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"It’s why the Find My network is built with privacy in mind, uses end-to-end encryption..." "Apple can provide the paired account details in response to a subp
by paxys 5y ago
"It’s why the Find My network is built with privacy in mind, uses end-to-end encryption..."
"Apple can provide the paired account details in response to a subpoena or valid request from law enforcement"
Hmm
- jackson1442 5y agoFrom my understanding, location is E2E but they still register the serial to your account.
- function_seven 5y agoBoth can be true. The actual pairing of tag to owner is encrypted in the communication of its whereabouts. Some stranger detecting an AirTag that you own is not able to determine that you own it. But also Apple can pair the serial number of the physical tag with the account that registered it. I think this requires the actual tag to be retrieved. The serial number isn't transmitted in the clear; it's gotta be read off the tag case. That's my understanding of it anyway.
- nomel 5y agoThe serial number, and last four digits of the owners phone number, is available to anyone that is within NFC range of the AirTag.
- ccouzens 5y agoEnd to end encryption has become a buzzword. It prevents identifying who an air tag is identifying its location to. It prevents identifying what air tags you're searching for. It is unclear to me how either property is useful to protecting someone from being tracked by someone else's air tags.
- gjsman-1000 5y agoThe location is end-to-end encrypted, Apple doesn't know where an item is at any given time, only the owner does. Who owns the tag (assuming someone has it in their possession) is not end-to-end encrypted.
- notatoad 5y agoprobably the same loophole as the "end-to-end encryption" in iMessage. it's end-to-end, but the client is their close-source proprietary software, so if they need access to the data they can just remotely access the client software that you've authenticated and access whatever they need to.
- jeromegv 5y agoThat’s not the iMessage loophole. The loophole is when you have iClouds backup enabled. They have access to it. Disable the backup, you disable the loophole.
- notatoad 5y agoMaybe something has changed or i'm missing something, but my understanding is that even without iCloud backup enabled, if you went through the "i forgot my password" process they could remotely generate a new key and create new copies of all your iMessages encrypted with the new key. Which is effectively replicating exactly the attack that e2e is supposed to protect against.
- MertsA 5y agoThat's not the only iMessage loophole. They also obscure key distribution and have the ability to add and remove keys that are ostensibly for your devices at will. Technically you can check in keychain but virtually no one even does that between their own devices, let alone share and verify out of band with every other party they communicate with. "E2E encrypted, we can't even read it, unless you use iCloud, or we get a NSL, or if we feel like being a MITM today".