4 ms·

Well, in aviation. Not so sure for software engineering.

by FabHK 5y ago

deleted 5y ago
[deleted]
lostlogin 5y ago
The 737 Max attempted pioneering work in this area.
- Veliladon 5y ago
  What do you mean attempted? Boeing successfully slaughtered 346 people with their negligence.
  - SAI_Peregrinus 5y ago
    And they didn't even get any new regulations written that I've seen. The hand wheels for the horizontal stabilizer trim became too hard for average pilots to physically operate if the aircraft is going too fast and out of trim far enough (even without being outside the safe operating envelope). There was no regulation limiting how much force the trim wheels can need while within the operating envelope. AFAIK, there's still no such regulation. So the "fixed" 737 Max models didn't change the hand wheels, meaning the physical backup in case of a trim runaway might not actually be usable. Yet they certified it without changes, because there's no regulation saying that the safety backup wheels have to be physically usable by average pilots in the event the primary powered system fails!
ipython 5y ago
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Therac-25 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Therac-25
- MaxBarraclough 5y ago
  A small fraction of software developers work on safety-critical software. Safety-critical software is (or at least should be) developed with quite different methodologies, as the cost/benefit assessment is very different regarding development speed against number and nature of defects. If there are lessons written in blood for the development of safety-critical software, they haven't propagated to the wider field of software development. (Disclaimer: I don't work on safety-critical software.)
wongarsu 5y ago
NASA's guidelines are not written in blood, but certainly in lost spacecraft. The most famous is the Mars Climate Orbiter that was lost due to ground system and orbiter using different units of measurement, but that's not the only example [1] 1: https://www.csoonline.com/article/3404528/8-famous-software-bugs-in-space.html https://www.csoonline.com/article/3404528/8-famous-software-...
- greenyoda 5y ago
  > NASA's guidelines are not written in blood I can think of at least three NASA missions that resulted in deaths: Apollo 1[1], and the Challenger[2] and Columbia[3] space shuttles. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_1 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challenger_disaster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challenger_disas... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaste...
  - ncmncm 5y ago
    Only one of those particularly affected guidelines. After, anything that might end up in a pure oxygen atmosphere had to be non-inflammable, and very uncomfortable.

Well, in aviation. Not so sure for software engineering.

by FabHK 5y ago

Well, in aviation. Not so sure for software engineering.

deleted 5y ago

[deleted]

lostlogin 5y ago

The 737 Max attempted pioneering work in this area.

Veliladon 5y ago
What do you mean attempted? Boeing successfully slaughtered 346 people with their negligence.
- SAI_Peregrinus 5y ago
  And they didn't even get any new regulations written that I've seen. The hand wheels for the horizontal stabilizer trim became too hard for average pilots to physically operate if the aircraft is going too fast and out of trim far enough (even without being outside the safe operating envelope). There was no regulation limiting how much force the trim wheels can need while within the operating envelope. AFAIK, there's still no such regulation. So the "fixed" 737 Max models didn't change the hand wheels, meaning the physical backup in case of a trim runaway might not actually be usable. Yet they certified it without changes, because there's no regulation saying that the safety backup wheels have to be physically usable by average pilots in the event the primary powered system fails!

ipython 5y ago

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Therac-25 https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Therac-25

MaxBarraclough 5y ago
A small fraction of software developers work on safety-critical software. Safety-critical software is (or at least should be) developed with quite different methodologies, as the cost/benefit assessment is very different regarding development speed against number and nature of defects. If there are lessons written in blood for the development of safety-critical software, they haven't propagated to the wider field of software development. (Disclaimer: I don't work on safety-critical software.)

wongarsu 5y ago

NASA's guidelines are not written in blood, but certainly in lost spacecraft. The most famous is the Mars Climate Orbiter that was lost due to ground system and orbiter using different units of measurement, but that's not the only example [1] 1: https://www.csoonline.com/article/3404528/8-famous-software-bugs-in-space.html https://www.csoonline.com/article/3404528/8-famous-software-...

greenyoda 5y ago
> NASA's guidelines are not written in blood I can think of at least three NASA missions that resulted in deaths: Apollo 1[1], and the Challenger[2] and Columbia[3] space shuttles. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apollo_1 [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challenger_disaster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Challenger_disas... [3] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaster https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space_Shuttle_Columbia_disaste...
- ncmncm 5y ago
  Only one of those particularly affected guidelines. After, anything that might end up in a pure oxygen atmosphere had to be non-inflammable, and very uncomfortable.