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> If you consider an alternative history where the US army invades main land Japan, you have been a massacre of epic proportions. Ground invasion vs. atomic bo

> If you consider an alternative history where the US army invades main land Japan, you have been a massacre of epic proportions. Ground invasion vs. atomic bombings is a false dichotomy. Quoting the US strategic bombing survey: "Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

panick21_ 5y ago
This is simply an opinion. How actual believes on the matter by leading war council member on this question would have evolved is highly questionable. And we have basically no historical example where traditional bombing leads to that outcome.
s5300 5y ago
I wish I could link a great source, but I believe there was some credible talk of a sect of the Japanese military leaders wanting to overthrow the Emperor & keep fighting what would have been a very gruesome meatgrinder defeat/suicide pact
- InTheArena 5y ago
  Yep - Wikipedia has a good summary of the attitude: While Japan no longer had a realistic prospect of winning the war, Japan's leaders believed they could make the cost of invading and occupying the Home Islands too high for the Allies to accept, which would lead to some sort of armistice rather than total defeat. The Japanese plan for defeating the invasion was called Operation Ketsugō (決号作戦, ketsugō sakusen) ("Operation Codename Decisive"). The Japanese planned to commit the entire population of Japan to resisting the invasion, and from June 1945 onward, a propaganda campaign calling for "The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million" commenced.[48] The main message of "The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million" campaign was that it was "glorious to die for the holy emperor of Japan, and every Japanese man, woman, and child should die for the Emperor when the Allies arrived".[48] While this was not realistic, both American and Japanese officers at the time predicted a Japanese death toll in the millions.[48] From the Battle of Saipan onward, Japanese propaganda intensified the glory of patriotic death and depicted the Americans as merciless "white devils".[49] During the Battle of Okinawa, Japanese officers had ordered civilians unable to fight to commit suicide rather than fall into American hands, and all available evidence suggests the same orders would have been given in the home islands.[50] The Japanese were secretly constructing an underground headquarters in Matsushiro, Nagano Prefecture, to shelter the Emperor and the Imperial General Staff during an invasion. In planning for Operation Ketsugo, IGHQ overestimated the strength of the invading forces: while the Allied invasion plan called for fewer than 70 divisions, the Japanese expected up to 90.[51] It took Hirohito to block this form happening, and even then, one of the junta groups in the army tried to force a coup.
  - deleted 5y ago
    [deleted]
- steveBK123 5y ago
  Well I mean, there basically was a coup attempt even after 2 nukes to try and stop the emperor from announcing the surrender.
larkost 5y ago
But that is taking a hindsight view on things. The U.S. planners had no real access to the thoughts of these people, and from their perspective, one gained by the island-by-island battles like Saipan, both the Japanese military and civilian populations seemed to be determined to fight (or commit suicide) to the last man, woman, and child. There was no sign to the outside world that without something drastic changing that surrender was something they were approaching. I do agree that after the firebombing talked about here that I don't see a huge change caused by atomic weapons (more efficient ways of dealing mass death than what we were already doing with more effort), but it seems that both sides felt that it did change things. So without having insight that we are not sure of even with the benefit of hindsight, I am not sure I can fault those in charge for thinking this might save lives (Japanese as well as American). Note: I don't give credit for that sort of thinking to Curtis LeMay; he was just in it to kill the enemy faster (i.e.: a psychopath).
- myrmidon 5y ago
  I'm not criticizing the choice to drop the nukes, I'm disputing the opinion that the nukes were necessary/helpful to "save lives" (WITH the benefit of hindsight). I can see how that belief is appealing, but from what I know the facts do not really support it and the truth is more inconvenient.
  - drran 5y ago
    Can you lay out your opinion and arguments? «Nuclear bombing was used not to end the war and save lives, but for ... because ...»
    - myrmidon 5y ago
      Nuclear bombing was not necessary to win the war, nor to effect a surrender of Japan by the end of 1945 (without a costly ground invasion). Of course this is clearer in retrospect.
      - drran 5y ago
drran 5y ago
Can you give us insight, please: When RF plan to surrender?
- myrmidon 5y ago
  I'm not sure what you're asking for. Note that I'm not criticizing the choice to drop the nukes, I'm arguing against the belief (that many people still hold now, with the benefit of hindsight) that it was necessary and saved lifes.
  - drran 5y ago
    You said that it was possible to predict when Japan will surrender. Can you do that trick again, please?
    - myrmidon 5y ago
      > You said that it was possible to predict when Japan will surrender. Could you maybe point out what exactly in my post makes you belief that? What I said is that a survey by/for the US government itself came to the conclusion that the atomic bombs were not necessary to effect a surrender in 1945, NOR a ground invasion.
      - drran 5y ago
        They come to that conclusion after the end of the war, by asking Japan officials. We all are smart after a battle. Can you do this trick NOW?
mannykannot 5y ago
> Ground invasion vs. atomic bombings is a false dichotomy. I think you are right for a reason other than the one you are giving here. At the time, there were considerable and growing doubts that invasion was at all feasible at any cost. The bombing survey was only, and could only have been, conducted after the surrender and during the subsequent occupation. The information available at the time, such as the all-out defense of Okinawa and Japan's preparations for doing the same throughout the main islands, was making invasion untenable. Earlier assumptions about the ability of the allies to bring to bear superior force no longer seemed realistic. [1] What about a negotiations? Japan was showing no interest in negotiations, and intercepted diplomatic communications confirmed this. Equally importantly, the allies were opposed to anything less than unconditional surrender because the armistice of 1918 had set the stage for WWII. In addition, there were considerable and realistic doubts that the Japanese military, still occupying a wide swath of Asia, would accept the outcome of such negotiations. There was a fourth option - a naval blockade, promoted by Admiral King - and that was apparently expected to kill far more Japanese than either an invasion (insofar as it was feasible at all) or a nuclear attack with the two bombs then available. As for a demonstration of nuclear weapons: with only two available, if their use failed to bring about a surrender, it would be back to square one for several months. It was not beyond every ethical principle to think that, if these bombs were used, it should be done in a way that maximized their likelihood of ending the war. As it happens, even the bombing of Hiroshima did not seem to bring about meaningful change in the Japanese leadership's position. As we are discussing the ethics of the decision, we should put aside ex post facto judgement such as that from the bombing survey, but also ask whether the cost in Japanese lives was given much consideration in Washington. I have not seen anything definitive either way, and I am sure Japanese lives did not count as equal to allied ones, but it seems clear that, out of what seemed to be the feasible alternatives available, the use of nuclear bombs did not stand out in terms of civilian casualties and human suffering. [1] Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire.
mcguire 5y ago
This matches the collection of ULTRA-decoded Japanese diplomatic traffic and notes from those close to the Japanese Supreme Council that I can't find online at the moment. [Notes mine.] https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-053/h-053-2.html https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/di... "[August 9] The news of the Soviet offensive sent the Supreme Council into urgent session, with Prime Minster Suzuki and Minster of Foreign Affairs Togo coming out in favor of opening a negotiating channel to the United States via Switzerland and Sweden, along with Navy Minister Yonai. Togo’s proposal to accept the Potsdam Declaration with the condition that the emperor’s position be preserved (something the declaration did not specifically address). The hardliners countered with a proposal that added additional conditions (which the Allies would certainly reject). [IIRC, these conditions were 1. No occupation of Japan, 2. The Japanese would handle the demobilization of their armies, and 3. The Japanese would perform their own war crimes investigations and trials.] As the discussion was going on, General Amani and General Umezu were secretly taking steps to implement martial law to prevent any such negotiations from happening at all. [I do not believe this was the same conspiracy as the attempted military coup several days later to prevent the emperor from broadcasting his surrender speech.] At 1030, Suzuki reported to the council that the emperor was in favor of ending the war quickly. Nevertheless, the council was still deadlocked 3–3 at 1100 when word of the Nagasaki bomb was received, and remained so even afterward. "With the Supreme Council still deadlocked, the full cabinet met at 1430 on 9 August, again arriving at a 3–3 vote. Arguments raged in a series of meetings late into the night. Finally, Suzuki requested an impromptu imperial conference with the Supreme Council and the emperor, which commenced at midnight and continued until 0200. Finally, Suzuki informed the emperor that consensus was impossible and requested that Hirohito break the stalemate. The emperor sided with Togo’s proposal to make an offer to accept the Potsdam Declaration with the condition that the emperor’s position be preserved. Suzuki then implored the Supreme Council to accept the emperor’s will. "On 10 August, the Japanese government sent a telegram via the Swiss, which was immediately intercepted by U.S. intelligence. As U.S. leaders evaluated the Japanese proposal, President Truman ordered a halt to the bombing of Japan and that the next use of an atomic bomb would require explicit presidential authorization (the second one didn’t). ... "On 12 August, the United States responded to the Japanese offer, stating that “The ultimate form of government of Japan, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” The Japanese found the response to be ambiguous, which it was, provoking more heated discussion in the Supreme Council whether to hold out for an “explicit guarantee” of the emperor’s position. ... "On 13 August, U.S. B-29s dropped leaflets all over Japan, making public the Japanese proposal and the U.S. counterproposal. A strong case can be made that it was actually the psychological impact of this huge leaflet drop that tipped the balance (making it one of the most effective psyops campaigns in history), although by this time the full magnitude of the collapse of Japanese defenses in Manchuria and Sakhalin Islands was also known to the Supreme Council, which finally agreed that the language in the U.S. counterproposal was good enough. [There were more bombings of Japan at this time, as the Japanese surrender message to the Allies was sent encoded and there was an increase in military radio traffic.] "At 2300 on 14 August (Tokyo time) the emperor made a gramophone recording reading his statement to the Japanese people of his decision to surrender (without ever actually using that word), which was to be broadcast to the Japanese people over the radio at noon on 15 August." The Japanese government at the time gave most of the power to the military (2/3 to 1/3 in the Supreme Council (and more given the pre-war tradition of assassination)) and that council was deadlocked up until Prime Minister Suzuki requested the Emperor to break the deadlock---the only time he cast a vote in the council, as far as I know. Ground invasion (either by the US or more likely by both the US and USSR, leading to a split North and South Japan akin to Eastern and Western Europe) vs. atomic bombings is indeed a false dichotomy; the third option (favored by the US Navy) was to simply continue the blockade of Japan, leading to mass starvation. Oh, and this whole situation is made more touchy by the fact that the Japanese Army had 1,500,000 (?) men in armies on the Asian mainland. One concern was that if the Japanese government did collapse, there would be no one in a position to tell the military in Japan and in Asia to stop fighting. Here's the deal about the USSBS: it's massive. The US let a big stack of social scientists and operations researchers loose and took everything they produced as part of it. And then wrote conclusions that accept parts of it and contradict others. If you want a conclusion, you can find it in there somewhere. I do not know of any serious historians who accept the idea that Japan would have surrendered before the end of 1945 without any outside push. Certainly, they didn't seem to be in any particular rush even with the pushes. Oh, and about just not using the atomic bombs? Truman addressed this later: what are you going to tell the parents of the soldiers who are killed after Aug 10? This particular war has been going on since 1937 (if not 1931); tens of millions of people have been killed. And you chose not to use a weapon that could have ended it?

panick21_ 5y ago

This is simply an opinion. How actual believes on the matter by leading war council member on this question would have evolved is highly questionable. And we have basically no historical example where traditional bombing leads to that outcome.

s5300 5y ago

I wish I could link a great source, but I believe there was some credible talk of a sect of the Japanese military leaders wanting to overthrow the Emperor & keep fighting what would have been a very gruesome meatgrinder defeat/suicide pact

InTheArena 5y ago
Yep - Wikipedia has a good summary of the attitude: While Japan no longer had a realistic prospect of winning the war, Japan's leaders believed they could make the cost of invading and occupying the Home Islands too high for the Allies to accept, which would lead to some sort of armistice rather than total defeat. The Japanese plan for defeating the invasion was called Operation Ketsugō (決号作戦, ketsugō sakusen) ("Operation Codename Decisive"). The Japanese planned to commit the entire population of Japan to resisting the invasion, and from June 1945 onward, a propaganda campaign calling for "The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million" commenced.[48] The main message of "The Glorious Death of One Hundred Million" campaign was that it was "glorious to die for the holy emperor of Japan, and every Japanese man, woman, and child should die for the Emperor when the Allies arrived".[48] While this was not realistic, both American and Japanese officers at the time predicted a Japanese death toll in the millions.[48] From the Battle of Saipan onward, Japanese propaganda intensified the glory of patriotic death and depicted the Americans as merciless "white devils".[49] During the Battle of Okinawa, Japanese officers had ordered civilians unable to fight to commit suicide rather than fall into American hands, and all available evidence suggests the same orders would have been given in the home islands.[50] The Japanese were secretly constructing an underground headquarters in Matsushiro, Nagano Prefecture, to shelter the Emperor and the Imperial General Staff during an invasion. In planning for Operation Ketsugo, IGHQ overestimated the strength of the invading forces: while the Allied invasion plan called for fewer than 70 divisions, the Japanese expected up to 90.[51] It took Hirohito to block this form happening, and even then, one of the junta groups in the army tried to force a coup.
- deleted 5y ago
  [deleted]
steveBK123 5y ago
Well I mean, there basically was a coup attempt even after 2 nukes to try and stop the emperor from announcing the surrender.

larkost 5y ago

But that is taking a hindsight view on things. The U.S. planners had no real access to the thoughts of these people, and from their perspective, one gained by the island-by-island battles like Saipan, both the Japanese military and civilian populations seemed to be determined to fight (or commit suicide) to the last man, woman, and child. There was no sign to the outside world that without something drastic changing that surrender was something they were approaching. I do agree that after the firebombing talked about here that I don't see a huge change caused by atomic weapons (more efficient ways of dealing mass death than what we were already doing with more effort), but it seems that both sides felt that it did change things. So without having insight that we are not sure of even with the benefit of hindsight, I am not sure I can fault those in charge for thinking this might save lives (Japanese as well as American). Note: I don't give credit for that sort of thinking to Curtis LeMay; he was just in it to kill the enemy faster (i.e.: a psychopath).

myrmidon 5y ago
I'm not criticizing the choice to drop the nukes, I'm disputing the opinion that the nukes were necessary/helpful to "save lives" (WITH the benefit of hindsight). I can see how that belief is appealing, but from what I know the facts do not really support it and the truth is more inconvenient.
- drran 5y ago
  Can you lay out your opinion and arguments? «Nuclear bombing was used not to end the war and save lives, but for ... because ...»
  - myrmidon 5y ago
    Nuclear bombing was not necessary to win the war, nor to effect a surrender of Japan by the end of 1945 (without a costly ground invasion). Of course this is clearer in retrospect.
    - drran 5y ago

drran 5y ago

Can you give us insight, please: When RF plan to surrender?

myrmidon 5y ago
I'm not sure what you're asking for. Note that I'm not criticizing the choice to drop the nukes, I'm arguing against the belief (that many people still hold now, with the benefit of hindsight) that it was necessary and saved lifes.
- drran 5y ago
  You said that it was possible to predict when Japan will surrender. Can you do that trick again, please?
  - myrmidon 5y ago
    > You said that it was possible to predict when Japan will surrender. Could you maybe point out what exactly in my post makes you belief that? What I said is that a survey by/for the US government itself came to the conclusion that the atomic bombs were not necessary to effect a surrender in 1945, NOR a ground invasion.
    - drran 5y ago
      They come to that conclusion after the end of the war, by asking Japan officials. We all are smart after a battle. Can you do this trick NOW?

mannykannot 5y ago

> Ground invasion vs. atomic bombings is a false dichotomy. I think you are right for a reason other than the one you are giving here. At the time, there were considerable and growing doubts that invasion was at all feasible at any cost. The bombing survey was only, and could only have been, conducted after the surrender and during the subsequent occupation. The information available at the time, such as the all-out defense of Okinawa and Japan's preparations for doing the same throughout the main islands, was making invasion untenable. Earlier assumptions about the ability of the allies to bring to bear superior force no longer seemed realistic. [1] What about a negotiations? Japan was showing no interest in negotiations, and intercepted diplomatic communications confirmed this. Equally importantly, the allies were opposed to anything less than unconditional surrender because the armistice of 1918 had set the stage for WWII. In addition, there were considerable and realistic doubts that the Japanese military, still occupying a wide swath of Asia, would accept the outcome of such negotiations. There was a fourth option - a naval blockade, promoted by Admiral King - and that was apparently expected to kill far more Japanese than either an invasion (insofar as it was feasible at all) or a nuclear attack with the two bombs then available. As for a demonstration of nuclear weapons: with only two available, if their use failed to bring about a surrender, it would be back to square one for several months. It was not beyond every ethical principle to think that, if these bombs were used, it should be done in a way that maximized their likelihood of ending the war. As it happens, even the bombing of Hiroshima did not seem to bring about meaningful change in the Japanese leadership's position. As we are discussing the ethics of the decision, we should put aside ex post facto judgement such as that from the bombing survey, but also ask whether the cost in Japanese lives was given much consideration in Washington. I have not seen anything definitive either way, and I am sure Japanese lives did not count as equal to allied ones, but it seems clear that, out of what seemed to be the feasible alternatives available, the use of nuclear bombs did not stand out in terms of civilian casualties and human suffering. [1] Richard B. Frank, Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire.

mcguire 5y ago

This matches the collection of ULTRA-decoded Japanese diplomatic traffic and notes from those close to the Japanese Supreme Council that I can't find online at the moment. [Notes mine.] https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-053/h-053-2.html https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/di... "[August 9] The news of the Soviet offensive sent the Supreme Council into urgent session, with Prime Minster Suzuki and Minster of Foreign Affairs Togo coming out in favor of opening a negotiating channel to the United States via Switzerland and Sweden, along with Navy Minister Yonai. Togo’s proposal to accept the Potsdam Declaration with the condition that the emperor’s position be preserved (something the declaration did not specifically address). The hardliners countered with a proposal that added additional conditions (which the Allies would certainly reject). [IIRC, these conditions were 1. No occupation of Japan, 2. The Japanese would handle the demobilization of their armies, and 3. The Japanese would perform their own war crimes investigations and trials.] As the discussion was going on, General Amani and General Umezu were secretly taking steps to implement martial law to prevent any such negotiations from happening at all. [I do not believe this was the same conspiracy as the attempted military coup several days later to prevent the emperor from broadcasting his surrender speech.] At 1030, Suzuki reported to the council that the emperor was in favor of ending the war quickly. Nevertheless, the council was still deadlocked 3–3 at 1100 when word of the Nagasaki bomb was received, and remained so even afterward. "With the Supreme Council still deadlocked, the full cabinet met at 1430 on 9 August, again arriving at a 3–3 vote. Arguments raged in a series of meetings late into the night. Finally, Suzuki requested an impromptu imperial conference with the Supreme Council and the emperor, which commenced at midnight and continued until 0200. Finally, Suzuki informed the emperor that consensus was impossible and requested that Hirohito break the stalemate. The emperor sided with Togo’s proposal to make an offer to accept the Potsdam Declaration with the condition that the emperor’s position be preserved. Suzuki then implored the Supreme Council to accept the emperor’s will. "On 10 August, the Japanese government sent a telegram via the Swiss, which was immediately intercepted by U.S. intelligence. As U.S. leaders evaluated the Japanese proposal, President Truman ordered a halt to the bombing of Japan and that the next use of an atomic bomb would require explicit presidential authorization (the second one didn’t). ... "On 12 August, the United States responded to the Japanese offer, stating that “The ultimate form of government of Japan, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, to be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.” The Japanese found the response to be ambiguous, which it was, provoking more heated discussion in the Supreme Council whether to hold out for an “explicit guarantee” of the emperor’s position. ... "On 13 August, U.S. B-29s dropped leaflets all over Japan, making public the Japanese proposal and the U.S. counterproposal. A strong case can be made that it was actually the psychological impact of this huge leaflet drop that tipped the balance (making it one of the most effective psyops campaigns in history), although by this time the full magnitude of the collapse of Japanese defenses in Manchuria and Sakhalin Islands was also known to the Supreme Council, which finally agreed that the language in the U.S. counterproposal was good enough. [There were more bombings of Japan at this time, as the Japanese surrender message to the Allies was sent encoded and there was an increase in military radio traffic.] "At 2300 on 14 August (Tokyo time) the emperor made a gramophone recording reading his statement to the Japanese people of his decision to surrender (without ever actually using that word), which was to be broadcast to the Japanese people over the radio at noon on 15 August." The Japanese government at the time gave most of the power to the military (2/3 to 1/3 in the Supreme Council (and more given the pre-war tradition of assassination)) and that council was deadlocked up until Prime Minister Suzuki requested the Emperor to break the deadlock---the only time he cast a vote in the council, as far as I know. Ground invasion (either by the US or more likely by both the US and USSR, leading to a split North and South Japan akin to Eastern and Western Europe) vs. atomic bombings is indeed a false dichotomy; the third option (favored by the US Navy) was to simply continue the blockade of Japan, leading to mass starvation. Oh, and this whole situation is made more touchy by the fact that the Japanese Army had 1,500,000 (?) men in armies on the Asian mainland. One concern was that if the Japanese government did collapse, there would be no one in a position to tell the military in Japan and in Asia to stop fighting. Here's the deal about the USSBS: it's massive. The US let a big stack of social scientists and operations researchers loose and took everything they produced as part of it. And then wrote conclusions that accept parts of it and contradict others. If you want a conclusion, you can find it in there somewhere. I do not know of any serious historians who accept the idea that Japan would have surrendered before the end of 1945 without any outside push. Certainly, they didn't seem to be in any particular rush even with the pushes. Oh, and about just not using the atomic bombs? Truman addressed this later: what are you going to tell the parents of the soldiers who are killed after Aug 10? This particular war has been going on since 1937 (if not 1931); tens of millions of people have been killed. And you chose not to use a weapon that could have ended it?