3 ms·

I definitely understand the aversion to trusting 1password's cloud service, but it's worth noting that their security model is such that it requires minimal/zer

I definitely understand the aversion to trusting 1password's cloud service, but it's worth noting that their security model is such that it requires minimal/zero trust of the server. Your vault is only ever decrypted on the client side, and the 1password service only ever stores/syncs the encrypted vault. This is why if you lose access to your secret key, your vault can never be decrypted, even by 1password - your secret key is only ever stored on your local device and never by 1password, not even a hash of it. 1password has a great white-paper on their security model if you're interested, and it's verified by 3rd party auditors.

vimota 5y ago
Oh I get that, and agree! But despite that it still feels like a honeypot, centralizing every user's most important security info in one cloud service (read: honeypot). At least with Dropbox/iCloud sync you're relying on the same e2e encrypted setup but in a less centralized service (for example, if there's some bug in the e2e encryption someone would need to take advantage of that AND iCloud's encryption and target users using the combination).
WhyNotHugo 5y ago
> I definitely understand the aversion to trusting 1password's cloud service, but it's worth noting that their security model is such that it requires minimal/zero trust of the server. It just requires absolute blind trust on their client apps... > Your vault is only ever decrypted on the client side Which is a closed source blob, so, again, requires absolute blind trust.
- andycreeth 5y ago
  Yup completely valid. In the context of the original post I was replying to, trust of the closed source client code was always required and that hasn't changed, so it didn't feel relevant to mention. I agree with you that there is significant merit in choosing an open source solution for passwords/secrets management.

vimota 5y ago

Oh I get that, and agree! But despite that it still feels like a honeypot, centralizing every user's most important security info in one cloud service (read: honeypot). At least with Dropbox/iCloud sync you're relying on the same e2e encrypted setup but in a less centralized service (for example, if there's some bug in the e2e encryption someone would need to take advantage of that AND iCloud's encryption and target users using the combination).

WhyNotHugo 5y ago

> I definitely understand the aversion to trusting 1password's cloud service, but it's worth noting that their security model is such that it requires minimal/zero trust of the server. It just requires absolute blind trust on their client apps... > Your vault is only ever decrypted on the client side Which is a closed source blob, so, again, requires absolute blind trust.

andycreeth 5y ago
Yup completely valid. In the context of the original post I was replying to, trust of the closed source client code was always required and that hasn't changed, so it didn't feel relevant to mention. I agree with you that there is significant merit in choosing an open source solution for passwords/secrets management.