3 ms·
The whole of it seems to be (I'll split it into two sections): > If an attacker has access to the system to such a degree that he can learn the internal state
by loeg 5y ago
The whole of it seems to be (I'll split it into two sections):
> If an attacker has access to the system to such a degree that he can learn the internal state of the RNG, arguably there are other lower hanging vulnerabilities -- side-channel, infoleak, or otherwise -- that might have higher priority.
I think this probably matches most people's intuitions.
> On the other hand, seed files are frequently used on systems that have a hard time generating much entropy on their own, and these seed files, being files, often leak or are duplicated and distributed accidentally, or are even seeded over the Internet intentionally, where their contents might be recorded or tampered with. Seen this way, an otherwise quasi-implausible vulnerability is a bit more practical than initially thought.
This is a reiteration of "unpredictable initial seeding is hard."