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Or, and here is a crazy idea, maybe they use a dedicated security chip to improve isolation and achieve better security? Don't know about apple, but the AMD se

by zibzab 5y ago

Or, and here is a crazy idea, maybe they use a dedicated security chip to improve isolation and achieve better security? Don't know about apple, but the AMD security firmware has been reverse engineered and no backdoors have so far been found. https://github.com/PSPReverse/PSPTool https://github.com/PSPReverse/PSPTool

dTal 5y ago
Security from whom?
- nonrandomstring 5y ago
  Good to see people starting to ask the right questions; (see Snowden: "Permanent Record", Farnell: "Digital Vegan", Anderson: "Security Engineering") - Security for who? Security from whom? Security to what end? There is no such thing as "bare security". No tide that raises all ships. "Security" is now a constant sum game. Your security is my insecurity.
OldTimeCoffee 5y ago
Yes, but then you can probe the pins and MITM, like you can with an external TPM chip. (See something like the TPM Genie) It's internal because it's more secure that way.
- zibzab 5y ago
  These are internal soc components, for this very reason. Not sure if we are agreeing or not...
  - OldTimeCoffee 5y ago
    I read 'dedicated security chip' as something akin to an external chip like a TPM chip as opposed to dedicated transistors in the CPU die (which is more secure). So it sounds like we're agreeing.
mhh__ 5y ago
The Intel source code was basically leaked for a bunch of their firmware and nothing particularly interesting got out.
- pdimitar 5y ago
  Any links? Interested to read more about it.
  - mhh__ 5y ago
    It did the rounds on here when it happened
- cruelty2 5y ago
- boppo1 5y ago
  Sure, but those of us paranoid about ME can't help but wonder if that was savvy PR.
southerntofu 5y ago
> maybe they use a dedicated security chip to improve isolation and achieve better security? I call bullshit on this one. Security through obscurity is not a feature. If you want to have a dedicated security chip protecting the users, we need to have all schematics and source code to ensure it's safe and adapt it to specific use-cases. Ideally, that security processor would be physically separate from the usual hardware and operating on specific data lanes. Just like secure smartphone designs don't give the modem hardware access to all phone memory. That the "security chip" is bundled with the CPU/chipset and answers to undocumented (secret?) x86 instructions means to my understanding that it's impossible (unless you're reverse-engineering the computer at the hardware level) to understand/restrict whatever it's doing. I mean i find it funny that many of us are running Minix without even knowing it, making it one of the most popular OS on the planet. And i'm glad some security researchers figured out how to disable Intel ME completely via some undocumented instructions. But i would certainly feel safer and more in control if i could know/inspect wtf hardware is doing inside my machine. I would certainly trust a free-hardware CPU without a security chip more than a modern Intel/AMD CPU any day of the week. Some previous related discussions on undocumented hardware: - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28977175 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28977175 OK Lenovo: we need to talk (october 2021) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28374523 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28374523 It's time for Operating Systems to Rediscover hardware Usenix keynote (august 2021)
- readams 5y ago
  I think you may be confused about what "security through obscurity" means. The security from these coprocessors is not from obscurity but is part of the design.
  - southerntofu 5y ago
    I like that we can disable Intel ME entirely via undocumented instructions. The fact that whether it's running at all and whatever computation is running depends on hiding certain x86 instructions and the code/memory of the security module is what i refer to "security by obscurity". If everything is taken into the design, great! Just open up the design and let us check. Also, if we can't change/upgrade the firmware without cooperation from Intel and motherboard manufacturers, how are we supposed to operate such hardware after Intel/others claims EOL? Or after those corporations die? I'm not exactly a fan of hardware tokens like Yubikeys but at the very least the design is clear/open. You know the protocol and can probe things around. Those things i don't call security by obscurity (unless your threat model involves someone doing electronics RE on your key). And if a flaw is found with the design, "just" get a new key no need to throw away your entire motherboard. (I still find environmental waste to be a major problem with hardware tokens but that's a discussion for another day)

by zibzab 5y ago

dTal 5y ago

Security from whom?

nonrandomstring 5y ago
Good to see people starting to ask the right questions; (see Snowden: "Permanent Record", Farnell: "Digital Vegan", Anderson: "Security Engineering") - Security for who? Security from whom? Security to what end? There is no such thing as "bare security". No tide that raises all ships. "Security" is now a constant sum game. Your security is my insecurity.

OldTimeCoffee 5y ago

Yes, but then you can probe the pins and MITM, like you can with an external TPM chip. (See something like the TPM Genie) It's internal because it's more secure that way.

zibzab 5y ago
These are internal soc components, for this very reason. Not sure if we are agreeing or not...
- OldTimeCoffee 5y ago
  I read 'dedicated security chip' as something akin to an external chip like a TPM chip as opposed to dedicated transistors in the CPU die (which is more secure). So it sounds like we're agreeing.

mhh__ 5y ago

The Intel source code was basically leaked for a bunch of their firmware and nothing particularly interesting got out.

pdimitar 5y ago
Any links? Interested to read more about it.
- mhh__ 5y ago
  It did the rounds on here when it happened
cruelty2 5y ago
boppo1 5y ago
Sure, but those of us paranoid about ME can't help but wonder if that was savvy PR.

southerntofu 5y ago

> maybe they use a dedicated security chip to improve isolation and achieve better security? I call bullshit on this one. Security through obscurity is not a feature. If you want to have a dedicated security chip protecting the users, we need to have all schematics and source code to ensure it's safe and adapt it to specific use-cases. Ideally, that security processor would be physically separate from the usual hardware and operating on specific data lanes. Just like secure smartphone designs don't give the modem hardware access to all phone memory. That the "security chip" is bundled with the CPU/chipset and answers to undocumented (secret?) x86 instructions means to my understanding that it's impossible (unless you're reverse-engineering the computer at the hardware level) to understand/restrict whatever it's doing. I mean i find it funny that many of us are running Minix without even knowing it, making it one of the most popular OS on the planet. And i'm glad some security researchers figured out how to disable Intel ME completely via some undocumented instructions. But i would certainly feel safer and more in control if i could know/inspect wtf hardware is doing inside my machine. I would certainly trust a free-hardware CPU without a security chip more than a modern Intel/AMD CPU any day of the week. Some previous related discussions on undocumented hardware: - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28977175 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28977175 OK Lenovo: we need to talk (october 2021) - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28374523 https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=28374523 It's time for Operating Systems to Rediscover hardware Usenix keynote (august 2021)

readams 5y ago
I think you may be confused about what "security through obscurity" means. The security from these coprocessors is not from obscurity but is part of the design.
- southerntofu 5y ago
  I like that we can disable Intel ME entirely via undocumented instructions. The fact that whether it's running at all and whatever computation is running depends on hiding certain x86 instructions and the code/memory of the security module is what i refer to "security by obscurity". If everything is taken into the design, great! Just open up the design and let us check. Also, if we can't change/upgrade the firmware without cooperation from Intel and motherboard manufacturers, how are we supposed to operate such hardware after Intel/others claims EOL? Or after those corporations die? I'm not exactly a fan of hardware tokens like Yubikeys but at the very least the design is clear/open. You know the protocol and can probe things around. Those things i don't call security by obscurity (unless your threat model involves someone doing electronics RE on your key). And if a flaw is found with the design, "just" get a new key no need to throw away your entire motherboard. (I still find environmental waste to be a major problem with hardware tokens but that's a discussion for another day)