I've said this repeatedly, but what I'd like would be a buy-time option to "enable sideloading" (specifically, to enable the hardware owner to add their own sig

I've said this repeatedly, but what I'd like would be a buy-time option to "enable sideloading" (specifically, to enable the hardware owner to add their own signing certificate to the root keystore, iOS would still enforce full normal trust chaining and such except that Apple wouldn't be the only valid root). Because I think not have sideloading is actively valuable in many cases too and thus should itself remain an option (and probably the default) for purchaser. Leaving the power with Apple has obvious downsides, but it also has upsides in terms of pooling negotiating power of users vs powerful developers and entirely eliminating a large class of possible social engineering attacks. The reason Apple has been able to enforce privacy protections vs Facebook for a current example is that there is no sideloading. Period. Facebook is a powerful enough entity vs its users[products] that if they could demand that users sideload the "Facebook store" and then run root from there they could get a sufficient mass to do so that they could then afford to ignore Apple and do an end run. Can see the same thing play out with stuff like Zoom, Dropbox etc: on iOS all these are applications in the App Store and must abide by all the privacy, disclosure, and so on rules. On the Mac, they demand their own clients which get a lot more powers. Of course, the MAS is a pile of shit, Apple has utterly fucked up on basic great software business things like "upgrade pricing", and there are lots of examples of fantastic decent small/med size software devs doing their own Mac software same as always. Apple certainly has perverse incentives they have abused, primarily around service integration (can't aim backups at any storage provider for example). Also, it all breaks down when there is an entity MORE powerful than Apple like a major government. Then Apple becomes a single point of failure for censorship and control, and indeed that ties right back into the former. We don't have E2EE encrypted wireless backups for iDevices because of Apple caving to "security" agencies. But still, it cuts both ways and I really appreciate that less technical (but still very smart!) users, including vulnerable members of my own family and friends, can have a platform in iOS which has much stronger guardrails that they cannot physically be talked into bypassing. I think giving those who ask for hardware, software, or both root cert access that access is enough of a release valve (these are probably all the same people who would jailbreak which is much worse) to help check Apple and bypass the big failing points while still accommodating the hundreds of millions of users whose threat models involve worse from other corporations. And it'd help nudge Apple's incentives in a good direction even for those staying fully within the walled garden by making them balance a bit on keeping them there.