only maintained “pressure” on Iraqi missile operations and that Scud CAP operations apparently were successful at harassing but never halting Iraqi launch operations. https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/11/2002115481/-1/-1/0/15CROSSBOW.PDF https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/11/2002115481/-1/-1/0/15C...