Reducing the "overcomplication" problem to a "communication" problem doesn't help, because it suffers from the same shortcoming where these Dunning-Kruger-esque

Reducing the "overcomplication" problem to a "communication" problem doesn't help, because it suffers from the same shortcoming where these Dunning-Kruger-esque paradoxes are concerned. All too often the pattern is the judge saying or thinking something like this: Since the subject matter is amenable to proof, and since I, the judge, am such a smart fellow that I would certainly be able to follow any proof presented to me with little effort, my reasoning now works as follows: Step 1: I expend little effort when passing judgment. For example, I shall feel free to pass judgment by declaring something to be "overcomplicated" if it comes from a person about whom I hold the opinion that he tends to overcomplicate stuff (fallacy). Step 2: The burden of proof to dissuade me from that judgment then falls on the enginneer. When he presents that proof, I shall then expend only little effort in trying to follow it, and if I can't, then it surely must be due to the fact that, on top of overcomplicating his engineering solutions, this particular engineer is also a bad communicator. Note that on top of piling on one piece of fallacious reasoning on top of another, this pattern now also starts to take on the flavour of special pleading. Step 3: I am then no longer under any professional or moral obligation to listen to pretty much anything that person has to say. And I will not let this stop me from using my influence to prevent this person from having a career in the company where I work.