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"You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verificat
by DonHopkins 5y ago
"You can't trust code that you did not totally create yourself. (Especially code from companies that employ people like me.) No amount of source-level verification or scrutiny will protect you from using untrusted code." -Ken Thompson
"Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow." -Eric S Raymond pretending to quote Linus Torvalds by mis-attributing his own wishful fallacy as "Linus's Law"
Then there's Theo de Raadt's salty quote about ESR's ridiculous "many eyes" argument that Raymond deceptively calls "Linus's Law":
https://groups.google.com/g/fa.openbsd.tech/c/gypClO4qTgM/m/UzcgS_iYn1IJ https://groups.google.com/g/fa.openbsd.tech/c/gypClO4qTgM/m/...
"Oh right, let's hear some of that "many eyes" crap again. My favorite part of the "many eyes" argument is how few bugs were found by the two eyes of Eric (the originator of the statement). All the many eyes are apparently attached to a lot of hands that type lots of words about many eyes, and never actually audit code." -Theo de Raadt on ESR's "Linus's Law"
Actually, that fallacious "many eyes" argument was "formulated" by Eric S Raymond (to whom Theo was referring as "the originator of the statement"), which ESR misleadingly named "Linux's Law" in "honor" of Linus Torvalds, who never even made that claim, which is ironic because it actually dishonors Linus by being an invalid fallacy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linus%27s_law https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linus%27s_law
>Validity
>In Facts and Fallacies about Software Engineering, Robert Glass refers to the law as a "mantra" of the open source movement, but calls it a fallacy due to the lack of supporting evidence and because research has indicated that the rate at which additional bugs are uncovered does not scale linearly with the number of reviewers; rather, there is a small maximum number of useful reviewers, between two and four, and additional reviewers above this number uncover bugs at a much lower rate. While closed-source practitioners also promote stringent, independent code analysis during a software project's development, they focus on in-depth review by a few and not primarily the number of "eyeballs".
>The persistence of the Heartbleed security bug in a critical piece of code for two years has been considered as a refutation of Raymond's dictum. Larry Seltzer suspects that the availability of source code may cause some developers and researchers to perform less extensive tests than they would with closed source software, making it easier for bugs to remain. In 2015, the Linux Foundation's executive director Jim Zemlin argued that the complexity of modern software has increased to such levels that specific resource allocation is desirable to improve its security. Regarding some of 2014's largest global open source software vulnerabilities, he says, "In these cases, the eyeballs weren't really looking". Large scale experiments or peer-reviewed surveys to test how well the mantra holds in practice have not been performed.
>Empirical support of the validity of Linus's law was obtained by comparing popular and unpopular projects of the same organization. Popular projects are projects with the top 5% of GitHub stars (7,481 stars or more). Bug identification was measured using the corrective commit probability, the ratio of commits determined to be related to fixing bugs. The analysis showed that popular projects had a higher ratio of bug fixes (e.g., Google's popular projects had a 27% higher bug fix rate than Google's less popular projects). Since it is unlikely that Google lowered its code quality standards in more popular projects, this is an indication of increased bug detection efficiency in popular projects.
The little experience Raymond DOES have auditing code has been a total fiasco and embarrassing failure, since his understanding of the code was incompetent and deeply tainted by his preconceived political ideology and conspiracy theories about climate change, which was his only motivation for auditing the code in the first place. His sole quest was to deceptively discredit the scientists who warned about climate change. The code he found and highlighted was actually COMMENTED OUT, and he never addressed the fact that the scientists were vindicated.
http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Eric_S._Raymond http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Eric_S._Raymond
>During the Climategate fiasco, Raymond's ability to read other peoples' source code (or at least his honesty about it) was called into question when he was caught quote-mining analysis software written by the CRU researchers, presenting a commented-out section of source code used for analyzing counterfactuals as evidence of deliberate data manipulation. When confronted with the fact that scientists as a general rule are scrupulously honest, Raymond claimed it was a case of an "error cascade," a concept that makes sense in computer science and other places where all data goes through a single potential failure point, but in areas where outside data and multiple lines of evidence are used for verification, doesn't entirely make sense. (He was curiously silent when all the researchers involved were exonerated of scientific misconduct.)
- urthor 5y agoAll that, and you never mentioned Log4J
- WesolyKubeczek 5y agoI would say that the law about enough eyeballs and shallow bugs, call it what you will, works remarkably well. It doesn't imply that bugs get fixed, only that they are shallow. Notice the vagueness of this statement. When some eyeballs find excuses to not fix the bugs or find a more entertaining problem to bikeshed, other enterprising eyeballs are busy creating 0day exploits for bugs they shallow.
- user-the-name 5y agoDoes it work remarkably well? Are bugs significantly less common in open source software? I do not really see any indication of this in practice.
- WesolyKubeczek 5y agoIt works well. It doesn't imply the bugs will be fixed. Sometimes it implies an exploit will be made. Sometimes the list of open bugs grows embarrassingly big, and that's it. Shallow. But, nevertheless, transparent it is.
- DonHopkins 5y ago>It doesn't imply that bugs get fixed, only that they are shallow. No, actually, it intentionally does imply that the bugs will get fixed: that's the whole point. Where did you get that idea -- have you even bothered to cast your own eyes on the original source of the quote, or any of the discussion around Heartbleed and other bugs, or is that just your "feeling"? If you go back and read the original source of the quote in context, you will see that it explicitly states that the key point is that bugs will get rapidly FIXED, in no uncertain terms: http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/ar01s04.html http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral... >[...] Linus was directly aiming to maximize the number of person-hours thrown at debugging and development, even at the possible cost of instability in the code and user-base burnout if any serious bug proved intractable. Linus was behaving as though he believed something like this: >8. Given a large enough beta-tester and co-developer base, almost every problem will be characterized quickly and the fix obvious to someone. [...] >But the key point is that both parts of the process (finding and fixing) tend to happen rapidly. [...] >In practice, the theoretical loss of efficiency due to duplication of work by debuggers almost never seems to be an issue in the Linux world. One effect of a ``release early and often'' policy is to minimize such duplication by propagating fed-back fixes quickly [JH]. [...] Notwithstanding the fact that ESR himself incompetently and dishonestly claimed to have found bugs in climate analysis software and didn't bother to fix them, because his actual point was to falsely discredit the scientists (whose exoneration he still has not acknowledged), not to altruistically advance science, but to mendaciously deny science. Is that what you mean by "bikeshedding"? Did the finding and fixing of the Heartbleed bug happen rapidly because it was open source? No, definitely not! Open source is not magical pixie dust. https://www.datamation.com/open-source/does-heartbleed-disprove-open-source-is-safer/ https://www.datamation.com/open-source/does-heartbleed-dispr... >Does Heartbleed Disprove ‘Open Source is Safer’? >[...] Or, as Eric Raymond famously said, “given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.” Yet, somehow, Heartbleed appears to have existed for over two years before being discovered. It may even have been used by American security agencies in their surveillance of the public. [...] >Implicit in the description is not only the idea that peer review can substitute for software testing, but also that no special effort is needed to detect bugs. Simply by going about their business as developers, FOSS project members are likely to notice bugs so that they can be repaired. >This claim has not gone unchallenged. It is a statement of belief, not the conclusion of a scientific study, a rationalization of the fact that peer review in FOSS has always been easier than software testing. Moreover, in Facts and Fallacies about Software Engineering, Robert L. Glass claims that no correlation exists between the number of bugs reported and the number of reviewers. >Yet despite the claim’s weaknesses, it remains one of FOSS’s major assertions of superiority. Heartbleed seems an exception that at least challenges the widely believed rule, or maybe even overturns it completely. [...] >A more useful analysis has been offered by Theo de Raadt, the founder of OpenBSD and OpenSSH. De Raadt notes that malloc, a memory allocation library, was long ago patched to prevent Heartbleed-type exploitations. However, at the same time, OpenSSL added “a wrapper around malloc & free so that the library will cache memory on its own, and not free it to the protective malloc” — all in the name of improving performance on some systems. >In other words, the potential for a bug was detected and patched, but was by-passed by an engineering decision that favored efficiency over security. Perhaps, too, the wrapper was never examined closely because it was assumed to be trivial and to add nothing new. It had become an established part of the code that nobody was likely to modify. But, whatever the case, de Raadt concludes scathingly, “OpenSSL is not developed by a responsible team.” >Assuming that de Raadt is right, then one take-away for FOSS is that all the eyes in the world cannot be counted on to catch basic design problems. >Taken together, Segglemann’s and de Raadt’s comments also suggest that assuming no special effort is needed to discover bugs is a mistake. Perhaps more attention needs to be paid to formal reviews and software testing than FOSS traditionally has managed. The fact that FOSS development often involves remote cooperation does not mean that log-in test or in-person testing sessions could not be added to many project’s development cycle. >What Heartbleed proves is that FOSS needs at to examine the unexamined assumption it has held for years. Greg DeKoenigsberg, a vice president at Eucalyptus Systems, summed up the situation neatly on Facebook: “we don’t put enough eyes in the right places, because we assume [bug-detection] will just happen because of open source pixie dust — and now we’re paying the price for it.” [...] https://www.esecurityplanet.com/applications/why-all-linux-security-bugs-arent-shallow/ https://www.esecurityplanet.com/applications/why-all-linux-s... >Why All Linux (Security) Bugs Aren’t Shallow >Zemlin quoted the oft-repeated Linus’ law, which states that given enough eyes all bugs are shallow. That “law” essentially promises that many eyes provide a measure of quality and control and security to open source code. So if Linus’ law is true, Zemlin asked, why are damaging security issues being found now in open source code? >“In these cases the eyeballs weren’t really looking,” Zemlin said. https://www.zdnet.com/article/did-open-source-matter-for-heartbleed/ https://www.zdnet.com/article/did-open-source-matter-for-hea... >Did open source matter for Heartbleed? >Open source does not provide a meaningful inherent security benefit for OpenSSL and it may actually discourage some important testing techniques. Also, panhandling is not a good business model for important software like OpenSSL. >Let's stipulate that OpenSSL has a good reputation, perhaps even that it deserves that reputation (although this is not the first highly-critical vulnerability in OpenSSL). I would argue that the reputation is based largely on wishful thinking and open source mythology. >Before the word "mythology" gets me into too much trouble, I ought to say, as Nixon might have put it, "we're all open source activists now." For some purposes, open source is a good thing, or a necessary thing, or both. I agree, at least in part, with those who say that cryptography code needs to be open source, because it requires a high level of trust. >Ultimately, the logic of that last statement presumes that there are people analyzing the open source code of OpenSSL in order to confirm that it is deserving of trust. This is the "many eyeballs" effect described in The Cathedral and the Bazaar, by Eric Raymond, one of the early gospels in the theology of open source. The idea is that if enough people have access to source code then someone will notice the bugs.