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Related: can anyone on HN explain which of those (matrix, signal, telegram, whatsapp) is the "safest" in terms of privacy and the technical reasons why?
by cardosof 5y ago
Related: can anyone on HN explain which of those (matrix, signal, telegram, whatsapp) is the "safest" in terms of privacy and the technical reasons why?
- sdkjglagjg 5y agoMatrix: Federated chat E2E encrypted for 1-1 chats and possible E2E on group chats. Cares about user freedom and encourages writing software and clients to integrate with Matrix. Possibly it's super private but it doesn't emphasize privacy that much. Signal: E2E encrypted with an emphasis on being super secure. Uses proven crypto techniques and doesn't allow unencrypted messaging I think. Does not allow and third party clients or integrations in the name of security, which does mean a restriction on user freedom. Telegram: Not E2E encrypted by default. Has an option for encrypted 1-1 chat, but otherwise everything is readable by the Telegram admins. Uses a homegrown encryption algorithm criticized by security researchers, but not known to be broken. Whatsapp: It's owned by Facebook do I need to say more.
- makeworld 5y agoSignal is open source and well established. The end-to-end encryption has been audited and cannot be disabled. Matrix has e2ee but the overall UX of Matrix is still not really there, and the encryption can have issues where messages are not able to be decrypted. It has been audited and is open source. With Matrix you have more freedom because you can run your own server, but personally I would pick Signal since there is less chance of messing things up, for example accidentally having an un-encrypted chat. Telegram does not do encrypted chats by default and has a history of implementing their own poor encryption. The Telegram server is closed source. WhatsApp has good encryption, the same as Signal, enabled for all chats. But it is closed source.
- stereoradonc 5y agoThats the usual response. Privacy (and e2EE) depends on threat model and business model. WhatsApp depends on FB (nee' Meta) for sustenance, and it's hard to believe that they will keep their paws off the sweet data nectar. Signal is bankrolled by state agencies and millionaires. MobileCoin adds little more distrust (it's like the Brave model of browser). Telegram doesn't have a visible model of selling user content. Signal copied everything from Telegram's features- namely the "secret chats" that don't sync between devices and disappear after a while (depending on the set time). Nothing else. Signal's UI is washed out and the only "innovation" they could bring was the change in the size of emoji.
- SecurityLagoon 5y agoSignal is opensource-ish. The fact you can't compile the code and federate with the main Signal network means having some version of source online is mostly meaningless. They proved this when they developed the crypto functionality behind everyone's back with no commits to the public source code for months. Who is to know if they are really running the source code they publish? Matrix is the only one where you can be sure that the source code matches what you are running on both the client and (your) server.
- lmm 5y agoMatrix is the only one of those that is fully open source in a meaningful way (i.e. it's practical to actually patch your client and use it on the network) and has identities that aren't tied to phone numbers, both things that should be absolutely bare minimum for anyone taking privacy seriously. All of them use broadly similar E2EE protocols from the same cryptographic lineage (except possibly Telegram who have a history of making false claims about their encryption protocols). The Signal/WhatsApp implementation feels a bit more mature than Matrix's. I don't feel super great about any of them, but I'd absolutely pick Matrix over any of the others.
- smoldesu 5y agoMore or less my thoughts on the matter. Matrix is by no means perfect (or even great), but it's a step up from XMPP/OMEMO in user experience and that's really what matters at the end of the day. If you require privacy and security at all costs, Matrix is your best option. The issue is that for everyone else, it's not a particularly attractive platform yet, and likely won't be until they revise their attestation protocol.
- AnonC 5y agoPrivacy from whom? If you’re looking for privacy from other users on the platform, Signal and WhatsApp fail miserably because everyone else in the groups you’re in would get your phone number. In Telegram the default is not to expose your phone number to others. If it’s privacy from the platform operators, then Telegram loses because it stores all normal chats in plain text on its servers (though that makes searching a great experience). Signal, to a great extent, and WhatsApp to a lesser extent, try to avoid storing information about your use of the platform. But they do maintain some metadata until the time you delete your account. All the above fail on the phone number requirement to sign up. They’re also centralized platforms depending on the benevolence of one team or company. Matrix is a mix here. It allows you to sign up without revealing your phone number. If you choose to use end-to-end encryption, then all your chats would be encrypted (like in Signal or WhatsApp, where this is the default). But Matrix also stores metadata about you and your presence. My recommendation would be Matrix because you’re not tied to one provider (you can self host it and connect with other Matrix instances, if you wish). The client UI and UX are lacking, but I believe this has a better future on privacy than Signal (with the addition of non-chat features like Mobilecoin).
- deleted 5y ago[deleted]
- danShumway 5y agoI'll attempt to give an answer to this, but only if other people promise to correct the mistakes I make, I am not a security expert and you should not trust my opinion without looking into things more. Short version: - If you absolutely need your messages to be private, use Signal. - If you're looking for a more flexible/future-proof chat app that doesn't have some of Signal's downsides, use Element, but be cautious because it's had some issues in the past. - Use the others if someone forces you to, I guess. Longer version: ---- Signal has been around for a while and is highly vetted by the security industry, and most security professionals I see online swear by it. Signal does a lot of stuff very right and for the most part does an extremely good job of not leaking extra data. Signal has several glaring downsides that do not affect its overall security, but that might be dealbreakers for some people: - it requires a phone number to sign up - very glaringly, it leaks to other contacts on your phone who are already using Signal that you've joined (they'll get a notification in Signal that you installed the app). - it's extremely centralized, which Moxie (the creator) lists as an upside because it allows faster iteration and simplifies some problems like key sharing, but which many people see as a downside for a lot of reasons, including that it makes it harder to fix problems that Moxie isn't interested in prioritizing (such as requiring phone numbers or leaking that you've joined to contacts). Signal is a narrow application trying to solve a narrow problem, secure text messages. It is highly secure for that use case, and difficult to use outside of that use-case. It also has some questionable choices about privacy in regards to user identity around signup, and questionable choices around things like alias accounts. But again, Signal isn't really trying to solve those problems. ---- Element/Matrix is trying to solve those problems. In theory, Element/Matrix is a better choice than Signal; but theory isn't the same as practice. In practice, Element is trying to do something much harder than Signal is doing, (decentralized end-to-end encryption), and Element is a much newer app undergoing a lot more active development, which makes it harder to trust. Element has had issues in the past with leaking data and vulnerabilities. Unlike with Signal, it is possible to make unencrypted rooms in Element (Signal makes this a bit harder unless one of your contacts is using SMS text messaging). Signal tends to be really obsessive about not leaking any contextual information around things like stickers, basically no HTTP requests to anyone other than Signal's servers, and a lot of those HTTP requests get masked and obfuscated in really smart ways. Element sometimes messes up in this area. Element is also just flat-out bigger than Signal in terms of what functionality it's trying to achieve, which makes it more complicated. All of that makes it harder to trust Element for really, really important communication at this time. On the other hand, Element is decentralized and is working on some privacy tools including P2P communication that Signal is kind of ignoring because Moxie likes his server. Element might occasionally leak information in a bad request, but it doesn't require users to give their phone number to join. It is attempting to solve problems around private communication that Signal is not interested in solving and that likely will not be interested in solving for some time if ever. Certainly if you are looking for a chat app in the neighborhood of Discord, or you care about having multiple identities online, or if you care about self-hosting, Signal is not going to work for you, it cannot handle those use cases -- it's not designed to do so. Element has the downside of being a bigger application, but it also has the upside of being a bigger application, meaning that it's a good way of unifying a lot of different chat needs into a single interface with pretty consistent security guarantees across all of them. And that turns out to be really good for adoption. There is a strong benefit to keeping apps small, but as Moxie himself would say, UX also matters with getting people to use encrypted apps -- and being able to seamlessly jump between public chat rooms and private end-to-end encrypted rooms is a big usability win. ---- My take: I use Element whenever possible for chats that I would like to be private but where it wouldn't be the end of the world if they leaked, and for default chats that I don't particularly care about. I am slowly looking to turn it into a Discord replacement for closed communities including family chats; this is something that frankly isn't possible on Signal. However, for a nontrivial amount of one-on-one communication, and on any topic where I desperately needed privacy, I would rely on Signal. It's easier for people to use because it's a much simpler, smaller product, and frankly I trust Signal's reliability and security more than I trust Element's. It's also easier to onboard friends and family members who are texting with me over the phone and who already know my number onto Signal because it's a drop-in replacement for their SMS. I don't have to stop using Signal just because someone in my family is on SMS (although note that in that case Signal offers very little to any encryption benefits for those conversations at all). My long-term hope is to move to Element for everything, and I think Element will likely get to the point where I can confidently do that. I don't think that Signal is the future of encryption, I just think it's the best tool on the market right now. I also don't think Element is necessarily insecure right now, I just don't know for certain that it is secure and I'm waiting to see its security validated more. At least, I'm not as confident about it as I am about Signal, and I find that Signal is a particularly good SMS replacement at this point in time. My feeling is that between Element and Signal, most chat needs should be covered including stuff like video calls, screen-shares, etc... so outside of existing user pressure, I really don't see the need to even look at or evaluate the other ones beyond "they're like Element but less flexible/future-proof/decentralized" or "they're like Signal but less trustworthy." I would also include stuff like email in that assessment. I use email because of network effects but I'm slowly moving away from it for everything else. Realistically if the network effects didn't exist there would be no reason to ever try to send secure information over email, and there's little to no need to try and build encryption on top of it (insert many links to why PGP encrypted emails are foot guns), because outside of network effects almost anything you can do with email you can also do with either Signal or Element. Signal has obviously better privacy and (frankly) Element has better decentralization given the current spam situation and the industry consolidation that email has seen over time. So my advice is use Signal/Element and ignore the rest unless you have friends/family/industry pressures to use the others. Balance between Signal/Element based on what your specific priorities are and how much the limitations of each bother you.
- 2Gkashmiri 5y agowhatsapp/signal/telegram REQUIRE a mobile number to get started. this is a no go from the start for many people, including me personally. i don't care if my chats are e2e if the people after me know WHO i am talking to. the identity is the message and it fails in that test. Second, matrix allows you to set up your own server where YOU allow who comes in, who stays and who talks to other servers, kinda like your own island. none of the others allow that, they are centralized to the core. "signal inc" might not tell the police what you typed but they will tell them when did you log in, how long were you typing and maybe who you were talking to. as i said, that is a big problem because if the police are asking this much about you, they don't care what you said or not. matrix, well you are the owner of the server if you choose so you get to decide. signal calls itself "open source" but its not really "free software". the same "open source vs free software" comes up. what i think signal is "source open" and not much. you can't set up your own server, your own client, they are selling centralization as a feature which its not. email has proved otherwise for decades. matrix is what is email.
- mr_johnson22 5y agoSelf-hosted Matrix servers still incur the risk of leaking metadata to whatever other servers it federates with (which of course isn't a problem if you don't federate, but that kind of defeats the purpose of using Matrix in the first place). IMO that's an acceptable tradeoff for achieving decentralization without making the protocol overly complex (AIUI something like Signal's "sealed sender" system doesn't work in a decentralized environment)...but it still feels like a nagging threat that needs a proper solution eventually.
- GauntletWizard 5y agoThe safest instant messenger is no instant messenger. No instant messenger cannot leak your chats, cannot reveal your presence information, cannot install viruses on your phone. Practicality and function are always a tradeoff for privacy, though.
- junon 5y agoWhat's your threat model? Who do you care about protecting against? What is the risk of the information you're communicating being leaked?
- cardosof 5y agoI don't know much about security. I'm asking from a purely theoretical perspective, so you could imagine a worst case scenario - for example, Alice wants to use her phone to securely chat with Bob about resisting the dictatorship they're living in or something like that. Or they need to trade industry secrets that are in their phones.
- junon 5y agoSo disclaiming this with the warning that I haven't really kept myself too up to date the last year or two with the latest in private communications so please correct me if I'm wrong or outdated about any of this. Also remember that privacy and security are never a silver bullet, and anyone claiming that something is, is probably not being genuine about their intentions. Privacy and security are about making things harder, not impossible - how difficult is entirely based on what you're trying to protect, and from who or whom you're trying to protect it. There are no perfect systems or completely safe platforms/locations/etc. Right, with that out of the way. In this case, tapping is less of a concern with anything E2EE encrypted and using proper cryptography suites - which is usually a given these days with most privacy-focused applications. Signal, Matrix, and Briar come to mind. But "censorship resistance" being the key term here, means that the infrastructure used to actually send the messages cannot be tampered with or otherwise taken offline. You want to make sure that automatic updates can't be pushed to the app by a third party. App signing helps but making sure that automatic updates are off and that you update frequently enough and ensuring that each release is properly released by the author is important. There are other modes where this still isn't bulletproof (system OTA update with a backdoor, app author is compromised, etc.) but these are typically not within your model. Open source projects tend to be the defacto if you really care about good intentions since it allows everyone (including you, but more importantly, independent auditors and people who are experts at looking at this stuff) to look at the code and assess that it works as described. Telegram is not censorship resistant[0], and while it's E2EE in secret chats, it's not E2EE by default. This is a common misconception by a lot of people. Signal by design isn't censorship resistant but they do a lot of work to make it effectively so (e.g. [1]) - when they're not fighting amongst themselves[2]. Signal is also quite aggressive when it comes to antiestablishment sentiments historically, which depending on where you are can work against you or be in conflict with your goals[3]. Matrix is a decent enough protocol at a higher level, though admittedly I'm not super acquainted with its internals. I do use it quite a bit, however, and generally like it, but it's very unapproachable to all but the savvier tech enthusiasts, and has a pretty young ecosystem when it comes to clients, phones, etc. It's also wildly underused compared to other platforms. I myself am a long time IRC user and get very confused with Matrix at times. Finally there's Briar[4], which I've not used but it was mentioned not too long ago here on HN. It can use other means of communication on phones to send messages securely. As always, Tor can be a great way to obfuscate your internet usage and in some cases even bypass state-enacted blockages of certain sites, but it's not foolproof and can actually make things worse[5] if you don't understand how it works and when not to use it. Make sure to research first. By the way, threat modeling[6] can be fun and is applicable to a lot of situations, including your own personal safety. The five functions[7] are a fun place to start. Read up on it if you want! Hope this is a decent enough overview! [0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_censorship_of_Telegram_Messenger https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Government_censorship_of_Teleg... [1] https://reclaimthenet.org/signal-offers-workarounds-for-iranian-users-blocked-from-using-the-app/ https://reclaimthenet.org/signal-offers-workarounds-for-iran... [2] https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/63 https://github.com/net4people/bbs/issues/63 [3] https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2021/05/i-have-lot-say-about-signal%E2%80%99s-cellebrite-hack https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2021/05/i-have-lot-say-ab... [4] https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/ https://briarproject.org/how-it-works/ [5] https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/ https://support.torproject.org/faq/staying-anonymous/ [6] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Threat_model [7] https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/online-learning/five-functions https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/online-learning/five-fun...
- ffpip 5y agoWhatsApp has the largest user base, so most of your friends will be on it. Chats are end-to-end encrypted, but most of them are backed up unencrypted into iCloud and Gdrive. It is also owned by Facebook, which means it can access all your metadata and contacts. Signal is also end-to-end encrypted, but suffers from a lack of users and their apps don't have a great UI. Sync is also not that great, and backups are terrible. Telegram is the best app feature-wise (stickers, multi-device, bots, instant sync, unlimited storage) but chats are not end to end encrypted by default. Their apps are native on all platforms, and are very smooth. Element (a matrix client) has e2ee chats, but the UI is not that great, and the number of users seem to be lower than Signal.
- CamelRocketFish 5y agoSignal’s UI has improved over the last couple of years. I’d suggest checking it out if you haven’t used it recently. The UI seems to be constantly improving (unlike whatsapp which doesn’t seem to have received a UI improvement in a very long time - no reactions in 2022).
- ffpip 5y agoI use Signal every week, it still feels unpolished compared to Telegram or even WhatsApp. Although I must agree with you that it has improved a lot over the last couple of years. FYI, WhatsApp has added Reactions. It is in beta for some users. https://wabetainfo.com/whatsapp-beta-for-android-2-21-25-11-whats-new/ https://wabetainfo.com/whatsapp-beta-for-android-2-21-25-11-...
- CamelRocketFish 5y agoI had no idea about the beta thanks for posting it. I do think whatsapp has a faster experience, I find media loads slower on signal as well as sharing content using the share sheet tends to have a slower upload time (upload has to occur for sharing a link seems strange).
- dathinab 5y agoMatrix is not bound to a phone number and has different design goal then the other three listed. I.e. it's not like a protocol usable by system competing with discord, slack, teams etc. If you ignore matrix in this comparison and only look at phone messaging signal wins by far. If it's about non-phone specific messaging matrix wins by default as the other don't even really compete there.
- SecurityLagoon 5y agoThe use case of Matrix is more to do with the client than the protocol. For example FluffyChat (https://fluffychat.im/ https://fluffychat.im/) is an up and coming client that is designed exactly the compete in the market of the other phone messengers you listed, while the protocol itself is very much more ambitious and multi-function.