It's one specific problem with a solution that is invalidated by uploading the recording to a 3rd-party service. E2EE is not the only security measure a journal

It's one specific problem with a solution that is invalidated by uploading the recording to a 3rd-party service. E2EE is not the only security measure a journalist should be taking, but it is one, and it is a fairly basic measure that isn't too tough for someone in the field to explain. The reason why we advise E2EE is to make sure that the recording is only unencrypted and listenable on devices you control, it's not just because we like Signal. Transferring it raw to another service invalidates the point of doing your call over something like Signal in the first place, because the purpose was to not have the recording sitting unencrypted on someone else's servers that you don't own or manage. My impression is that if a journalist is doing E2EE and then sending the recording off afterwards, they probably don't understand why that advice was given and they probably don't have an understanding of what the risks are we're trying to protect against when we tell them to do remote interviews over an E2EE service. We want journalists to be thinking about their source's privacy on a level beyond "I use Signal because I was told to." I get what you're saying -- E2EE is not a solution to every problem, and you're right about that, there are other security risks that are in separate categories. But what I'm getting at is not to say that it does solve every problem; just that if a journalist doesn't understand not to send recordings off someplace, to me that indicates a lack of knowledge about other security concepts.