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"PUFrt builds upon eMemory’s anti-fuse OTP (NeoFuse) and Quantum Tunneling PUF (NeoPUF) technologies to provide self-encrypted anti-Fuse OTPwith on-chip PUF. Th
by Animats 5y ago
"PUFrt builds upon eMemory’s anti-fuse OTP (NeoFuse) and Quantum Tunneling PUF (NeoPUF) technologies to provide self-encrypted anti-Fuse OTPwith on-chip PUF. The inborn HUK utilizes the NeoPUF’s guaranteed randomness..."
With enough new buzzwords, all things are possible.
The idea here seem to be a security token that generates its own random key and never lets it out of the device. Reasonable enough. The claim is that this is resistant to physical attack to obtain the secret key. Yet that's an unlikely attack vector. If you have physical possession of the token long enough to extract its unique private key by elaborate means, why do you need to clone it?
The usual problems with such devices involve replay attacks, or remote access attacks. (A remote access attack is when a token is used to open one door, and the door has been compromised to pass through the challenge/response from another more important door elsewhere, allowing an attacker to open the more important door.)
This isn't relevant to DRM. DRM for broadcast media requires that there be many protected copies of the same decrypt key. This thing is for unique keys only.
It seems strange that such a device would have a JTAG port, even if it is "disabled after the manufacturing process".
- kurthr 5y agoJTAG is typically used for pass/fail binning and scanning of logic/memory at package (and occasionally wafer) test. Without something like that it's very hard to get to <1000ppm defect rates. Properly designed, you wouldn't expect the Unique ID to be readable/extractable even from an enabled port, but could certainly reverse engineering its operation more easily.
- Animats 5y agoFor a small, low-speed single-purpose device like this, a self-test function can determine if the whole unit is a reject. There's no assembly into a larger system, where you want to detect bad parts before you build up a board. For a pure security device, the less internal access, the better.
- DennisP 5y agoFor cryptocurrency wallets, replay attacks aren't a possibility because they wipe themselves after a few attempts.
- derefr 5y ago> This isn't relevant to DRM. DRM for broadcast media requires that there be many protected copies of the same decrypt key. This thing is for unique keys only. Game consoles. Game consoles encrypt their boot disks with device-specific keys. They also have device-specific client certificates for authorizing access to game CDN servers (allowing console vendors to ban consoles by revoking those certificates.)
- rstuart4133 5y agoYou aren't wrong about the writing style. Reading it is a hard slog. > The idea here seem to be a security token that generates its own random key and never lets it out of the device. That is an idea. It's one that's been around since the first pin pads were developed a few decades ago that have since evolved into the TPM's we have today. But it's not the idea being pushed here. What's being pushed here is a way of protecting the key. The answer to the question "if you have access to the key long enough to extract the key why do you need to clone it" is simple enough. It can resist giving up it's information until you prove you're you. Example: enter the wrong PUK in 8 times and it destroys it's secret key. It's another concept that's been around for literally decades. There are stories about people going to enormous lengths to extract the keys out of similar devices that will resist merely probing them. The one that sticks in my mind was Mondex, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mondex https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mondex, where a University used an election beam to reconnect some test pins (which I presume performed a very similar function to the JTAG on this device) to extract secret keys. That "hack" killed Mondex, although "hack" is probably the wrong word. Mondex put up a $1M prize, and the hackers won it. There are also Youtube videos of people reverse engineering chips using little more sandpaper and a digital microscope. And they do that for little more than few seconds fame on Youtube. At the other end of the scale, the lengths people are willing to go to protect secret keys is extraordinary. Look up the price of HSMs some time. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_security_module So I say your wrong - a iron clad way of protecting the key really is a big deal. A cheap, true PUF (as they call it) would be a breakthrough. But after reading the article and the comments here - I have no idea if they've even moved the needle.
- jiveturkey 5y ago> why do you need to clone it? http://people.csail.mit.edu/rudolph/Teaching/Lectures/Security/Lecture-Security-PUFs-2.pdf http://people.csail.mit.edu/rudolph/Teaching/Lectures/Securi... gives 2 use cases. I can think of a supply chain attack prevention use case as well. I'm sure there are others. I also like the summary https://www.intrinsic-id.com/physical-unclonable-function/ https://www.intrinsic-id.com/physical-unclonable-function/ , with low cost for IoT being the most important aspect.