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Well, if you're going to throw down the gauntlet like that Mr. Caplan, how can I resist! I began by actually looking at this authors spreadsheets, then looking

Well, if you're going to throw down the gauntlet like that Mr. Caplan, how can I resist! I began by actually looking at this authors spreadsheets, then looking at their claims, and ultimately, I downloaded a copy of their book[0] to review what that book says. So here's the info: The fundamental claim of the book is that currently, the "western education model" is not (really) about skill accumulation or increasing the utility that an individual can provide society. Instead, our current "western education model" is about signalling a workers productivity to potential employers. That is the thesis of the book, as spelled out in the introduction of the book. I downloaded the spreadsheets[1] that the author talked about.[2] I've reviewed them for about an hour, in between reading, and my take is that no one cares about the spreadsheets because they're INCREDIBLY basic. In short, the spreadsheets are a collection of statistics about the outcomes of students who complete various levels of education. It shows income earned per year of education completed, for a number of different hypothetical students (excellent students, poor students, etc). The numbers aren't particularly shocking on their face, and the spreadsheets don't have anything like a single cell on the first sheet labeled "SMOKING GUN, WOW" to catch your attention. Instead, the general point from the statistics is that we see unusual jumps in the expected compensation of students at various "round numbers", such as jumps at 12 years of education completed (finished high school), and 16 years of education completed (finished undergraduate). The author seems to take these as strong proof for their original point that the value of education is in "signalling", not in increasing a persons ability. My fundamental issue with this is that this data, as I've read it, could be understood a different way than "education is just a social signal". By my reading, this data could just as well be "western hiring markets are wildly under-valuing the abilities of folks who narrowly miss common landmark achievements". I believe that's also an idea worthy of study, but I don't see it addressed in any of the authors writing, or in the book. [0] - https://eddierockerz.files.wordpress.com/2020/12/the-case-against-education-why-the-education-system-is-a-waste-of-time-and-money-pdfdrive-.pdf https://eddierockerz.files.wordpress.com/2020/12/the-case-ag... [1] - https://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/compensationcleanfinal.xls https://econfaculty.gmu.edu/bcaplan/compensationcleanfinal.x... [2] - https://www.econlib.org/archives/2014/06/embarrass_me_no.html https://www.econlib.org/archives/2014/06/embarrass_me_no.htm...

sgdjgkeirj 5y ago
This is a good point. Caplan makes a huge deal about the fact that a students that drops out one semester before finishing the degree takes a huge penalty to their salary. This is what he calls the “sheep skin effect”. He claims that because such a student gets almost all of the education, their penalty must correspond to the signaling component. But this is where his math runs against common sense. If you are an employer and see a student that dropped out of college without a very good reason, then that is a very strong negative signal. Even if you as an employer believe that education on its own provides valuable benefits to your employees, this does not mean you’d take a risk on someone that dropped out. There are sufficiently few of them that you can just not risk it.
- rrherr 5y ago
  > If you are an employer and see a student that dropped out of college without a very good reason, then that is a very strong negative signal. This is an argument for Caplan’s signaling theory, not against it. You literally said that whether or not a job applicant graduated is a very strong signal to employers.
  - DangitBobby 5y ago
    It provides more than one signal: a signal that you have obtained desireable knowledge and sensibilties from your education, and a signal that you can be relied on to complete something. The fact that the latter overshadows the former in a world where degree bearers are abundant is unsurprising and tells us precisey nothing we didn't already know.
  - qqqwerty 5y ago
    I think the term "negative signal" muddies the water here. Caplan is walking on a bit of a tightrope. He is arguing that colleges provide minimal education benefits, and that its primary value is in the signaling provided by the degree. But if Caplan is correct, why would someone drop out in their senior year? If the only real benefit is the degree, and if the degree comes with a lifetime of increased wages, surely a rational actor would stick it out. I think this is where his argument has some cracks. The first possible explanation for the dropouts is that college provides additional value to society by filtering out those who can handle the process vs those who can't. This is "filtering" not "signaling". Caplan does not model this value to society anywhere. And second, is that it is likely that more learning (or life experience, or whatever) is happening at college than Caplan is giving credit for. i.e. if some students are dropping out of college, than that likely means some students are struggling (but succeeding) to graduate, and likely learning some valuable lessons in the process.

sgdjgkeirj 5y ago

This is a good point. Caplan makes a huge deal about the fact that a students that drops out one semester before finishing the degree takes a huge penalty to their salary. This is what he calls the “sheep skin effect”. He claims that because such a student gets almost all of the education, their penalty must correspond to the signaling component. But this is where his math runs against common sense. If you are an employer and see a student that dropped out of college without a very good reason, then that is a very strong negative signal. Even if you as an employer believe that education on its own provides valuable benefits to your employees, this does not mean you’d take a risk on someone that dropped out. There are sufficiently few of them that you can just not risk it.

rrherr 5y ago
> If you are an employer and see a student that dropped out of college without a very good reason, then that is a very strong negative signal. This is an argument for Caplan’s signaling theory, not against it. You literally said that whether or not a job applicant graduated is a very strong signal to employers.
- DangitBobby 5y ago
  It provides more than one signal: a signal that you have obtained desireable knowledge and sensibilties from your education, and a signal that you can be relied on to complete something. The fact that the latter overshadows the former in a world where degree bearers are abundant is unsurprising and tells us precisey nothing we didn't already know.
- qqqwerty 5y ago
  I think the term "negative signal" muddies the water here. Caplan is walking on a bit of a tightrope. He is arguing that colleges provide minimal education benefits, and that its primary value is in the signaling provided by the degree. But if Caplan is correct, why would someone drop out in their senior year? If the only real benefit is the degree, and if the degree comes with a lifetime of increased wages, surely a rational actor would stick it out. I think this is where his argument has some cracks. The first possible explanation for the dropouts is that college provides additional value to society by filtering out those who can handle the process vs those who can't. This is "filtering" not "signaling". Caplan does not model this value to society anywhere. And second, is that it is likely that more learning (or life experience, or whatever) is happening at college than Caplan is giving credit for. i.e. if some students are dropping out of college, than that likely means some students are struggling (but succeeding) to graduate, and likely learning some valuable lessons in the process.